test(e2e): full virtualized build+boot+unlock QEMU harness
Opt-in via LIM_E2E_QEMU=1. Models the whole process on a virtio VM (the Pi's USB-gadget net can't be emulated, so it models the software stack, not the board): builds a LUKS image carrying the real lim initcpio Tor artifacts, boots it in QEMU rootless, lets the real netconf/tor/dropbear/ encryptssh chain publish the onion, delivers the passphrase over Tor, and asserts the boot-ok marker on the serial console. Supports a private offline Tor network via chutney. The pure command builders (config.qemu_argv/kernel_cmdline/ssh_argv, qemu_binary), the env parser, and drift guards that keep build_image.sh aligned with the harness run in the normal suite — no QEMU/root/network. The build stage needs root; harness.py primes sudo up front, keeps the credential warm, and reclaims work-dir ownership on every exit path so the pytest tmp cleanup never trips on root-owned files. QEMU stderr is captured so an early exit is debuggable, and each teardown step is fault-isolated so none masks the real error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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# Virtualized end-to-end Tor unlock harness
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This harness models the **entire** encrypted-image process in a virtual
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machine: it builds a LUKS image carrying the real `lim` Tor-in-initramfs
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artifacts, boots it in QEMU, lets the real `netconf → tor → dropbear →
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encryptssh` chain run in early userspace, then unlocks the root over Tor and
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proves the real system booted.
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It complements the lightweight, always-rootless
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[`test_tor_unlock_e2e.py`](../test_tor_unlock_e2e.py): that one round-trips a
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passphrase through Tor against a dropbear *stand-in*; this one runs the real
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dropbear, real cryptsetup, real mkinitcpio initramfs, and a real tor daemon in
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a booted machine.
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## Why a virtio machine and not an emulated Raspberry Pi
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QEMU's `raspi3b`/`raspi4b` machines do not emulate the Pi's USB-gadget
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Ethernet — exactly the network path the Pi images use in the initramfs
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(`g_ether`/`smsc95xx`/`lan78xx`). Without early networking there is no Tor and
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no unlock, so emulating the literal board is pointless here. Instead we
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reproduce the same *software stack* (same HOOKS chain, same tor hook, same
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torrc and onion keys) on a QEMU-friendly `virt`/`q35` machine with
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`virtio-net`. The only deltas from a real Pi image are the NIC driver and the
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CPU architecture.
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## Stages
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| Stage | File | Privilege |
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|---|---|---|
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| Build encrypted image | `build_image.sh` | **root** (loop, cryptsetup, chroot) |
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| Tor network | `tor_net.py` | rootless |
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| Boot + unlock | `boot_unlock.py` | rootless (QEMU user-mode net) |
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| Orchestration | `harness.py` | mixed (uses `sudo` for the build only) |
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| Pure command builders | `config.py` | none — unit-tested offline |
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## Keeping the host rootless
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Only `build_image.sh` needs root (there is no rootless dm-crypt). To keep your
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host unprivileged, run the whole harness **inside a throwaway VM** that has
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`/dev/kvm`, and drive it from there. QEMU itself, the tor client and the unlock
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are rootless: user-mode networking (`-netdev user`) needs no tap device, and a
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Tor onion service needs no inbound port forward (its rendezvous is outbound
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from both ends).
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When run directly on the host, `harness.py` invokes the build via `sudo -E`
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and then `chown`s the artifacts back so rootless QEMU can read them.
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## Requirements
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- `qemu-system-x86_64` (or `-aarch64` for `LIM_E2E_ARCH=aarch64`)
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- `arch-install-scripts` (`pacstrap`, `arch-chroot`)
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- `cryptsetup`, `mkinitcpio`, `tor`, `openssh`, `ncat` (SOCKS5 ProxyCommand)
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- Network access to the public Tor network, **or** `chutney` for a private one
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- `/dev/kvm` recommended (TCG works but is slow; aarch64-on-x86 is always TCG)
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## Running
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```bash
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# Public Tor network (simplest; non-deterministic, needs internet):
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LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
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# Private, offline, deterministic Tor network via chutney:
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git clone https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/chutney
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CHUTNEY_PATH=$PWD/chutney LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 \
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pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
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```
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Environment knobs: `LIM_E2E_ARCH` (`x86_64` default, or `aarch64`),
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`CHUTNEY_PATH` (enables the private network), `CHUTNEY_PATH` unset → public.
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## Determinism note (chutney)
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For a fully private loop the **guest image** must trust the same authorities as
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the host client. `ChutneyNetwork.test_network_conf()` distils the
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`TestingTorNetwork`/`DirAuthority` lines (rewriting `127.0.0.1` to the QEMU
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user-net host alias `10.0.2.2`) into a file, which `build_image.sh` appends to
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the baked-in torrc via `TOR_TEST_NETWORK_CONF`. The offline onion key
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generation is unaffected — it never touches the network either way.
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## What runs in CI without any of this
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The pure logic (`config.py`, the env parser, the chutney torrc parsing) and the
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drift guards that keep `build_image.sh` aligned with what the harness expects
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are covered by [`test_qemu_harness_unit.py`](../test_qemu_harness_unit.py),
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which runs in the normal `pytest` suite — no QEMU, root, or network.
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