test(e2e): rootless Tor onion unlock end-to-end test
Opt-in via LIM_E2E_TOR=1. Generates the v3 onion keys offline exactly as the image build does, stands up a real Tor onion service from a torrc mirroring the baked-in one, and delivers a passphrase through Tor to a dropbear stand-in — asserting it arrives and the endpoint "unlocks". Needs the real tor binary and network, so it is skipped otherwise; the offline keygen and production-flag guard run without network. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
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tests/e2e/__init__.py
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tests/e2e/__init__.py
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tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py
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tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py
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"""End-to-end test of the Tor onion LUKS-unlock path (rootless).
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It reproduces the operator-visible half of the decryption process that the
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"tor" mkinitcpio hook drives at boot:
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1. generate the v3 onion keys offline (as lim.image.tor does in the chroot),
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2. start a real Tor onion service from a torrc mirroring the baked-in one,
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forwarding the virtual port 22 to a local dropbear stand-in,
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3. connect to the .onion address through Tor and deliver the passphrase,
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4. assert the passphrase reached the unlock endpoint and it "unlocked".
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The physical flashing half (loop device, cryptsetup, mount, chroot,
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mkinitcpio) needs root and is out of scope here by design.
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Requires the real `tor` binary and live Tor network access, so it is
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opt-in and skipped unless LIM_E2E_TOR=1:
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LIM_E2E_TOR=1 pytest tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py -v
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"""
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import os
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import shutil
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import time
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import pytest
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from lim.image import tor as tor_module
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from tests.e2e import tor_harness
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(
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os.environ.get("LIM_E2E_TOR") != "1" or shutil.which("tor") is None,
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reason="needs LIM_E2E_TOR=1 and the tor binary (live network, slow).",
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)
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PASSPHRASE = b"correct horse battery staple"
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@pytest.fixture
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def workdir(tmp_path):
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(tmp_path / "onion").mkdir()
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(tmp_path / "data").mkdir()
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return tmp_path
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def test_offline_keygen_matches_production_flags():
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"""Guard: the harness keygen mirrors the flags production actually runs."""
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script = tor_module._KEYGEN_SCRIPT
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assert "--DisableNetwork 1" in script
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assert "HiddenServicePort" in script
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assert "22 127.0.0.1:22" in script
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assert "--SocksPort 0" in script
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def test_onion_keygen_is_deterministic_and_offline(workdir):
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"""Keys generate without network and the .onion address is stable."""
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address = tor_harness.generate_onion_keys(
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workdir / "onion", workdir / "data"
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)
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assert address.endswith(".onion")
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assert len(address) == len("v" * 56) + len(".onion") # v3 = 56 base32 chars
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for name in ("hs_ed25519_secret_key", "hs_ed25519_public_key", "hostname"):
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assert (workdir / "onion" / name).is_file()
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def test_unlock_passphrase_travels_over_onion(workdir):
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"""Full rootless round-trip: client -> Tor -> onion -> dropbear stand-in."""
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onion_dir = workdir / "onion"
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data_dir = workdir / "data"
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onion_address = tor_harness.generate_onion_keys(onion_dir, data_dir)
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backend_port = tor_harness.free_port()
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socks_port = tor_harness.free_port()
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torrc = workdir / "torrc"
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log_path = workdir / "tor.log"
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tor_harness.write_test_torrc(torrc, data_dir, onion_dir, backend_port)
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dropbear = tor_harness.FakeDropbear(backend_port)
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dropbear.start()
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service = tor_harness.start_onion_service(torrc, socks_port, log_path)
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try:
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tor_harness.wait_bootstrapped(log_path, service)
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# Onion descriptors need a moment to publish after bootstrap; retry.
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last_error = None
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for _ in range(5):
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try:
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stream = tor_harness.socks5_connect(socks_port, onion_address, 22)
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break
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except (OSError, RuntimeError) as exc:
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last_error = exc
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time.sleep(2)
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else:
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pytest.fail(f"Could not reach {onion_address} via Tor: {last_error}")
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with stream:
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stream.sendall(PASSPHRASE + b"\n")
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reply = stream.recv(64)
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finally:
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service.terminate()
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service.wait(timeout=15)
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dropbear.stop()
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assert reply.strip() == b"UNLOCKED"
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assert dropbear.received == PASSPHRASE
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tests/e2e/tor_harness.py
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tests/e2e/tor_harness.py
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"""Rootless helpers to stand up a real Tor onion service and reach it.
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These reproduce, without root/block-devices/chroot, what the "tor"
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mkinitcpio hook does at LUKS-decryption time: generate v3 onion keys
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offline, run a real Tor onion service that forwards the virtual port 22
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to a local "dropbear", and let a client reach that service through Tor.
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"""
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import socket
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import struct
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import subprocess
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import threading
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import time
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from pathlib import Path
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# Matches lim.image.tor._KEYGEN_SCRIPT: an empty -f torrc keeps the host's
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# /etc/tor/torrc out of the run, --DisableNetwork 1 makes the keys appear
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# without ever touching the network.
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KEYGEN_TIMEOUT = 30
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BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT = 180
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ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 90
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def free_port() -> int:
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with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
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sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
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return sock.getsockname()[1]
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def generate_onion_keys(onion_dir: Path, data_dir: Path) -> str:
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"""Create v3 onion keys offline; return the .onion hostname.
