feat(cli): numbered selection menus for distributions and versions

Replace the free-text distribution/version prompts with numbered menus via a
shared _choose helper. Name-first resolution keeps typing the name working, so
numeric catalog keys (e.g. arch "4") still select by name, not by position.
Applied to the distribution, arch, manjaro, retropie and raspios choosers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.claude/settings.json

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+{
+  "env": {
+    "GIT_CONFIG_COUNT": "1",
+    "GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0": "commit.gpgsign",
+    "GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0": "false"
+  },
+  "permissions": {
+    "defaultMode": "dontAsk",
+    "ask": [
+      "Bash(git commit)",
+      "Bash(git commit:*)",
+      "Bash(git * commit)",
+      "Bash(git * commit:*)",
+      "Bash(git push)",
+      "Bash(git push:*)",
+      "Bash(git * push)",
+      "Bash(git * push:*)"
+    ]
+  },
+  "sandbox": {
+    "enabled": true,
+    "autoAllowBashIfSandboxed": true,
+    "allowUnsandboxedCommands": false
+  }
+}

.github/FUNDING.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+github: kevinveenbirkenbach
+
+patreon: kevinveenbirkenbach
+
+buy_me_a_coffee: kevinveenbirkenbach
+
+custom: https://s.veen.world/paypaldonate

.github/dependabot.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+version: 2
+updates:
+  - package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
+    directory: "/"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"
+  - package-ecosystem: "pip"
+    directory: "/"
+    schedule:
+      interval: "weekly"

.github/workflows/test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+name: tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+  pull_request:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+jobs:
+  lint:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: astral-sh/ruff-action@v3
+
+  pytest:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      # tor lets the deterministic offline onion-keygen test run (it validates
+      # the real production keygen path); that test needs no network.
+      - run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y tor
+      - run: pip install pytest pyyaml
+      - run: make test
+
+  tor-network-e2e:
+    # The live onion round-trip depends on the public Tor network, so it is
+    # informational (continue-on-error) rather than a blocking merge gate.
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    continue-on-error: true
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y tor
+      - run: pip install pytest pyyaml
+      - run: LIM_E2E_TOR=1 make test-tor PYTHON=python
+
+  qemu-e2e-debian:
+    # Full build -> boot -> LUKS-unlock in QEMU, deterministic via the direct
+    # transport (debootstrap works on Ubuntu; no Tor). Heavy (root, loop,
+    # cryptsetup, and TCG when the runner has no /dev/kvm).
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 45
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v5
+        with:
+          python-version: "3.12"
+      - run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y qemu-system-x86 debootstrap cryptsetup
+      - run: pip install pytest pyyaml
+      - run: make test-qemu-debian PYTHON=python

.gitignore

@@ -2,3 +2,9 @@ decrypted/
 .encrypted/
 *package-lock.json
 log.txt
+__pycache__/
+*.pyc
+.pytest_cache/
+dist/
+build/
+*.egg-info/

.travis.yml

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-language: shell
-script: shellcheck $(find . -type f -name '*.sh')

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# Changelog
+
+## [2.2.0] - 2026-07-21
+
+- Optional remote LUKS unlock via a Tor onion service in the initramfs.
+  Encrypted image setups can bake *tor* into the initramfs (mkinitcpio hooks
+  ordered *netconf tor dropbear encryptssh*), generate the v3 onion keys
+  offline in the image chroot, and print the stable *.onion* address. Unlock
+  with *torsocks ssh root@<onion-address>*. Useful behind NAT/CGNAT or a
+  dynamic IP, where the direct *ssh root@<ip>* unlock cannot reach the host.
+- End-to-end tests: a rootless one (*LIM_E2E_TOR=1*) that round-trips a
+  passphrase through a real Tor onion service, and a full virtualized one
+  (*LIM_E2E_QEMU=1*) that builds a LUKS image, boots it in QEMU, and unlocks
+  the root over Tor. The offline onion keygen runs in CI; *make test-tor* /
+  *make test-qemu* / *make test-all* run the opt-in stages.
+
+## [2.1.0] - 2026-07-14
+
+Initial PyPI release 🥳
+
+## [2.0.0] - 2026-07-14
+
+All bash scripts were ported to the *lim/* Python package with a unified CLI, a mocked test suite, and CI.
+
+**💥 Breaking changes**
+
+- *scripts/*.sh* removed. Use *lim --type <command>* instead.
+- *--extra* is deprecated and ignored.
+- Root commands re-execute themselves with sudo automatically.
+
+**✨ New**
+
+- New command types besides *image*, *single*, *raid1*, *backup* and
+  *chroot*: *mount*, *umount*, *single-boot*, *raid1-boot*, *lock*,
+  *unlock*, *import*, *export*.
+- *distributions.yml* as single point of truth for the image catalog.
+- 102 pytest tests with mocked system commands plus a max-250-lines
+  architecture guard. Run with *make test*.
+- Strict ruff linting, GitHub Actions CI, Dependabot, *Makefile* with
+  *install* and *test* targets.
+
+**🐛 Fixes over the bash version**
+
+- Correct partition paths for *mmcblk* and *nvme* devices.
+- *chown* targets the invoking user instead of root.
+- sha512 checksums are verified; every pipeline stage is checked.
+- fstab UUID seeding skips PARTUUID and LABEL based images.
+- Pre-mounted images no longer get empty UUIDs in fstab and crypttab.
+- Missing system tools abort with a clear message, not a traceback.
+
+**📦 Dependencies**
+
+- Python 3.10 or newer, PyYAML 6 or newer.
+- System tools per command: *cryptsetup*, *fdisk*, *rsync*, *wget*,
+  *gpg*, *encfs*, *pv*, *bsdtar*.
+
+## [1.0.0] - 2026-07-14
+
+Official Release 🥳
+

MIRRORS

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+git@github.com:kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager.git
+ssh://git@code.infinito.nexus:2201/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager.git
+ssh://git@git.veen.world:2201/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager.git
+https://pypi.org/project/linux-image-manager/

Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+.PHONY: install test test-tor test-qemu test-qemu-debian test-all
+
+PREFIX ?= $(HOME)/.local
+# Interpreter used for the tests. Override if your active venv lacks pytest,
+# e.g.  make test PYTHON=/usr/bin/python3
+PYTHON ?= python3
+
+install:
+	chmod +x main.py
+	install -d $(PREFIX)/bin
+	ln -sf $(CURDIR)/main.py $(PREFIX)/bin/lim
+	@echo "Installed lim to $(PREFIX)/bin/lim"
+
+# Default suite: fully mocked, no root/QEMU/network. The opt-in e2e tests skip.
+test:
+	$(PYTHON) -m pytest
+
+# Rootless Tor onion unlock e2e (needs the `tor` binary and network access).
+test-tor:
+	LIM_E2E_TOR=1 $(PYTHON) -m pytest tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py -v
+
+# Full virtualized build+boot+unlock e2e. Needs qemu, arch-install-scripts,
+# cryptsetup and ssh; the build stage runs under sudo. The default "direct"
+# transport delivers the passphrase deterministically via a QEMU port-forward;
+# set LIM_E2E_TRANSPORT=tor for the full onion path (also needs tor + ncat, and
+# is flaky over public Tor inside QEMU).
+test-qemu:
+	LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 $(PYTHON) -m pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
+
+# Same, but builds a Debian image with debootstrap (initramfs-tools backend)
+# instead of Arch. Needs debootstrap + cryptsetup + ssh; runs under sudo.
+test-qemu-debian:
+	LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 LIM_E2E_OS=debian $(PYTHON) -m pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
+
+# Everything: mocked suite plus both opt-in e2e stages, in one run.
+test-all:
+	LIM_E2E_TOR=1 LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 $(PYTHON) -m pytest -v -s

README.md

@@ -1,59 +1,186 @@
 # Linux Image Manager 🖥️🛠️
 
+[![GitHub Sponsors](https://img.shields.io/badge/Sponsor-GitHub%20Sponsors-blue?logo=github)](https://github.com/sponsors/kevinveenbirkenbach) [![Patreon](https://img.shields.io/badge/Support-Patreon-orange?logo=patreon)](https://www.patreon.com/c/kevinveenbirkenbach) [![Buy Me a Coffee](https://img.shields.io/badge/Buy%20me%20a%20Coffee-Funding-yellow?logo=buymeacoffee)](https://buymeacoffee.com/kevinveenbirkenbach) [![PayPal](https://img.shields.io/badge/Donate-PayPal-blue?logo=paypal)](https://s.veen.world/paypaldonate)
+
 [![License: GPL v3](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-GPL%20v3-blue.svg)](./LICENSE.txt) [![GitHub stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager.svg?style=social)](https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager/stargazers)
 
-Linux Image Manager(lim) is a powerful collection of shell scripts for downloading, configuring, and managing Linux images. Whether you're setting up encrypted storage, configuring a virtual Btrfs RAID1, performing backups, or chrooting into an image, this tool makes Linux image administration simple and efficient. 🚀
+Linux Image Manager (lim) is a Python tool for downloading, configuring, and managing Linux images. Whether you're setting up encrypted storage, configuring a virtual Btrfs RAID1, performing backups, or chrooting into an image, this tool makes Linux image administration simple and efficient. 🚀
 
 ## Features ✨
 
-- **Image Download & Setup:** Automatically download and prepare Linux distributions.
+- **Image Download & Setup:** Automatically download, verify (checksum + GPG signature) and prepare Linux distributions.
 - **Encrypted Storage:** Configure LUKS encryption for secure image management.
+- **Tor Onion Unlock:** Optionally bake a Tor onion service into the initramfs so the dropbear LUKS unlock shell stays reachable behind NAT or dynamic IPs.
 - **Virtual RAID1:** Easily set up virtual Btrfs RAID1 for data redundancy.
-- **Chroot Environment:** Seamlessly chroot into your Linux image for system maintenance.
+- **Backup & Restore:** Create image backups from devices using dd.
-- **Backup & Restore:** Comprehensive backup and restore options for system images.
+- **Chroot Environment:** Easily enter a chroot shell to maintain or modify Linux images.
+- **Data Import/Export:** Sync personal data into an encfs-encrypted store and back.
 - **Automated Procedures:** Simplify partitioning, formatting, mounting, and more.
 
 ## Installation 📦
 
-Install Linux Image Manager quickly with [Kevin's Package Manager](https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/package-manager) under the alias `lim`. Just run:
+Install Linux Image Manager quickly using [Kevin's Package Manager](https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/package-manager) under the alias `lim`. Just run:
 
 ```bash
 package-manager install lim
 ```
 
-This command makes Linux Image Manager globally available as `lim` in your terminal. 🔧
+This command makes Linux Image Manager globally available as `lim` in your terminal. The `lim` alias points to the **main.py** entry point.
+
+The only Python dependency is **PyYAML** (`>=6`), used to read the image catalog. The pip/wheel install pulls it in automatically; on the `package-manager`/symlink install path make sure it is present (`python-yaml` on Arch). The commands also call the usual system tools (`cryptsetup`, `fdisk`, `dd`, `rsync`, `wget`, `gpg`, `encfs`, `pv`, `bsdtar`, ...), so those need to be installed for the command you use.
 
