Split the mkinitcpio-only remote-LUKS-unlock path into an InitramfsBackend
ABC with a get_backend() dispatch, and add the initramfs-tools backend for
Debian / Raspberry Pi OS.
- base.py: six-step backend contract; encryption.py becomes a thin,
distro-neutral sequencer (get_backend by distribution).
- initramfs_tools.py: crypttab `none luks,initramfs`, cmdline rewritten to
root=/dev/mapper + ip=::::host:eth0:dhcp, dropbear-initramfs
authorized_keys, update-initramfs -k all (no build-host uname leak).
- shipped hooks (configuration/initramfs-tools/*): single-hop non-anonymous
onion, libnss DNS baking, sed-not-source DHCP, kill-tor-before-pivot.
- shared offline onion keygen in keygen.py; tor.py removed (logic moved to
mkinitcpio.py).
- raspios added to the apt distro family (session.py, raspberry.py).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Split the rootless Tor e2e skip so the deterministic offline checks (the
real offline onion keygen and the production-flag guard) run whenever the
tor binary is present, while only the live onion round-trip stays gated on
LIM_E2E_TOR=1. The pytest job now installs tor so the keygen — which
validates the exact production keygen path — runs on every push. A separate
continue-on-error tor-network-e2e job exercises the full round-trip without
making the public Tor network a blocking merge gate.
The full QEMU build/boot/unlock e2e still needs root + KVM + Arch tooling
and stays local/opt-in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opt-in via LIM_E2E_QEMU=1. Models the whole process on a virtio VM (the
Pi's USB-gadget net can't be emulated, so it models the software stack,
not the board): builds a LUKS image carrying the real lim initcpio Tor
artifacts, boots it in QEMU rootless, lets the real netconf/tor/dropbear/
encryptssh chain publish the onion, delivers the passphrase over Tor, and
asserts the boot-ok marker on the serial console. Supports a private
offline Tor network via chutney.
The pure command builders (config.qemu_argv/kernel_cmdline/ssh_argv,
qemu_binary), the env parser, and drift guards that keep build_image.sh
aligned with the harness run in the normal suite — no QEMU/root/network.
The build stage needs root; harness.py primes sudo up front, keeps the
credential warm, and reclaims work-dir ownership on every exit path so
the pytest tmp cleanup never trips on root-owned files. QEMU stderr is
captured so an early exit is debuggable, and each teardown step is
fault-isolated so none masks the real error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opt-in via LIM_E2E_TOR=1. Generates the v3 onion keys offline exactly as
the image build does, stands up a real Tor onion service from a torrc
mirroring the baked-in one, and delivers a passphrase through Tor to a
dropbear stand-in — asserting it arrives and the endpoint "unlocks".
Needs the real tor binary and network, so it is skipped otherwise; the
offline keygen and production-flag guard run without network.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encrypted image setups can now bake a Tor onion service into the initramfs
so the dropbear unlock shell stays reachable behind NAT or a dynamic IP.
When the user opts in, configure_encryption installs tor + busybox, drops
the mkinitcpio hooks (ordered `netconf tor dropbear encryptssh`), generates
the v3 onion keys offline in the image chroot, and prints the stable
.onion address. Unlock with `torsocks ssh root@<onion-address>`.
The runtime hook syncs the clock via NTP first (RTC-less boards boot at
1970, which Tor's consensus checks reject) and starts the onion service
pointing at dropbear on 127.0.0.1:22.
Hardening baked in from an adversarial review of the shipped path:
- cmdline.txt boot path (RPi4-class firmware boot) now sets the same
ip=::::<host>:eth0:dhcp net.ifnames=0 params as the boot.txt path, so
the initramfs actually gets a network and the onion can publish.
- the initramfs bakes in libnss_dns.so.2 so the NTP hostname resolves.
- the hook extracts DHCP DNS with sed instead of sourcing the lease files,
which would run attacker-controlled DHCP option strings as root pre-boot.
- NTP is attempted unconditionally (bounded), not gated on DHCP-provided DNS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bash scripts were untestable and duplicated device/LUKS/mount logic;
the lim/ package centralizes it behind one subprocess wrapper and a
YAML image catalog (single point of truth).
BREAKING CHANGE: scripts/*.sh removed. Use `lim --type <cmd>`; new
types mount/umount/single-boot/raid1-boot/lock/unlock/import/export
replace direct script calls. --extra is deprecated and ignored.
- distributions.yml + lim/catalog.py hold the image catalog (PyYAML)
- pytest suite: 102 tests with mocked subprocess (tests/unit) and a
250-line max file-length guard (tests/lint)
- ruff strict (select ALL), GitHub Actions CI, Dependabot; Travis gone
- Makefile: install (symlink ~/.local/bin/lim) and test targets
- fixes over bash: SUDO_USER-aware chown, mmcblk/nvme partition paths,
sha512 checksum support, whole-pipeline failure detection, blkid
UUID fallback for pre-mounted images, conditional fstab seeding for
PARTUUID/LABEL images, clean errors for missing binaries