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Mirrors lim.image.tor._KEYGEN_SCRIPT, run directly on the host instead
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of inside the image chroot (the tor invocation is identical).
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"""
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onion_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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onion_dir.chmod(0o700)
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empty_torrc = data_dir.parent / "keygen-torrc"
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empty_torrc.write_text("")
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process = subprocess.Popen(
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[
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"tor", "-f", str(empty_torrc), "--DisableNetwork", "1",
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"--DataDirectory", str(data_dir),
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"--HiddenServiceDir", str(onion_dir),
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"--HiddenServicePort", "22 127.0.0.1:22",
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"--SocksPort", "0", "--RunAsDaemon", "0", "--Log", "notice stderr",
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],
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stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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)
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hostname = onion_dir / "hostname"
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try:
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deadline = time.monotonic() + KEYGEN_TIMEOUT
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while time.monotonic() < deadline:
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if hostname.is_file() and hostname.read_text().strip():
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break
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time.sleep(0.5)
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finally:
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process.terminate()
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process.wait(timeout=10)
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if not (hostname.is_file() and hostname.read_text().strip()):
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raise RuntimeError("Offline onion key generation produced no hostname.")
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return hostname.read_text().strip()
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def start_onion_service(
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torrc_path: Path, socks_port: int, log_path: Path
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) -> subprocess.Popen:
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"""Start Tor with the given torrc (service side) plus a SOCKS port.
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The torrc carries the HiddenServiceDir/HiddenServicePort just like the
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baked-in image torrc; --SocksPort lets the same instance also act as the
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client's entry point so the test needs only one bootstrap.
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"""
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return subprocess.Popen(
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[
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"tor", "-f", str(torrc_path),
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"--SocksPort", str(socks_port),
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"--Log", f"notice file {log_path}",
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],
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stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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)
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def wait_bootstrapped(log_path: Path, process: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
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deadline = time.monotonic() + BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT
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while time.monotonic() < deadline:
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if process.poll() is not None:
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raise RuntimeError(f"Tor exited early (code {process.returncode}).")
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if log_path.is_file() and "Bootstrapped 100%" in log_path.read_text():
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return
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time.sleep(1)
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raise RuntimeError("Tor did not bootstrap in time.")
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def _socks5_handshake(sock: socket.socket, onion_host: str, onion_port: int) -> None:
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sock.sendall(b"\x05\x01\x00") # VER, 1 method, no-auth
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if sock.recv(2) != b"\x05\x00":
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raise RuntimeError("SOCKS5 handshake rejected.")
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host = onion_host.encode()
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request = (
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b"\x05\x01\x00\x03"
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+ bytes([len(host)]) + host
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+ struct.pack(">H", onion_port)
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)
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sock.settimeout(ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
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sock.sendall(request)
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header = sock.recv(4)
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if len(header) < 2 or header[1] != 0x00:
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code = header[1] if len(header) >= 2 else -1
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raise RuntimeError(f"SOCKS5 CONNECT failed (reply code {code}).")
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# Drain the bound-address tail so the stream starts at real payload.
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atyp = header[3]
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tail = {0x01: 4, 0x04: 16}.get(atyp)
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if tail is None: # domain name
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tail = sock.recv(1)[0]
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sock.recv(tail + 2)
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def socks5_connect(socks_port: int, onion_host: str, onion_port: int) -> socket.socket:
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"""Open a stream to onion_host:onion_port through Tor's SOCKS5 proxy."""
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sock = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", socks_port), timeout=30)
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try:
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_socks5_handshake(sock, onion_host, onion_port)
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except (OSError, RuntimeError):
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sock.close()
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raise
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return sock
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class FakeDropbear:
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r"""Stand-in for the initramfs dropbear+cryptsetup unlock endpoint.
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Accepts one connection on 127.0.0.1:<port>, reads a passphrase line, and
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replies "UNLOCKED\n" — the observable proof that a passphrase delivered
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over the onion connection reached the unlock shell.
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"""
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def __init__(self, port: int) -> None:
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self.port = port
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self.received: bytes | None = None
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self._server = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
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self._server.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
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self._server.bind(("127.0.0.1", port))
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self._server.listen(1)
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self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._serve, daemon=True)
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def start(self) -> None:
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self._thread.start()
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def _serve(self) -> None:
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try:
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self._server.settimeout(BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT + ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
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conn, _ = self._server.accept()
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with conn:
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conn.settimeout(ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
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self.received = conn.recv(4096).strip()
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conn.sendall(b"UNLOCKED\n")
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except OSError:
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pass
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def stop(self) -> None:
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self._server.close()
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self._thread.join(timeout=5)
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def write_test_torrc(path: Path, data_dir: Path, onion_dir: Path, backend_port: int) -> None:
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"""Write a torrc mirroring the baked-in one, with test-writable paths.
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The virtual onion port stays 22 (as in production); only the loopback
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backend and the data/key directories move to rootless temp locations.
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"""
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path.write_text(
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f"DataDirectory {data_dir}\n"
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f"HiddenServiceDir {onion_dir}\n"
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f"HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:{backend_port}\n"
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"SocksPort 0\n"
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)
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