 ## Usage ⚙️
 
-Linux Image Manager comes with a variety of scripts tailored for different tasks. Here are a few examples:
+`lim` provides a unified interface for all image and storage operations. Commands that need root privileges re-execute themselves with `sudo` automatically. The built-in `--help` option displays detailed usage information.
+
+### Available Command Types
+
+| `--type`      | Description                                                                 |
+|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| `image`       | Download, verify and transfer a Linux image to a device, incl. optional LUKS encryption and Raspberry Pi configuration. |
+| `single`      | Set up LUKS encryption with Btrfs on a single drive.                        |
+| `raid1`       | Set up an encrypted virtual Btrfs RAID1 across two drives.                  |
+| `backup`      | Create an image backup from a memory device using dd.                      |
+| `chroot`      | Mount an image and open a shell inside it.                                  |
+| `mount`       | Unlock and mount an encrypted drive.                                        |
+| `umount`      | Unmount an encrypted drive and close the mapper.                            |
+| `single-boot` | Register a single encrypted drive for automount on boot (keyfile, crypttab, fstab). |
+| `raid1-boot`  | Register an encrypted RAID1 for automount on boot.                          |
+| `unlock`      | Decrypt the encfs data store.                                               |
+| `lock`        | Lock the encfs data store.                                                  |
+| `import`      | Import personal data from the system into the encrypted store.              |
+| `export`      | Export personal data from the encrypted store back to the system.           |
+
+### Command-Line Options
+
+- **`--type`** *(required)*: Choose the command to execute (see table above).
+- **`--auto-confirm`** *(optional)*: Bypass the confirmation prompt before execution.
+- **`--help`** *(optional)*: Display detailed help information.
+
+### Example Commands
 
-### Virtual Btrfs RAID1 Setup
 ```bash
-lim raid1/setup.sh
+# Display help
+lim --help
+
+# Execute the Linux image setup
+lim --type image
+
+# Run the single drive encryption setup without a confirmation prompt
+lim --type single --auto-confirm
+
+# Set up an encrypted RAID1
+lim --type raid1
+
+# Back up a memory device to an image file
+lim --type backup
+
+# Enter a chroot environment for a Linux image
+lim --type chroot
 ```
 
-### Linux Image Setup
+## Project Structure 🗂️
-```bash
-lim image/setup.sh
-```
 
-### Chroot into Linux Image
-```bash
-lim image/chroot.sh
 ```
-
+main.py               # entry point (the `lim` alias)
-### Backup Image
+lim/
-```bash
+  cli.py              # argument parsing and command dispatch
-lim image/backup.sh
+  catalog.py          # read-only access to distributions.yml
+  device.py           # block device selection, dd, blkid helpers
+  luks.py             # LUKS keyfiles, crypttab/fstab bookkeeping
+  runner.py           # subprocess wrapper used by all modules
+  storage/            # single drive and RAID1 encryption setups
+  image/              # image setup, backup, chroot, verification
+  data/               # encfs lock/unlock and data import/export
+  distributions.yml   # single point of truth for the image catalog
+  configuration/      # package collections used during image setup
+tests/unit/           # unit tests (all external commands mocked)
+tests/e2e/            # Tor onion unlock end-to-end tests (rootless + QEMU, opt-in)
+tests/e2e/qemu/       # full virtualized build+boot+unlock harness
+tests/lint/           # architecture guards (e.g. max file length)
 ```
 
-Explore the `scripts/` directory for more functionalities and detailed usage instructions.
-
 ## Configuration & Customization 🔧
 
-Customize your environment in the `configuration/` folder:
+Customize your environment in the `lim/configuration/` folder:
-- **General Packages:** Common packages for all setup scripts.
+- **General Packages:** Contains common packages for all setup scripts.
-- **Server LUKS Packages:** Packages needed for setting up LUKS encryption on servers.
+- **Server LUKS Packages:** Contains packages needed for setting up LUKS encryption on servers.
+- **initcpio Hooks:** The mkinitcpio install/runtime hooks and torrc baked into images for the Tor onion unlock.
+
+## Remote LUKS Unlock via Tor 🧅
+
+When you answer yes to *"Should the system be remotely unlockable via a Tor
+onion service?"* during an encrypted `lim --type image` setup, the image gets:
+
+- `tor` and `busybox` installed, plus a custom `tor` mkinitcpio hook ordered
+  between `netconf` and `dropbear`.
+- A v3 onion service key generated **offline** inside the image chroot; the
+  resulting `.onion` address is printed at the end of the setup and stays
+  stable across reboots and IP changes.
+- An NTP clock sync in early userspace (boards like the Raspberry Pi have no
+  RTC and would otherwise boot with a clock Tor rejects). Override the server
+  with the kernel parameter `tor_ntp=<host>`.
+
+After booting the device, unlock it from any machine with a running Tor
+client:
+
+```bash
+torsocks ssh root@<onion-address>
+```
+
+Typing the LUKS passphrase into that shell resumes the boot. The direct
+`ssh root@<ip>` unlock keeps working as before; Tor is an additional path,
+useful behind NAT/CGNAT where no port forwarding is possible.
+
+**Security note:** the onion private key is stored in the initramfs on the
+unencrypted boot partition. Anyone with physical access to the SD card can
+read it and impersonate the onion service — treat the address as
+non-secret. Access control remains the SSH public key
+(`/etc/dropbear/root_key`), exactly as with the direct unlock.
+
+## Development & Tests 🧪
+
+The unit suite mocks all external commands, so it runs safely on any machine:
+
+```bash
+pytest
+```
+
+### Tor unlock end-to-end test
+
+`tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py` reproduces the operator-visible half of the
+Tor decryption process **rootless** — no block devices, no `cryptsetup`, no
+`chroot`. It generates the v3 onion keys offline (exactly as `lim.image.tor`
+does inside the image), starts a real Tor onion service from a torrc mirroring
+the baked-in one, then connects to the `.onion` address through Tor and
+delivers a passphrase to a dropbear stand-in, asserting it arrives and the
+endpoint "unlocks".
+
+It needs the real `tor` binary and live Tor network access (onion bootstrap is
+slow), so it is opt-in and skipped otherwise:
+
+```bash
+LIM_E2E_TOR=1 pytest tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py -v
+```
+
+The offline-only checks in that file (onion keygen, production-flag guard) run
+without network. The physical flashing half (`dd`, `cryptsetup luksFormat`,
+`mount`, `chroot`, `mkinitcpio`) requires root and a matching CPU/qemu setup and
+is not covered by this rootless test.
+
+### Full virtualized unlock (QEMU)
+
+For the *whole* process — build an encrypted image, boot it, run the real
+initramfs Tor+dropbear chain, and unlock it — `tests/e2e/qemu/` drives a QEMU
+virtual machine end to end and asserts the real system booted only after the
+passphrase was delivered over Tor. It is opt-in (`LIM_E2E_QEMU=1`) and needs
+QEMU, `arch-install-scripts`, `cryptsetup`, `tor` and `ncat`; the build stage
+needs root (ideally inside a throwaway VM to keep the host rootless). A private,
+offline Tor network via [chutney](https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/chutney)
+is supported. See [tests/e2e/qemu/README.md](tests/e2e/qemu/README.md).
+
+The harness's pure logic and drift guards run in the normal suite
+(`test_qemu_harness_unit.py`) — no QEMU, root, or network needed.
 
 ## License 📜
 

lim/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+"""Linux Image Manager — administration tool for Linux images and encrypted storage."""
+
+__version__ = "1.0.0"

lim/catalog.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+"""Read-only access to the image catalog (distributions.yml in the package)."""
+
+from functools import cache
+
+import yaml
+
+from lim import config
+
+CATALOG_PATH = config.CATALOG_PATH
+
+
+@cache
+def _load() -> dict:
+    with CATALOG_PATH.open() as handle:
+        return yaml.safe_load(handle)
+
+
+def arch_rpi_images() -> dict[str, dict[str, str]]:
+    return _load()["arch_rpi_images"]
+
+
+def manjaro_gnome_releases() -> dict[str, dict[str, str]]:
+    return _load()["manjaro_gnome_releases"]
+
+
+def retropie_images() -> dict[str, dict[str, str]]:
+    return _load()["retropie_images"]
+
+
+def raspios_images() -> dict[str, dict[str, str]]:
+    return _load()["raspios_images"]
+
+
+def mkinitcpio_modules_by_rpi() -> dict[str, str]:
+    return _load()["mkinitcpio_modules_by_rpi"]

lim/cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+"""Command line interface: `lim --type <command>`."""
+
+import argparse
+import sys
+from collections.abc import Callable
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from lim import system, ui
+from lim.data import crypt, sync
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image import backup, chroot
+from lim.image import setup as image_setup
+from lim.image import unlock as image_unlock
+from lim.image import wizard as image_wizard
+from lim.storage import raid1, single_drive
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Command:
+    func: Callable[[], None]
+    description: str
+    needs_root: bool
+
+
+COMMANDS: dict[str, Command] = {
+    "image": Command(
+        image_setup.run_setup,
+        "Linux Image Setup:\n"
+        "  - Creates partitions and formats them.\n"
+        "  - Transfers the Linux image file to the device.\n"
+        "  - Configures boot and root partitions.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "guided": Command(
+        image_wizard.run_guided,
+        "Guided Encrypted Linux Image Setup (default command):\n"
+        "  - Walks through flashing a Linux image (Arch, Raspberry Pi OS, ...) onto a device.\n"
+        "  - Encrypts the root with LUKS and enables remote unlock over Tor.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "remote-unlock": Command(
+        image_unlock.remote_unlock,
+        "Remote LUKS Boot Unlock:\n"
+        "  - Reaches a waiting initramfs over Tor (onion) or plain SSH.\n"
+        "  - Runs cryptroot-unlock or presents the passphrase prompt.",
+        needs_root=False,
+    ),
+    "single": Command(
+        single_drive.setup,
+        "Single Drive Encryption Setup:\n"
+        "  - Sets up disk encryption using LUKS on one drive.\n"
+        "  - Configures a Btrfs file system for secure storage.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "raid1": Command(
+        raid1.setup,
+        "RAID1 Encryption Setup:\n"
+        "  - Configures a virtual RAID1 with two drives.\n"
+        "  - Uses LUKS encryption and a Btrfs RAID1 file system for redundancy.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "backup": Command(
+        backup.run_backup,
+        "Backup Image Setup:\n"
+        "  - Creates an image backup from a memory device to a file.\n"
+        "  - Uses dd to transfer the image from the specified device to an image file.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "chroot": Command(
+        chroot.run_chroot,
+        "Chroot Environment Setup:\n"
+        "  - Mounts partitions and configures the chroot environment for a Linux image.\n"
+        "  - Provides a shell within the Linux image for system maintenance.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "mount": Command(
+        single_drive.mount,
+        "Mount Encrypted Storage:\n  - Unlocks a LUKS partition and mounts it.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "umount": Command(
+        single_drive.umount,
+        "Unmount Encrypted Storage:\n  - Unmounts a LUKS partition and closes the mapper.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "single-boot": Command(
+        single_drive.mount_on_boot,
+        "Single Drive Automount Setup:\n"
+        "  - Creates a LUKS keyfile and registers it in crypttab and fstab.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "raid1-boot": Command(
+        raid1.mount_on_boot,
+        "RAID1 Automount Setup:\n"
+        "  - Creates LUKS keyfiles for both drives and registers them in crypttab/fstab.",
+        needs_root=True,
+    ),
+    "unlock": Command(
+        crypt.unlock,
+        "Unlock Data:\n  - Decrypts the encfs data store into the decrypted folder.",
+        needs_root=False,
+    ),
+    "lock": Command(
+        crypt.lock,
+        "Lock Data:\n  - Unmounts the decrypted encfs folder.",
+        needs_root=False,
+    ),
+    "import": Command(
+        sync.import_from_system,
+        "Import Data:\n  - Copies personal data from the system into the encrypted store.",
+        needs_root=False,
+    ),
+    "export": Command(
+        sync.export_to_system,
+        "Export Data:\n  - Copies personal data from the encrypted store back to the system.",
+        needs_root=False,
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def build_parser() -> argparse.ArgumentParser:
+    epilog_lines = ["Available script types:"]
+    epilog_lines += [
+        f"  {name:<12} - {command.description.splitlines()[0].rstrip(':')}"
+        for name, command in COMMANDS.items()
+    ]
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        prog="lim",
+        description="Linux Image Manager — manages Linux images and encrypted storage.",
+        epilog="\n".join(epilog_lines),
+        formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--type",
+        default="guided",
+        choices=list(COMMANDS.keys()),
+        help="Command to execute (default: guided).",
+    )
+    parser.add_argument(
+        "--auto-confirm",
+        action="store_true",
+        help="Automatically confirm execution without prompting the user.",
+    )
+    return parser
+
+
+def main(argv: list[str] | None = None) -> None:
+    args = build_parser().parse_args(argv)
+    command = COMMANDS[args.type]
+
+    if command.needs_root:
+        system.ensure_root()
+
+    ui.header()
+    ui.info(f"Selected command: {args.type}")
+    ui.info("Description:")
+    print(command.description)
+
+    try:
+        if not args.auto_confirm:
+            input("Press Enter to execute or Ctrl+C to cancel...")
+        command.func()
+    except LimError as exc:
+        ui.error(f"{exc} -> Leaving program.")
+        sys.exit(1)
+    except KeyboardInterrupt:
+        print()
+        ui.error("Execution aborted by user.")
+        sys.exit(1)

