feat(image): remote LUKS unlock via a Tor onion service in the initramfs
Encrypted image setups can now bake a Tor onion service into the initramfs so the dropbear unlock shell stays reachable behind NAT or a dynamic IP. When the user opts in, configure_encryption installs tor + busybox, drops the mkinitcpio hooks (ordered `netconf tor dropbear encryptssh`), generates the v3 onion keys offline in the image chroot, and prints the stable .onion address. Unlock with `torsocks ssh root@<onion-address>`. The runtime hook syncs the clock via NTP first (RTC-less boards boot at 1970, which Tor's consensus checks reject) and starts the onion service pointing at dropbear on 127.0.0.1:22. Hardening baked in from an adversarial review of the shipped path: - cmdline.txt boot path (RPi4-class firmware boot) now sets the same ip=::::<host>:eth0:dhcp net.ifnames=0 params as the boot.txt path, so the initramfs actually gets a network and the onion can publish. - the initramfs bakes in libnss_dns.so.2 so the NTP hostname resolves. - the hook extracts DHCP DNS with sed instead of sourcing the lease files, which would run attacker-controlled DHCP option strings as root pre-boot. - NTP is attempted unconditionally (bounded), not gated on DHCP-provided DNS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
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from lim import catalog, fsutil, packages, runner, ui
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from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
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from lim.image.session import ImageSession, chroot_bash, install_packages
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from lim.image.tor import configure_tor_unlock
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MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_PREFIX = (
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"base udev autodetect microcode modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block"
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@@ -32,9 +33,10 @@ def _configure_mkinitcpio(plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> None:
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fsutil.replace_in_file(
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"BINARIES=()", "BINARIES=(/usr/lib/libgcc_s.so.1)", mkinitcpio_path
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)
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tor_hook = "tor " if plan.tor_unlock else ""
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fsutil.replace_in_file(
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f"HOOKS=({MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_PREFIX} {MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_SUFFIX})",
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f"HOOKS=({MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_PREFIX} sleep netconf dropbear encryptssh "
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f"HOOKS=({MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_PREFIX} sleep netconf {tor_hook}dropbear encryptssh "
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f"{MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_SUFFIX})",
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mkinitcpio_path,
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)
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@@ -90,9 +92,15 @@ def _configure_bootloader(plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, root: Path) ->
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else:
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cmdline_txt_path = session.boot_mount_path / "cmdline.txt"
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ui.info(f"Configuring {cmdline_txt_path}...")
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# Firmware-boot boards (e.g. RPi4 cmdline.txt) need the same early
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# networking as the boot.txt branch, or the initramfs netconf hook
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# brings up no interface and remote unlock (dropbear + tor) is
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# unreachable — the onion never even publishes.
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hostname = (root / "etc/hostname").read_text().strip()
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fsutil.replace_in_file(
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"root=/dev/mmcblk0p2",
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f"{cryptdevice} rootfstype={plan.root_filesystem}",
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f"{cryptdevice} rootfstype={plan.root_filesystem} "
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f"ip=::::{hostname}:eth0:dhcp net.ifnames=0 biosdevname=0",
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cmdline_txt_path,
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)
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ui.info(f"Content of {cmdline_txt_path}:{cmdline_txt_path.read_text()}")
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@@ -112,6 +120,10 @@ def configure_encryption(
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ui.info(f"Adding {authorized_keys} to dropbear...")
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runner.run(["cp", "-v", str(authorized_keys), str(dropbear_root_key_path)], sudo=True)
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if plan.tor_unlock:
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# Hook files and onion keys must exist before mkinitcpio bakes the image.
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configure_tor_unlock(plan, root)
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_configure_mkinitcpio(plan, root)
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_register_encrypted_root(plan, session, root)
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_configure_bootloader(plan, session, root)
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