lim/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+"""Package and repository paths shared by all modules.
+
+Configuration and the image catalog ship inside the package so that
+wheel installs work; the encfs data store stays repository-relative.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+PACKAGE_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
+CONFIGURATION_PATH = PACKAGE_ROOT / "configuration"
+PACKAGE_PATH = CONFIGURATION_PATH / "packages"
+CATALOG_PATH = PACKAGE_ROOT / "distributions.yml"
+
+REPOSITORY_PATH = PACKAGE_ROOT.parent
+ENCRYPTED_PATH = REPOSITORY_PATH / ".encrypted"
+DECRYPTED_PATH = REPOSITORY_PATH / "decrypted"
+DATA_PATH = DECRYPTED_PATH / "data"
+BACKUP_PATH = DECRYPTED_PATH / "backup"

lim/configuration/initcpio/tor_hook

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#!/usr/bin/ash
+# mkinitcpio runtime hook: start Tor so the dropbear unlock shell is
+# reachable as an onion service while encryptssh waits for the passphrase.
+# Installed to /etc/initcpio/hooks/tor by linux-image-manager.
+
+# netconf's ipconfig drops its DHCP lease data (incl. DNS) into
+# /tmp/net-*.conf; busybox's resolver only reads /etc/resolv.conf.
+_tor_write_resolv_conf() {
+    [ -s /etc/resolv.conf ] && return 0
+    local conf dns
+    for conf in /tmp/net-*.conf; do
+        [ -f "$conf" ] || continue
+        # Extract ONLY the DNS fields with sed; never source these files —
+        # they hold attacker-controllable DHCP option strings (hostname,
+        # domain, rootpath), and sourcing would run them as root pre-boot.
+        for dns in $(sed -n 's/^IPV4DNS[01]=//p' "$conf"); do
+            [ -n "$dns" ] && [ "$dns" != "0.0.0.0" ] \
+                && echo "nameserver $dns" >> /etc/resolv.conf
+        done
+    done
+    [ -s /etc/resolv.conf ]
+}
+
+run_hook() {
+    # Tor rejects consensus documents when the clock is far off; boards
+    # without an RTC boot in 1970, so sync before starting Tor. Bounded:
+    # a failed sync must never block the boot.
+    msg "tor: syncing clock via NTP..."
+    # Best-effort DNS; a tor_ntp IP literal needs none, so never gate on it.
+    _tor_write_resolv_conf || msg "tor: no DNS from DHCP (fine if tor_ntp is an IP)"
+    /usr/local/bin/busybox timeout 30 \
+        /usr/local/bin/busybox ntpd -n -q -p "${tor_ntp:-pool.ntp.org}" \
+        || msg "tor: NTP sync failed, keeping current clock"
+
+    msg "tor: starting onion service for remote unlock..."
+    mkdir -p /var/lib/tor
+    chmod 0700 /var/lib/tor /etc/tor/onion
+    chmod 0600 /etc/tor/onion/hs_ed25519_secret_key
+    tor -f /etc/tor/torrc --RunAsDaemon 1 --Log "notice file /tmp/tor.log" \
+        || msg "tor: failed to start, unlock stays reachable via direct IP"
+}
+
+run_cleanuphook() {
+    # Nothing from the initramfs may keep running after the pivot.
+    /usr/local/bin/busybox killall tor 2>/dev/null
+    return 0
+}

lim/configuration/initcpio/tor_install

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# mkinitcpio install hook: Tor onion service for remote LUKS unlock.
+# Installed to /etc/initcpio/install/tor by linux-image-manager.
+
+build() {
+    add_binary /usr/bin/tor
+    # Full busybox for the ntpd applet: boards without an RTC (e.g. most
+    # Raspberry Pis) wake up in 1970, which Tor's consensus checks reject.
+    # A different target path keeps mkinitcpio's own busybox untouched.
+    add_binary /usr/bin/busybox /usr/local/bin/busybox
+    # glibc resolves the NTP server hostname via getaddrinfo(), which dlopen()s
+    # these NSS modules at runtime — add_binary only follows NEEDED libs, so
+    # without them DNS silently fails, ntpd never syncs, and the clock stays
+    # at 1970. glibc's built-in default (no nsswitch.conf) is "dns ... files".
+    add_binary /usr/lib/libnss_dns.so.2
+    add_binary /usr/lib/libnss_files.so.2
+    add_file /etc/tor/initramfs-torrc /etc/tor/torrc
+    add_file /etc/tor/initramfs-onion/hostname /etc/tor/onion/hostname
+    add_file /etc/tor/initramfs-onion/hs_ed25519_public_key /etc/tor/onion/hs_ed25519_public_key
+    add_file /etc/tor/initramfs-onion/hs_ed25519_secret_key /etc/tor/onion/hs_ed25519_secret_key
+    add_runscript
+}
+
+help() {
+    cat <<HELPEOF
+Starts a Tor onion service in early userspace so the dropbear unlock
+shell stays reachable under the .onion address baked into the image,
+even behind NAT or a dynamic IP.
+
+Place it between netconf and dropbear:
+  HOOKS=(... netconf tor dropbear encryptssh ...)
+
+Optional kernel parameter:
+  tor_ntp=<server>  NTP server used to set the clock before Tor starts
+                    (default: pool.ntp.org)
+HELPEOF
+}

lim/configuration/initcpio/torrc

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Tor configuration for the initramfs onion unlock service.
+# Baked into the initramfs as /etc/tor/torrc by the "tor" mkinitcpio hook;
+# the onion keys come from /etc/tor/initramfs-onion on the system.
+DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
+HiddenServiceDir /etc/tor/onion
+HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
+SocksPort 0

lim/configuration/initramfs-tools/tor_bottom

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# initramfs-tools cleanup hook: stop Tor before the pivot to the real root.
+# Installed to /etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-bottom/tor by lim.
+# Nothing from the initramfs may keep running once run-init replaces it.
+PREREQ=""
+prereqs() { echo "$PREREQ"; }
+case "$1" in
+    prereqs) prereqs; exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+# pidof/killall may be absent; scan /proc for the tor binary (no extra tools).
+for pid in $(ls /proc 2>/dev/null); do
+    case "$pid" in
+        *[!0-9]*) continue ;;
+    esac
+    [ "$(readlink "/proc/$pid/exe" 2>/dev/null)" = "/usr/bin/tor" ] \
+        && kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null
+done
+exit 0

lim/configuration/initramfs-tools/tor_hook

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# initramfs-tools build hook: bake the Tor onion service into the initramfs.
+# Installed to /etc/initramfs-tools/hooks/tor by linux-image-manager.
+PREREQ="dropbear"
+prereqs() { echo "$PREREQ"; }
+case "$1" in
+    prereqs) prereqs; exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+. /usr/share/initramfs-tools/hook-functions
+
+copy_exec /usr/bin/tor /usr/bin
+
+# glibc resolves the NTP server hostname via getaddrinfo(), which dlopen()s
+# these NSS modules at runtime; without them DNS silently fails and the clock
+# (RTC-less boards) stays at 1970, so Tor rejects the consensus.
+for nss in /usr/lib/*/libnss_dns.so.2 /usr/lib/*/libnss_files.so.2 \
+           /lib/*/libnss_dns.so.2 /lib/*/libnss_files.so.2; do
+    [ -e "$nss" ] && copy_exec "$nss"
+done
+
+# Full busybox for the ntpd applet (the initramfs busybox may lack it); a
+# distinct path keeps the initramfs's own busybox untouched.
+for bb in /bin/busybox /usr/bin/busybox; do
+    [ -x "$bb" ] && { copy_exec "$bb" /usr/local/bin/busybox; break; }
+done
+
+date -u +%s > "${DESTDIR}/etc/tor-clock-floor"
+
+# Onion keys + torrc, staged on the system by lim.
+mkdir -p "${DESTDIR}/etc/tor/onion"
+for key in hostname hs_ed25519_public_key hs_ed25519_secret_key; do
+    cp -a "/etc/tor/initramfs-onion/${key}" "${DESTDIR}/etc/tor/onion/${key}"
+done
+chmod 0700 "${DESTDIR}/etc/tor/onion"
+chmod 0600 "${DESTDIR}/etc/tor/onion/hs_ed25519_secret_key"
+cp -a /etc/tor/initramfs-torrc "${DESTDIR}/etc/tor/torrc"

lim/configuration/initramfs-tools/tor_premount

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# initramfs-tools runtime hook: bring up networking, sync the clock and start
+# the Tor onion service so the dropbear unlock shell is reachable while
+# cryptsetup waits. Installed to /etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-premount/tor.
+PREREQ=""
+prereqs() { echo "$PREREQ"; }
+case "$1" in
+    prereqs) prereqs; exit 0 ;;
+esac
+
+. /scripts/functions
+
+log_begin_msg "tor: bringing up networking and starting the onion service"
+
+# init-premount runs BEFORE the cryptroot/dropbear networking, so Tor would
+# start with no network and never publish the onion. Bring the interface up
+# ourselves from the ip= cmdline (idempotent; the later dropbear setup reuses
+# the lease in /run/net-*.conf).
+configure_networking
+
+# initramfs-tools does not export arbitrary cmdline params as shell vars.
+tor_ntp=$(sed -n 's/.*\btor_ntp=\([^ ]*\).*/\1/p' /proc/cmdline)
+
+# Best-effort DNS from the DHCP lease; extract ONLY the DNS fields with sed,
+# never source the files (attacker-controllable DHCP option strings would run
+# as root pre-boot).
+if [ ! -s /etc/resolv.conf ]; then
+    for conf in /run/net-*.conf /tmp/net-*.conf; do
+        [ -f "$conf" ] || continue
+        for dns in $(sed -n 's/^IPV4DNS[01]=//p' "$conf"); do
+            [ -n "$dns" ] && [ "$dns" != "0.0.0.0" ] \
+                && echo "nameserver $dns" >> /etc/resolv.conf
+        done
+    done
+fi
+
+floor=$(cat /etc/tor-clock-floor 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
+if [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$floor" ]; then
+    /usr/local/bin/busybox date -s "@$floor" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || date -s "@$floor" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+fi
+
+if [ -x /usr/local/bin/busybox ]; then
+    /usr/local/bin/busybox timeout 30 \
+        /usr/local/bin/busybox ntpd -n -q -p "${tor_ntp:-pool.ntp.org}" \
+        || log_warning_msg "tor: NTP sync failed, keeping current clock"
+fi
+
+mkdir -p /var/lib/tor
+chmod 0700 /var/lib/tor /etc/tor/onion
+chmod 0600 /etc/tor/onion/hs_ed25519_secret_key
+tor -f /etc/tor/torrc --RunAsDaemon 1 --Log "notice file /run/tor.log" \
+    || log_warning_msg "tor: failed to start, unlock stays reachable via direct IP"
+
+log_end_msg

lim/configuration/initramfs-tools/torrc

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Tor configuration for the initramfs onion unlock service (initramfs-tools).
+# Baked into the initramfs as /etc/tor/torrc by the "tor" hook; the onion keys
+# come from /etc/tor/initramfs-onion on the system.
+DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
+HiddenServiceDir /etc/tor/onion
+HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
+SocksPort 0
+# Single-hop, non-anonymous onion service. A boot-unlock onion needs
+# reachability (behind NAT / a dynamic IP), NOT server-location anonymity, so
+# it can skip the multi-hop, vanguards-restricted circuits that a fresh Tor
+# with a limited relay view fails to build ("Giving up on launching a
+# rendezvous circuit"). Single-hop builds trivial 1-hop circuits that publish
+# and rendezvous reliably. Entry guards are likewise unnecessary here.
+HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1
+HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1
+UseEntryGuards 0

lim/configuration/packages/server/luks-debian.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Packages for LUKS remote unlock on Debian / Raspberry Pi OS (initramfs-tools)
+cryptsetup
+cryptsetup-initramfs
+dropbear-initramfs
+busybox

lim/configuration/packages/server/tor-debian.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# Packages for the Tor onion unlock service in the initramfs (Debian)
+tor
+busybox  # full applet set: ntpd for clock sync on RTC-less boards

lim/configuration/packages/server/tor.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# Packages for the Tor onion unlock service in the initramfs
+tor
+busybox  # full applet set: ntpd for clock sync on RTC-less boards

lim/data/crypt.py

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+"""Lock/unlock the encfs-encrypted data directory."""
+
+from lim import config, runner, ui
+
+
+def unlock() -> None:
+    ui.info(f"Unlocking directory {config.DECRYPTED_PATH}...")
+    if not config.DECRYPTED_PATH.is_dir():
+        ui.info(f"Creating directory {config.DECRYPTED_PATH}...")
+        config.DECRYPTED_PATH.mkdir()
+    ui.info(f"Decrypting directory {config.ENCRYPTED_PATH} to {config.DECRYPTED_PATH}...")
+    runner.run(["encfs", str(config.ENCRYPTED_PATH), str(config.DECRYPTED_PATH)])
+    print("ATTENTION: DATA IS NOW DECRYPTED!")
+
+
+def lock() -> None:
+    ui.info(f"Locking directory {config.DECRYPTED_PATH}...")
+    runner.run(
+        ["fusermount", "-u", str(config.DECRYPTED_PATH)],
+        error_msg="Unmounting failed.",
+    )
+    ui.info("Data is now encrypted.")
+    ui.info(f"Removing directory {config.DECRYPTED_PATH}...")
+    config.DECRYPTED_PATH.rmdir()

lim/data/sync.py

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+"""Import personal data from the system into the encrypted store, or export it back."""
+
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import config, runner, system, ui
+from lim.data import crypt
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+# Paths relative to $HOME; trailing "/" marks a directory tree.
+BACKUP_ITEMS = [
+    ".ssh/",
+    ".gitconfig",
+    ".atom/config.cson",
+    ".projectlibre/projectlibre.conf",
+    ".local/share/rhythmbox/rhythmdb.xml",
+    ".config/keepassxc/keepassxc.ini",
+    "Documents/certificates/",
+    "Documents/security/",
+    "Documents/identity/",
+    "Documents/health/",
+    "Documents/licenses/",
+]
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SyncOperation:
+    source: str
+    destination: str
+    backup_dir: str
+    is_directory: bool
+
+
+def build_sync_plan(
+    mode: str,
+    home: Path,
+    data_path: Path,
+    backup_folder: Path,
+) -> list[SyncOperation]:
+    """One rsync operation per existing backup item; missing sources are skipped."""
+    operations = []
+    for item in BACKUP_ITEMS:
+        is_directory = item.endswith("/")
+        system_path = home / item
+        # The store mirrors the absolute system path below DATA_PATH.
+        data_path_item = Path(f"{data_path}{system_path}")
+        if mode == "export":
+            source, destination = data_path_item, system_path
+        elif mode == "import":
+            source, destination = system_path, data_path_item
+        else:
+            raise LimError(f"Unknown sync mode: {mode}")
+        ui.info(f"{mode.capitalize()} data from {source} to {destination}...")
+        if not (source.is_file() or source.is_dir()):
+            ui.warning(f"{source} doesn't exist. Copying data is not possible.")
+            continue
+        if is_directory:
+            backup_dir = Path(f"{backup_folder}{system_path}")
+        else:
+            backup_dir = Path(f"{backup_folder}{system_path}").parent
+        operations.append(
+            SyncOperation(
+                source=f"{source}/" if is_directory else str(source),
+                destination=f"{destination}/" if is_directory else str(destination),
+                backup_dir=str(backup_dir),
+                is_directory=is_directory,
+            )
+        )
+    return operations
+
+
+def rsync_command(operation: SyncOperation) -> list[str]:
+    command = ["rsync", "-abcEPuvW"]
+    if operation.is_directory:
+        command.append("--delete")
+    command += [f"--backup-dir={operation.backup_dir}", operation.source, operation.destination]
+    return command
+
+
+def execute_sync_plan(operations: list[SyncOperation]) -> None:
+    for operation in operations:
+        Path(operation.backup_dir).mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        destination_dir = (
+            Path(operation.destination)
+            if operation.is_directory
+            else Path(operation.destination).parent
+        )
+        destination_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        if not operation.is_directory and Path(operation.destination).is_file():
+            ui.info("The destination file already exists!")
+            ui.info("Difference:")
+            runner.run(["diff", operation.destination, operation.source], check=False)
+        runner.run(rsync_command(operation))
+
+
+def ensure_unlocked() -> None:
+    mounts = runner.output(["mount"], check=False)
+    if str(config.DECRYPTED_PATH) not in mounts:
+        ui.info(f"The decrypted folder {config.DECRYPTED_PATH} is locked. You need to unlock it!")
+        crypt.unlock()
+
+
+def import_from_system(mode: str = "import") -> None:
+    ensure_unlocked()
+    backup_folder = config.BACKUP_PATH / mode / time.strftime("%Y%m%d%H%M%S")
+    backup_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    operations = build_sync_plan(mode, system.real_home(), config.DATA_PATH, backup_folder)
+    execute_sync_plan(operations)
+
+
+def export_to_system() -> None:
+    import_from_system(mode="export")
+    user = system.real_user()
+    home = system.real_home()
+    ui.info("Setting right permissions for imported files...")
+    try:
+        (home / ".ssh").chmod(0o700)
+        for child in (home / ".ssh").rglob("*"):
+            child.chmod(0o700 if child.is_dir() else 0o600)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise LimError(f"Failed to set correct ssh permissions: {exc}") from exc
+    # Best effort without privilege escalation, like the original script.
+    chowned = runner.run(["chown", "-R", f"{user}:{user}", str(home)], check=False)
+    if chowned.returncode != 0:
+        ui.warning(f'Not all files could be owned by user "{user}"...')

lim/device.py

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+"""Block-device selection and low-level device helpers."""
+
+import stat as stat_module
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+SYS_BLOCK_PATH = Path("/sys/block")
+
+PARTITION_TABLE_INFO = """\
+##########################################################################################
+Note on Partition Table Deletion:
+---------------------------------------------
+• MBR (Master Boot Record):
+  - Typically occupies the first sector (512 bytes), i.e., 1 block.
+
+• GPT (GUID Partition Table):
+  - Uses a protective MBR (1 block), a GPT header (1 block),
+    and usually a partition entry array that takes up about 32 blocks.
+  - Total: approximately 34 blocks (assuming a 512-byte block size).
+
+Recommendation: For deleting a GPT partition table, use a block size of 512 bytes
+                and overwrite at least 34 blocks to ensure the entire table is cleared.
+##########################################################################################"""
+
+
+def optimal_blocksize(name: str, sys_block_path: Path = SYS_BLOCK_PATH) -> str:
+    """64 * physical block size, or "4K" when the size cannot be read.
+
+    See https://www.heise.de/ct/hotline/Optimale-Blockgroesse-fuer-dd-2056768.html
+    """
+    size_path = sys_block_path / name / "queue" / "physical_block_size"
+    try:
+        return str(64 * int(size_path.read_text().strip()))
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return "4K"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Device:
+    name: str  # e.g. "sda" or "mmcblk0"
+
+    @property
+    def path(self) -> str:
+        return f"/dev/{self.name}"
+
+    @property
+    def optimal_blocksize(self) -> str:
+        return optimal_blocksize(self.name)
+
+    def partition(self, number: int) -> str:
+        """/dev/sda -> /dev/sda1, /dev/mmcblk0 -> /dev/mmcblk0p1."""
+        if self.name[-1].isdigit():
+            return f"{self.path}p{number}"
+        return f"{self.path}{number}"
+
+
+def is_block_device(path: str) -> bool:
+    try:
+        return stat_module.S_ISBLK(Path(path).stat().st_mode)
+    except OSError:
+        return False
+
+
+def select_device() -> Device:
+    ui.info("Available devices:")
+    runner.run(["lsblk", "-o", "NAME,SIZE,TYPE,MODEL"], check=False)
+    name = ui.ask("Please type in the name of the device: /dev/")
+    device = Device(name)
+    if not name or not is_block_device(device.path):
+        raise LimError(f"{device.path} is not a valid device.")
+    ui.info(f"Device path set to: {device.path}")
+    ui.info(f"Optimal blocksize set to: {device.optimal_blocksize}")
+    return device
+
+
+def overwrite_device(device: Device) -> None:
+    """Optionally overwrite the device (or its first blocks) with zeros."""
+    print(PARTITION_TABLE_INFO)
+    answer = ui.ask(
+        f"Should {device.path} be overwritten with zeros before copying? (y/N/block count)"
+    )
+    if answer == "y":
+        ui.info("Overwriting entire device...")
+        runner.run(
+            [
+                "dd",
+                "if=/dev/zero",
+                f"of={device.path}",
+                f"bs={device.optimal_blocksize}",
+                "status=progress",
+            ],
+            sudo=True,
+            error_msg=f"Overwriting {device.path} failed.",
+        )
+        runner.sync_disks()
+    elif answer in ("", "N"):
+        ui.info("Skipping Overwriting...")
+    elif answer.isdigit():
+        ui.info(f"Overwriting {answer} blocks...")
+        runner.run(
+            [
+                "dd",
+                "if=/dev/zero",
+                f"of={device.path}",
+                f"bs={device.optimal_blocksize}",
+                f"count={answer}",
+                "status=progress",
+            ],
+            sudo=True,
+            error_msg=f"Overwriting {device.path} failed.",
+        )
+        runner.sync_disks()
+    else:
+        raise LimError("Invalid input. Block count must be a number.")
+
+
+def blkid_value(path: str, tag: str) -> str:
+    """Return a blkid tag value ("TYPE", "UUID", ...) or "" when unavailable."""
+    return runner.output(["blkid", path, "-s", tag, "-o", "value"], sudo=True, check=False)
+
+
+def is_mounted(path_fragment: str) -> bool:
+    """Whether any current mount line contains the given fragment."""
+    mounts = runner.output(["mount"], check=False)
+    return any(path_fragment in line for line in mounts.splitlines())

lim/distributions.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+# Single point of truth for the downloadable image catalog.
+# Consumed by lim/catalog.py.
+
+# Image and LUKS --pbkdf-memory cost per Raspberry Pi version.
+arch_rpi_images:
+  "1":
+    image: ArchLinuxARM-rpi-armv7-latest.tar.gz
+    luks_memory_cost: "64000"
+  "2":
+    image: ArchLinuxARM-rpi-armv7-latest.tar.gz
+    luks_memory_cost: "128000"
+  "3b":
+    image: ArchLinuxARM-rpi-aarch64-latest.tar.gz
+    luks_memory_cost: "128000"
+  "3b+":
+    image: ArchLinuxARM-rpi-aarch64-latest.tar.gz
+    luks_memory_cost: "128000"
+  "4":
+    image: ArchLinuxARM-rpi-aarch64-latest.tar.gz
+    luks_memory_cost: "256000"
+
+manjaro_gnome_releases:
+  "20":
+    checksum: 2df3697908483550d4a473815b08c1377e6b6892
+    url: https://osdn.net/projects/manjaro-archive/storage/gnome/20.0/
+    image: manjaro-gnome-20.0-200426-linux56.iso
+  "21":
+    url: https://download.manjaro.org/gnome/21.3.7/
+    image: manjaro-gnome-21.3.7-220816-linux515.iso
+  "22":
+    url: https://download.manjaro.org/gnome/22.1.3/
+    image: manjaro-gnome-22.1.3-230529-linux61.iso
+  "24":
+    url: https://download.manjaro.org/gnome/24.2.1/
+    image: manjaro-gnome-24.2.1-241216-linux612.iso
+  "25":
+    url: https://download.manjaro.org/gnome/25.0.10/
+    image: manjaro-gnome-25.0.10-251013-linux612.iso
+  # At the moment just optimized for Raspberry Pi 4.
+  raspberrypi:
+    url: https://github.com/manjaro-arm/rpi4-images/releases/download/23.02/
+    image: Manjaro-ARM-gnome-rpi4-23.02.img.xz
+    luks_memory_cost: "256000"
+    raspberry_pi_version: "4"
+
+retropie_images:
+  "1":
+    checksum: 95a6f84453df36318830de7e8507170e
+    image: retropie-buster-4.8-rpi1_zero.img.gz
+  "2":
+    checksum: 224e64d8820fc64046ba3850f481c87e
+    image: retropie-buster-4.8-rpi2_3_zero2w.img.gz
+  "3":
+    checksum: 224e64d8820fc64046ba3850f481c87e
+    image: retropie-buster-4.8-rpi2_3_zero2w.img.gz
+  "4":
+    checksum: b5daa6e7660a99c246966f3f09b4014b
+    image: retropie-buster-4.8-rpi4_400.img.gz
+
+# Raspberry Pi OS. The "_latest" endpoints 302-redirect to the current release;
+# image is only the local filename (must end .img.xz for decompress_command).
+raspios_images:
+  lite64:
+    source_url: https://downloads.raspberrypi.com/raspios_lite_arm64_latest
+    image: raspios_lite_arm64_latest.img.xz
+  desktop64:
+    source_url: https://downloads.raspberrypi.com/raspios_arm64_latest
+    image: raspios_arm64_latest.img.xz
+  lite32:
+    source_url: https://downloads.raspberrypi.com/raspios_lite_armhf_latest
+    image: raspios_lite_armhf_latest.img.xz
+
+# Extra kernel modules the initramfs needs for early network access,
+# see https://raspberrypi.stackexchange.com/questions/67051
+mkinitcpio_modules_by_rpi:
+  "1": ""
+  "2": ""
+  "3b": smsc95xx
+  "3b+": lan78xx
+  "4": lan78xx

lim/errors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+class LimError(Exception):
+    """Fatal error that aborts the current lim command."""

lim/fsutil.py

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+"""Small file manipulation helpers."""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+
+def replace_in_file(search: str, replace: str, path: str | Path) -> None:
+    """Replace every literal occurrence of ``search``; fail when absent."""
+    path = Path(path)
+    text = path.read_text()
+    new_text = text.replace(search, replace)
+    if new_text == text:
+        raise LimError(f"Search string '{search}' not found in {path}.")
+    path.write_text(new_text)
+
+
+def drop_fstab_mount(mount_point: str, path: str | Path) -> None:
+    """Remove any (non-comment) fstab line whose mount point field equals mount_point.
+
+    Lets a fresh mapper/boot entry replace a stock image's existing one instead
+    of colliding with it. No-op when the file or a matching line is absent.
+    """
+    path = Path(path)
+    if not path.exists():
+        return
+    kept = [
+        line
+        for line in path.read_text().splitlines()
+        if line.lstrip().startswith("#") or line.split()[1:2] != [mount_point]
+    ]
+    path.write_text("".join(f"{line}\n" for line in kept))
+
+
+def ensure_line_in_file(line: str, path: str | Path) -> bool:
+    """Append ``line`` unless already present. Returns True when appended."""
+    path = Path(path)
+    content = path.read_text() if path.exists() else ""
+    if line in content.splitlines():
+        ui.warning(f"File {path} already contains the following entry:")
+        print(line)
+        ui.info("Skipped.")
+        return False
+    with path.open("a") as handle:
+        if content and not content.endswith("\n"):
+            handle.write("\n")
+        handle.write(line + "\n")
+    return True

lim/image/backup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+"""Create an image backup from a memory device into a file."""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import runner, ui
+
+
+def run_backup() -> None:
+    ui.info("Backupscript for memory devices started...")
+    print()
+    device = device_module.select_device()
+
+    working_dir = Path.cwd()
+    path = ""
+    while not path:
+        path = ui.ask(f"Please type in backup image path+name relative to {working_dir}:")
+    output_file = f"{path}.img" if path.startswith("/") else f"{working_dir}/{path}.img"
+
+    ui.info(f"Input file: {device.path}")
+    ui.info(f"Output file: {output_file}")
+    ui.ask('Please confirm by pushing "Enter". To cancel use "Ctrl + C"')
+
+    ui.info("Imagetransfer starts. This can take a while...")
+    runner.run(
+        ["dd", f"if={device.path}", f"of={output_file}", "bs=1M", "status=progress"],
+        sudo=True,
+        error_msg='"dd" failed.',
+    )
+    runner.sync_disks()
+
+    ui.success("Imagetransfer successfull.")

lim/image/choosers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+"""Interactive selection of the distribution image to install."""
+
+from lim import catalog, runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+
+
+def _choose(prompt: str, options: list[str]) -> str:
+    """List options numbered; accept either a number or the name itself."""
+    ui.info(f"{prompt}:")
+    for index, name in enumerate(options, 1):
+        ui.info(f"  {index}) {name}")
+    answer = ui.ask("Pick a number or name:").strip()
+    if answer in options:  # name wins, so numeric names (e.g. arch "4") still work
+        return answer
+    if answer.isdigit() and 1 <= int(answer) <= len(options):
+        return options[int(answer) - 1]
+    return answer
+
+
+def choose_arch(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    version = _choose("Which Raspberry Pi version", list(catalog.arch_rpi_images()))
+    entry = catalog.arch_rpi_images().get(version)
+    if entry is None:
+        raise LimError(f"Version {version} isn't supported.")
+    plan.raspberry_pi_version = version
+    plan.boot_size = "+500M"
+    plan.base_download_url = "http://os.archlinuxarm.org/os/"
+    plan.image_name = entry["image"]
+    plan.luks_memory_cost = entry["luks_memory_cost"]
+
+
+def choose_manjaro(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    plan.boot_size = "+500M"
+    flavour = _choose("Which Manjaro version", ["architect", "gnome"])
+    if flavour == "architect":
+        plan.image_checksum = "6b1c2fce12f244c1e32212767a9d3af2cf8263b2"
+        plan.base_download_url = (
+            "https://osdn.net/frs/redir.php?m=dotsrc&f=%2Fstorage%2Fg%2Fm%2Fma"
+            "%2Fmanjaro%2Farchitect%2F20.0%2F"
+        )
+        plan.image_name = "manjaro-architect-20.0-200426-linux56.iso"
+    elif flavour == "gnome":
+        release = _choose("Which Gnome release", list(catalog.manjaro_gnome_releases()))
+        entry = catalog.manjaro_gnome_releases().get(release)
+        if entry is None:
+            raise LimError(f"Gnome release {release} isn't supported.")
+        plan.image_checksum = entry.get("checksum")
+        plan.base_download_url = entry["url"]
+        plan.image_name = entry["image"]
+        plan.luks_memory_cost = entry.get("luks_memory_cost")
+        plan.raspberry_pi_version = entry.get("raspberry_pi_version")
+    else:
+        raise LimError(f"Manjaro version {flavour} isn't supported.")
+
+
+def choose_moode(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    plan.boot_size = "+200M"
+    plan.image_checksum = "185cbc9a4994534bb7a4bc2744c78197"
+    plan.base_download_url = "https://github.com/moode-player/moode/releases/download/r651prod/"
+    plan.image_name = "moode-r651-iso.zip"
+
+
+def choose_retropie(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    plan.boot_size = "+500M"
+    version = _choose("Which RetroPie version", list(catalog.retropie_images()))
+    entry = catalog.retropie_images().get(version)
+    if entry is None:
+        raise LimError(f"Version {version} isn't supported.")
+    plan.raspberry_pi_version = version
+    plan.base_download_url = "https://github.com/RetroPie/RetroPie-Setup/releases/download/4.8/"
+    plan.image_checksum = entry["checksum"]
+    plan.image_name = entry["image"]
+
+
+def choose_raspios(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    plan.boot_size = "+512M"
+    plan.root_filesystem = "ext4"
+    variant = _choose("Which Raspberry Pi OS image", list(catalog.raspios_images()))
+    entry = catalog.raspios_images().get(variant)
+    if entry is None:
+        raise LimError(f"Raspberry Pi OS variant {variant} isn't supported.")
+    plan.source_url = entry["source_url"]
+    plan.image_name = entry["image"]
+
+
+def choose_torbox(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    plan.base_download_url = "https://www.torbox.ch/data/"
+    plan.image_name = "torbox-20220102-v050.gz"
+    plan.image_checksum = "0E1BA7FFD14AAAE5F0462C8293D95B62C3BF1D9E726E26977BD04772C55680D3"
+    plan.boot_size = "+200M"
+
+
+def choose_android_x86(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    plan.base_download_url = (
+        "https://www.fosshub.com/Android-x86.html?dwl=android-x86_64-9.0-r2.iso"
+    )
+    plan.image_name = "android-x86_64-9.0-r2.iso"
+    plan.image_checksum = "f7eb8fc56f29ad5432335dc054183acf086c539f3990f0b6e9ff58bd6df4604e"
+    plan.boot_size = "+500M"
+
+
+DISTRIBUTION_CHOOSERS = {
+    "android-x86": choose_android_x86,
+    "torbox": choose_torbox,
+    "arch": choose_arch,
+    "manjaro": choose_manjaro,
+    "moode": choose_moode,
+    "retropie": choose_retropie,
+    "raspios": choose_raspios,
+}
+
+
+def choose_linux_image(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    distribution = _choose("Which distribution", list(DISTRIBUTION_CHOOSERS))
+    chooser = DISTRIBUTION_CHOOSERS.get(distribution)
+    if chooser is None:
+        raise LimError(f"Distribution {distribution} isn't supported.")
+    plan.distribution = distribution
+    chooser(plan)
+
+
+def choose_local_image(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    ui.info("Available images:")
+    runner.run(["ls", "-l", str(plan.image_folder)], check=False)
+    plan.image_name = ui.ask("Which image would you like to use?")

lim/image/chroot.py

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+"""Mount an image and open an interactive shell inside it."""
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession
+
+
+def run_chroot() -> None:
+    ui.info("Starting chroot...")
+    device = device_module.select_device()
+    session = ImageSession(device)
+    try:
+        session.make_working_folder()
+        session.make_mount_folders()
+        session.decrypt_root()
+        session.mount_partitions()
+        session.mount_chroot_binds()
+        session.copy_qemu()
+        session.copy_resolv_conf()
+        ui.info("Bash shell starts...")
+        runner.run(["chroot", str(session.root_mount_path), "/bin/bash"], sudo=True)
+    finally:
+        session.destructor()

lim/image/crossarch.py

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+"""Ensure the host can chroot into a foreign-architecture image (qemu binfmt)."""
+
+import platform
+import shutil
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+# Building natively needs no qemu; on these the chroot runs directly.
+_NATIVE_ARM = ("aarch64", "armv7l", "armv6l", "arm64")
+
+# Repo-based installs only; AUR helpers refuse to run from this root process.
+_BINFMT_INSTALLERS = {
+    "apt-get": ["apt-get", "install", "-y", "qemu-user-static", "binfmt-support"],
+    "dnf": ["dnf", "install", "-y", "qemu-user-static"],
+    "zypper": ["zypper", "--non-interactive", "install", "qemu-linux-user"],
+    "pacman": ["pacman", "-S", "--needed", "--noconfirm", "qemu-user-static-binfmt"],
+}
+
+
+def _entry_enabled(entry: Path) -> bool:
+    try:
+        return "enabled" in entry.read_text()
+    except OSError:
+        return False
+
+
+def qemu_binfmt_enabled() -> bool:
+    binfmt = Path("/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc")
+    return binfmt.is_dir() and any(_entry_enabled(e) for e in binfmt.glob("qemu-*"))
+
+
+def auto_enable() -> bool:
+    """Install qemu-user-static via the host package manager and register binfmt."""
+    command = next((cmd for tool, cmd in _BINFMT_INSTALLERS.items() if shutil.which(tool)), None)
+    if command is None:
+        ui.warning("No supported host package manager found (apt-get/dnf/zypper/pacman).")
+        return False
+    runner.run(command, sudo=True, check=False)
+    runner.run(["systemctl", "restart", "systemd-binfmt"], sudo=True, check=False)
+    return qemu_binfmt_enabled()
+
+
+def ensure_ready() -> None:
+    """Make foreign-arch chroot work, or fail with actionable guidance.
+
+    Called before the target is erased, so a host that cannot run the image's
+    binaries aborts early instead of mid-build with a cryptic "Exec format error".
+    """
+    if platform.machine() in _NATIVE_ARM:
+        return
+    if qemu_binfmt_enabled():
+        ui.info("Cross-architecture build: qemu binfmt handlers are registered.")
+        return
+    ui.warning(
+        f"Cross-architecture build: this host ({platform.machine()}) cannot run the "
+        "image's ARM binaries in chroot yet."
+    )
+    if ui.confirm("Install qemu-user-static and register binfmt now?"):
+        if auto_enable():
+            ui.success("qemu binfmt handlers registered.")
+            return
+        ui.warning("Automatic setup did not register a handler.")
+    raise LimError(
+        "Cross-architecture chroot is not available. Install qemu-user-static + binfmt "
+        "manually, or build on the target itself (e.g. the Pi booted from USB).\n"
+        "  Arch/Manjaro : qemu-user-static + qemu-user-static-binfmt (AUR), "
+        "then: sudo systemctl restart systemd-binfmt\n"
+        "  Debian/Ubuntu: sudo apt install qemu-user-static binfmt-support"
+    )

lim/image/encryption.py

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"""Remote-unlockable LUKS boot configuration.
+
+Distro-agnostic orchestration; the init-system-specific steps live in the
+initramfs backends (mkinitcpio for Arch/Manjaro, initramfs-tools for
+Debian/Raspberry Pi OS). See lim/image/initramfs/.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import packages, ui
+from lim.image.initramfs import get_backend
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession, install_packages
+
+
+def configure_encryption(
+    plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, authorized_keys: Path
+) -> str | None:
+    """Configure the remote-unlock LUKS stack; return the onion address, if any."""
+    root = session.root_mount_path
+    backend = get_backend(plan.distribution)
+    ui.info("Setup encryption...")
+    ui.info("Installing neccessary software...")
+    install_packages(
+        plan.distribution,
+        root,
+        " ".join(packages.get_packages(backend.luks_package_collection())),
+    )
+
+    backend.install_authorized_key(root, authorized_keys)
+
+    onion_address = None
+    if plan.tor_unlock:
+        # Hook files and onion keys must exist before the initramfs is baked.
+        onion_address = backend.install_tor_unlock(plan, root)
+
+    # crypttab must be written before the initramfs is (re)generated so the
+    # Debian cryptsetup hook can bake the mapping in.
+    backend.register_encrypted_root(plan, session, root)
+    backend.configure_initramfs(plan, root)
+    backend.configure_bootloader(plan, session, root)
+    return onion_address

lim/image/initramfs/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+"""Distro-specific initramfs backends for encrypted remote unlock."""
+
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image.initramfs.base import InitramfsBackend
+from lim.image.initramfs.initramfs_tools import InitramfsToolsBackend
+from lim.image.initramfs.mkinitcpio import MkinitcpioBackend
+
+_MKINITCPIO = frozenset({"arch", "manjaro"})
+_INITRAMFS_TOOLS = frozenset({"raspios", "moode", "retropie"})
+
+
+def get_backend(distribution: str | None) -> InitramfsBackend:
+    """Pick the initramfs backend for a distribution's init system."""
+    if distribution in _MKINITCPIO:
+        return MkinitcpioBackend()
+    if distribution in _INITRAMFS_TOOLS:
+        return InitramfsToolsBackend()
+    raise LimError(f"No initramfs backend for distribution {distribution!r}.")
+
+
+__all__ = ["InitramfsBackend", "get_backend"]

lim/image/initramfs/base.py

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+"""The initramfs backend interface.
+
+Encrypted remote-unlock images differ by init system: Arch/Manjaro use
+mkinitcpio, Debian/Raspberry Pi OS use initramfs-tools. Each backend owns the
+distro-specific bits (package set, crypttab syntax, initramfs generation,
+bootloader cmdline, and how the Tor hook is baked in); the encryption flow
+orchestrates them the same way for every distro.
+"""
+
+from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession
+
+
+class InitramfsBackend(ABC):
+    """Distro-specific steps to build an encrypted, remote-unlockable image."""
+
+    @abstractmethod
+    def luks_package_collection(self) -> str:
+        """Name of the package collection providing the LUKS/unlock stack."""
+
+    @abstractmethod
+    def install_authorized_key(self, root: Path, authorized_keys: Path) -> None:
+        """Place the SSH public key where the initramfs dropbear reads it."""
+
+    @abstractmethod
+    def install_tor_unlock(self, plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> str:
+        """Bake the Tor onion service into the initramfs; return the address."""
+
+    @abstractmethod
+    def register_encrypted_root(self, plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, root: Path) -> None:
+        """Write fstab and crypttab in the distro's syntax."""
+
+    @abstractmethod
+    def configure_initramfs(self, plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> None:
+        """Configure the initramfs modules/hooks and (re)generate it."""
+
+    @abstractmethod
+    def configure_bootloader(self, plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, root: Path) -> None:
+        """Point the bootloader at the encrypted root with early networking."""

lim/image/initramfs/initramfs_tools.py

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+"""initramfs-tools backend (Debian / Raspberry Pi OS).
+
+Debian does not use mkinitcpio; the LUKS unlock stack is cryptsetup-initramfs
+(reads /etc/crypttab, option ``initramfs``) + dropbear-initramfs (serves the
+passphrase prompt over SSH). Raspberry Pi OS ships without an initramfs, so we
+enable one in config.txt and regenerate with update-initramfs.
+
+NOTE: the exact dropbear-initramfs key path, the boot-partition mount point
+(/boot vs /boot/firmware) and the initramfs enable knob vary across Raspberry
+Pi OS releases; verify on the target release. This path is not exercised by the
+QEMU harness yet.
+"""
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import config, fsutil, packages, runner, ui
+from lim.image.initramfs import keygen
+from lim.image.initramfs.base import InitramfsBackend
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession, chroot_bash, install_packages
+
+# Numeric IP, not a hostname: the initramfs has no DNS resolver.
+_DEFAULT_NTP = "162.159.200.123"
+
+
+class InitramfsToolsBackend(InitramfsBackend):
+    def luks_package_collection(self) -> str:
+        return "server/luks-debian"
+
+    def install_authorized_key(self, root: Path, authorized_keys: Path) -> None:
+        # dropbear-initramfs (bookworm) reads /etc/dropbear/initramfs/authorized_keys.
+        target = root / "etc/dropbear/initramfs/authorized_keys"
+        ui.info(f"Adding {authorized_keys} to {target}...")
+        runner.run(
+            ["install", "-D", "-m", "0600", str(authorized_keys), str(target)],
+            sudo=True,
+        )
+
+    def install_tor_unlock(self, plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> str:
+        ui.info("Setting up remote unlock via Tor onion service (initramfs-tools)...")
+        install_packages(
+            plan.distribution, root, " ".join(packages.get_packages("server/tor-debian"))
+        )
+        source_dir = config.CONFIGURATION_PATH / "initramfs-tools"
+        for source, target, mode in (
+            (source_dir / "tor_hook", root / "etc/initramfs-tools/hooks/tor", "0755"),
+            (
+                source_dir / "tor_premount",
+                root / "etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-premount/tor",
+                "0755",
+            ),
+            (
+                source_dir / "tor_bottom",
+                root / "etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-bottom/tor",
+                "0755",
+            ),
+            (source_dir / "torrc", root / keygen.TORRC_STAGING_PATH, "0644"),
+        ):
+            ui.info(f"Installing {target}...")
+            runner.run(["install", "-D", "-m", mode, str(source), str(target)], sudo=True)
+        onion_address = keygen.generate_onion_keys(root)
+        ui.success(f"Onion unlock address: {onion_address}")
+        ui.info(f"Unlock later with: torsocks ssh root@{onion_address}")
+        return onion_address
+
+    def register_encrypted_root(self, plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, root: Path) -> None:
+        fstab_path = root / "etc/fstab"
+        fstab_line = (
+            f"/dev/mapper/{session.root_mapper_name}  /  {plan.root_filesystem}"
+            "  defaults,noatime  0  1"
+        )
+        ui.info(f"Configuring {fstab_path}...")
+        # A stock image already mounts / by PARTUUID; drop it so the mapper wins.
+        fsutil.drop_fstab_mount("/", fstab_path)
+        fsutil.ensure_line_in_file(fstab_line, fstab_path)
+
+        crypttab_path = root / "etc/crypttab"
+        # `initramfs` bakes the mapping into the initramfs so cryptsetup-initramfs
+        # unlocks the root before the pivot.
+        crypttab_line = (
+            f"{session.root_mapper_name} UUID={session.root_partition_uuid} none luks,initramfs"
+        )
+        ui.info(f"Configuring {crypttab_path}...")
+        fsutil.ensure_line_in_file(crypttab_line, crypttab_path)
+
+    def configure_initramfs(self, plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> None:  # noqa: ARG002
+        ui.info("Regenerating the Debian initramfs (update-initramfs)...")
+        # Create for all installed kernels when none exists yet (Raspberry Pi OS
+        # ships without one), else update the existing one. `-k all` avoids the
+        # build host's `uname -r` leaking into the chroot.
+        chroot_bash(
+            root,
+            "update-initramfs -c -k all 2>/dev/null || update-initramfs -u -k all",
+        )
+
+    def configure_bootloader(self, plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, root: Path) -> None:
+        hostname = (root / "etc/hostname").read_text().strip()
+        boot = session.boot_mount_path
+
+        config_txt = boot / "config.txt"
+        if config_txt.is_file():
+            ui.info(f"Enabling an initramfs in {config_txt}...")
+            fsutil.ensure_line_in_file("auto_initramfs=1", config_txt)
+
+        cmdline_txt = boot / "cmdline.txt"
+        ui.info(f"Configuring {cmdline_txt}...")
+        text = cmdline_txt.read_text().strip()
+        text = re.sub(r"root=\S+", f"root=/dev/mapper/{session.root_mapper_name}", text)
+        if "ip=" not in text:
+            text = f"{text} ip=::::{hostname}:eth0:dhcp"
+        if "net.ifnames=0" not in text:
+            text = f"{text} net.ifnames=0"
+        if plan.tor_unlock and "tor_ntp=" not in text:
+            text = f"{text} tor_ntp={_DEFAULT_NTP}"
+        cmdline_txt.write_text(text + "\n")
+        ui.info(f"Content of {cmdline_txt}:{cmdline_txt.read_text()}")

lim/image/initramfs/keygen.py

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"""Offline Tor onion key generation, shared by every initramfs backend.
+
+``tor --DisableNetwork 1`` writes a v3 onion service's keys without touching
+the network, so the same stable ``.onion`` address can be baked into the
+initramfs whether the distro uses mkinitcpio or initramfs-tools.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image.session import chroot_bash
+
+# Staged relative to the mounted image root.
+ONION_STAGING_DIR = "etc/tor/initramfs-onion"
+TORRC_STAGING_PATH = "etc/tor/initramfs-torrc"
+
+# An empty -f torrc keeps the image's /etc/tor/torrc (User tor, ...) out of the
+# keygen run, which would otherwise fail as non-root inside the chroot.
+_KEYGEN_SCRIPT = f"""
+mkdir -p /{ONION_STAGING_DIR}
+chmod 0700 /{ONION_STAGING_DIR}
+: > /tmp/tor-keygen-torrc
+tor -f /tmp/tor-keygen-torrc --DisableNetwork 1 \\
+    --DataDirectory /tmp/tor-keygen-data \\
+    --HiddenServiceDir /{ONION_STAGING_DIR} \\
+    --HiddenServicePort "22 127.0.0.1:22" \\
+    --SocksPort 0 --RunAsDaemon 0 --Log "notice stderr" &
+tor_pid=$!
+for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+    [ -s /{ONION_STAGING_DIR}/hostname ] && break
+    sleep 1
+done
+kill "$tor_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+rm -rf /tmp/tor-keygen-data /tmp/tor-keygen-torrc
+[ -s /{ONION_STAGING_DIR}/hostname ]
+"""
+
+
+def generate_onion_keys(root: Path) -> str:
+    """Generate the onion keys offline in the chroot; return the .onion address.
+
+    Idempotent: existing keys are kept so the address stays stable across
+    re-runs.
+    """
+    hostname_path = root / ONION_STAGING_DIR / "hostname"
+    if hostname_path.is_file():
+        ui.info("Onion keys already exist, keeping the existing address.")
+    else:
+        ui.info("Generating onion service keys (offline, inside the chroot)...")
+        chroot_bash(root, _KEYGEN_SCRIPT, error_msg="Onion key generation failed.")
+        if not hostname_path.is_file():
+            raise LimError(f"Onion key generation produced no {hostname_path}.")
+    return hostname_path.read_text().strip()

lim/image/initramfs/mkinitcpio.py

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+"""mkinitcpio backend (Arch Linux ARM / Manjaro ARM).
+
+See https://gist.github.com/gea0/4fc2be0cb7a74d0e7cc4322aed710d38 and
+https://gist.github.com/EnigmaCurry/2f9bed46073da8e38057fe78a61e7994
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import catalog, config, fsutil, packages, runner, ui
+from lim.image.initramfs import keygen
+from lim.image.initramfs.base import InitramfsBackend
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession, chroot_bash, install_packages
+
+MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_PREFIX = (
+    "base udev autodetect microcode modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block"
+)
+MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_SUFFIX = "filesystems fsck"
+
+
+class MkinitcpioBackend(InitramfsBackend):
+    def luks_package_collection(self) -> str:
+        return "server/luks"
+
+    def install_authorized_key(self, root: Path, authorized_keys: Path) -> None:
+        dropbear_root_key_path = root / "etc/dropbear/root_key"
+        ui.info(f"Adding {authorized_keys} to dropbear...")
+        runner.run(["cp", "-v", str(authorized_keys), str(dropbear_root_key_path)], sudo=True)
+
+    def install_tor_unlock(self, plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> str:
+        ui.info("Setting up remote unlock via Tor onion service...")
+        install_packages(plan.distribution, root, " ".join(packages.get_packages("server/tor")))
+        source_dir = config.CONFIGURATION_PATH / "initcpio"
+        for source, target in (
+            (source_dir / "tor_install", root / "etc/initcpio/install/tor"),
+            (source_dir / "tor_hook", root / "etc/initcpio/hooks/tor"),
+            (source_dir / "torrc", root / keygen.TORRC_STAGING_PATH),
+        ):
+            ui.info(f"Installing {target}...")
+            runner.run(["install", "-D", "-m", "0644", str(source), str(target)], sudo=True)
+        onion_address = keygen.generate_onion_keys(root)
+        ui.success(f"Onion unlock address: {onion_address}")
+        ui.info(f"Unlock later with: torsocks ssh root@{onion_address}")
+        return onion_address
+
+    def register_encrypted_root(self, plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, root: Path) -> None:
+        fstab_path = root / "etc/fstab"
+        fstab_line = (
+            f"UUID={session.root_partition_uuid}  / {plan.root_filesystem}"
+            "    defaults,noatime  0  1"
+        )
+        ui.info(f"Configuring {fstab_path}...")
+        fsutil.ensure_line_in_file(fstab_line, fstab_path)
+        ui.info(f"Content of {fstab_path}:{fstab_path.read_text()}")
+
+        crypttab_path = root / "etc/crypttab"
+        crypttab_line = f"{session.root_mapper_name} UUID={session.root_partition_uuid} none luks"
+        ui.info(f"Configuring {crypttab_path}...")
+        fsutil.ensure_line_in_file(crypttab_line, crypttab_path)
+        ui.info(f"Content of {crypttab_path}:{crypttab_path.read_text()}")
+
+    def configure_initramfs(self, plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> None:
+        # Concerning mkinitcpio warnings, see
+        # https://gist.github.com/imrvelj/c65cd5ca7f5505a65e59204f5a3f7a6d
+        mkinitcpio_path = root / "etc/mkinitcpio.conf"
+        ui.info(f"Configuring {mkinitcpio_path}...")
+        additional_modules = catalog.mkinitcpio_modules_by_rpi().get(plan.raspberry_pi_version)
+        if additional_modules is None:
+            ui.warning(f"Version {plan.raspberry_pi_version} isn't supported.")
+            additional_modules = ""
+        modules = f"g_cdc usb_f_acm usb_f_ecm {additional_modules} g_ether".replace("  ", " ")
+        fsutil.replace_in_file("MODULES=()", f"MODULES=({modules})", mkinitcpio_path)
+        fsutil.replace_in_file("BINARIES=()", "BINARIES=(/usr/lib/libgcc_s.so.1)", mkinitcpio_path)
+        tor_hook = "tor " if plan.tor_unlock else ""
+        fsutil.replace_in_file(
+            f"HOOKS=({MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_PREFIX} {MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_SUFFIX})",
+            f"HOOKS=({MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_PREFIX} sleep netconf {tor_hook}dropbear "
+            f"encryptssh {MKINITCPIO_HOOKS_SUFFIX})",
+            mkinitcpio_path,
+        )
+        ui.info(f"Content of {mkinitcpio_path}:{mkinitcpio_path.read_text()}")
+        ui.info("Generating mkinitcpio...")
+        chroot_bash(root, "mkinitcpio -vP")
+
+    def configure_bootloader(self, plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, root: Path) -> None:
+        cryptdevice = (
+            f"cryptdevice=UUID={session.root_partition_uuid}:{session.root_mapper_name} "
+            f"root={session.root_mapper_path}"
+        )
+        boot_txt_path = session.boot_mount_path / "boot.txt"
+        if boot_txt_path.is_file():
+            ui.info(f"Configuring {boot_txt_path}...")
+            hostname = (root / "etc/hostname").read_text().strip()
+            fsutil.replace_in_file("part uuid ${devtype} ${devnum}:2 uuid", "", boot_txt_path)
+            fsutil.replace_in_file(
+                "setenv bootargs console=ttyS1,115200 console=tty0 root=PARTUUID=${uuid} "
+                'rw rootwait smsc95xx.macaddr="${usbethaddr}"',
+                f"setenv bootargs console=ttyS1,115200 console=tty0 "
+                f"ip=::::{hostname}:eth0:dhcp {cryptdevice} rw rootwait "
+                # Concerning issues with network adapter names, see
+                # https://forum.iobroker.net/topic/40542/raspberry-pi4-kein-eth0-mehr/16
+                'smsc95xx.macaddr="${usbethaddr}" net.ifnames=0 biosdevname=0',
+                boot_txt_path,
+            )
+            ui.info(f"Content of {boot_txt_path}:{boot_txt_path.read_text()}")
+            ui.info("Generating...")
+            chroot_bash(root, "cd /boot/ && ./mkscr || exit 1")
+        else:
+            cmdline_txt_path = session.boot_mount_path / "cmdline.txt"
+            ui.info(f"Configuring {cmdline_txt_path}...")
+            # Firmware-boot boards (e.g. RPi4 cmdline.txt) need the same early
+            # networking as the boot.txt branch, or the initramfs netconf hook
+            # brings up no interface and remote unlock (dropbear + tor) is
+            # unreachable — the onion never even publishes.
+            hostname = (root / "etc/hostname").read_text().strip()
+            fsutil.replace_in_file(
+                "root=/dev/mmcblk0p2",
+                f"{cryptdevice} rootfstype={plan.root_filesystem} "
+                f"ip=::::{hostname}:eth0:dhcp net.ifnames=0 biosdevname=0",
+                cmdline_txt_path,
+            )
+            ui.info(f"Content of {cmdline_txt_path}:{cmdline_txt_path.read_text()}")

lim/image/loopimg.py

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+"""Attach a stock disk image as a loop device to read its partitions."""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+
+def attach(image_path: Path) -> str:
+    """Attach the image via losetup with partition scanning; return /dev/loopN."""
+    ui.info(f"Attaching {image_path} as a loop device...")
+    loop = runner.output(
+        ["losetup", "-Pf", "--show", str(image_path)],
+        sudo=True,
+        error_msg=f"Attaching {image_path} as a loop device failed.",
+    ).strip()
+    if not loop:
+        raise LimError(f"losetup returned no device for {image_path}.")
+    return loop
+
+
+def detach(loop: str) -> None:
+    runner.run(["losetup", "-d", loop], sudo=True, check=False)
+
+
+def partition(loop: str, number: int) -> str:
+    """/dev/loop0 -> /dev/loop0p1 (losetup -P names partitions with a p suffix)."""
+    return f"{loop}p{number}"

lim/image/plan.py

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+"""The image setup plan collected from the user's answers."""
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from pathlib import Path
+
+DEFAULT_BOOT_SIZE = "+500M"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class ImagePlan:
+    operation_system: str = "linux"
+    distribution: str | None = None
+    base_download_url: str | None = None
+    image_name: str | None = None
+    # Direct download URL when it cannot be derived as base_download_url + image_name
+    # (Raspberry Pi OS ships behind a "_latest" redirect but must land under a
+    # .img.xz name so decompress_command recognises it).
+    source_url: str | None = None
+    image_checksum: str | None = None
+    boot_size: str = ""
+    luks_memory_cost: str | None = None
+    raspberry_pi_version: str | None = None
+    encrypt_system: bool = False
+    tor_unlock: bool = False
+    root_filesystem: str = ""
+    image_folder: Path = field(default_factory=Path)
+
+    @property
+    def download_url(self) -> str | None:
+        if self.source_url is not None:
+            return self.source_url
+        if self.base_download_url is None or self.image_name is None:
+            return None
+        return f"{self.base_download_url}{self.image_name}"
+
+    @property
+    def image_path(self) -> Path:
+        return self.image_folder / self.image_name

lim/image/raspberry.py

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+"""Raspberry-Pi-specific configuration of a freshly transferred image."""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import fsutil, runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image.encryption import configure_encryption
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession, chroot_bash, install_packages
+
+ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME = "administrator"
+
+
+def configure_sudoers(root_mount_path: Path, username: str) -> None:
+    sudo_config_dir = root_mount_path / "etc/sudoers.d"
+    sudo_config_file = sudo_config_dir / username
+    sudo_config_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    try:
+        sudo_config_file.write_text(f"{username} ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL\n")
+        sudo_config_file.chmod(0o440)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise LimError(f"Failed to create sudoers file for {username}: {exc}") from exc
+
+
+def configure_ssh_key(public_key_path: str, target_ssh_folder: Path, authorized_keys: Path) -> None:
+    source = Path(public_key_path)
+    if not source.is_file():
+        raise LimError(
+            f'The ssh key "{public_key_path}" can\'t be copied to '
+            f'"{authorized_keys}" because it doesn\'t exist.'
+        )
+    ui.info("Copy ssh key to target...")
+    target_ssh_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    authorized_keys.write_text(source.read_text())
+    ui.info(f"{authorized_keys} contains the following: {authorized_keys.read_text()}")
+    ui.info("Set permissions with chmod...")
+    target_ssh_folder.chmod(0o700)
+    authorized_keys.chmod(0o600)
+
+
+def _ensure_image_mounted(session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    ui.info("Start regular mounting procedure...")
+    if device_module.is_mounted(session.boot_partition_path):
+        ui.info(f"{session.boot_partition_path} is allready mounted...")
+    elif device_module.is_mounted(session.root_mapper_path):
+        ui.info(f"{session.root_mapper_path} is allready mounted...")
+    else:
+        session.decrypt_root()
+        session.mount_partitions()
+    if session.boot_partition_uuid is None:
+        # Partitions were mounted by an earlier run; fetch what mount_partitions
+        # would have provided so fstab/crypttab never see a None UUID.
+        session.read_partition_uuids()
+
+
+def _seed_boot_uuid(session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    fstab_path = session.root_mount_path / "etc/fstab"
+    if "/dev/mmcblk0p1" not in fstab_path.read_text():
+        # PARTUUID=/LABEL= based images (e.g. RetroPie, Manjaro ARM) have
+        # nothing to seed — that is a valid state, not an error.
+        ui.info(f"{fstab_path} does not reference /dev/mmcblk0p1. Skipping UUID seeding.")
+        return
+    ui.info(f"Seeding UUID to {fstab_path} to avoid path conflicts...")
+    fsutil.replace_in_file("/dev/mmcblk0p1", f"UUID={session.boot_partition_uuid}", fstab_path)
+    ui.info(f"Content of {fstab_path}:{fstab_path.read_text()}")
+
+
+def _select_target_user(root: Path) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """Return (default username, target username), renaming the home on request."""
+    target_home_path = root / "home"
+    home_entries = sorted(path.name for path in target_home_path.iterdir())
+    if not home_entries:
+        raise LimError(f"No home directory found under {target_home_path}.")
+    default_username = home_entries[0]
+    rename = default_username != ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME and ui.confirm(
+        f"Should the {default_username} be renamed to {ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME}? "
+    )
+    if not rename:
+        return default_username, default_username
+    ui.info(
+        f"Rename home directory from {target_home_path / default_username} "
+        f"to {target_home_path / ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME}..."
+    )
+    runner.run(
+        [
+            "mv",
+            "-v",
+            str(target_home_path / default_username),
+            str(target_home_path / ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME),
+        ],
+        sudo=True,
+        error_msg="Failed to rename home directory",
+    )
+    return default_username, ADMINISTRATOR_USERNAME
+
+
+def _change_passwords(root: Path, target_username: str) -> None:
+    password = ui.ask(
+        f"Type in new password for user root and {target_username} (leave empty to skip): "
+    )
+    if not password:
+        ui.info("No password change requested, skipped password change...")
+        return
+    repeated = ui.ask(f'Repeat new password for "{target_username}": ')
+    if password != repeated:
+        raise LimError("Passwords didn't match.")
+    ui.info("Changing passwords on target system...")
+    chroot_bash(
+        root,
+        f"( echo '{password}'; echo '{password}' ) | passwd {target_username}\n"
+        f"( echo '{password}'; echo '{password}' ) | passwd\n",
+        error_msg="Failed to change password.",
+    )
+
+
+def _configure_hostname(root: Path) -> None:
+    hostname_path = root / "etc/hostname"
+    hostname = ui.ask("Type in the hostname (leave empty to skip): ")
+    if hostname:
+        hostname_path.write_text(hostname + "\n")
+    else:
+        hostname = hostname_path.read_text().strip()
+        ui.info("No hostname change requested, skipped hostname change...")
+    ui.info(f"Used hostname is: {hostname}")
+
+
+def _update_system(plan: ImagePlan, root: Path) -> None:
+    if not ui.confirm("Should the system be updated?"):
+        return
+    ui.info("Updating system...")
+    if plan.distribution in ("arch", "manjaro"):
+        chroot_bash(root, "pacman --noconfirm -Syyu")
+    elif plan.distribution in ("moode", "retropie", "raspios"):
+        chroot_bash(root, "yes | apt update\nyes | apt upgrade\n")
+    else:
+        ui.warning(
+            f'System update for operation system "{plan.distribution}" '
+            "is not supported yet. Skipped."
+        )
+
+
+def _run_retropie_procedures(session: ImageSession, public_key_path: str) -> None:
+    if public_key_path:
+        (session.boot_mount_path / "ssh").write_text("\n")
+    if not ui.confirm("Should the RetroFlag specific procedures be executed?"):
+        return
+    ui.info("Executing RetroFlag specific procedures...")
+    chroot_bash(
+        session.root_mount_path,
+        'wget -O - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RetroFlag/'
+        'retroflag-picase/master/install_gpi.sh" | bash\n',
+    )
+
+
+def _configure_users_and_keys(session: ImageSession) -> tuple[str, Path]:
+    """Handle user rename, sudo rights and SSH key; return (public key path, authorized_keys)."""
+    root = session.root_mount_path
+    ui.info("Define target paths...")
+    default_username, target_username = _select_target_user(root)
+    renamed = default_username != target_username
+    target_user_ssh_folder = root / "home" / target_username / ".ssh"
+    target_authorized_keys = target_user_ssh_folder / "authorized_keys"
+
+    if ui.confirm(f"Should the {target_username} have sudo rights? "):
+        configure_sudoers(root, target_username)
+
+    public_key_path = ui.ask(
+        "Enter the path to the SSH key to be added to the image (default: none):"
+    )
+    if public_key_path:
+        configure_ssh_key(public_key_path, target_user_ssh_folder, target_authorized_keys)
+    else:
+        ui.info("Skipped SSH-key copying..")
+
+    ui.info("Start chroot procedures...")
+    session.mount_chroot_binds()
+    session.copy_qemu()
+    session.copy_resolv_conf()
+
+    chroot_user_home = f"/home/{target_username}/"
+    if renamed:
+        ui.info("Delete old user and create new user")
+        chroot_bash(
+            root,
+            f"userdel -r {default_username}\n"
+            f"useradd -m -d {chroot_user_home} -s /bin/bash {target_username}\n"
+            f"chown -R {target_username}:{target_username} {chroot_user_home}\n",
+            error_msg="Failed to delete old user and create new user",
+        )
+
+    if public_key_path:
+        ui.info("Chroot to set ownership...")
+        chroot_bash(
+            root,
+            f"chown -vR {target_username}:{target_username} {chroot_user_home}.ssh\n",
+        )
+
+    _change_passwords(root, target_username)
+    return public_key_path, target_authorized_keys
+
+
+def configure_raspberry_image(plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    _ensure_image_mounted(session)
+    root = session.root_mount_path
+    _seed_boot_uuid(session)
+
+    public_key_path, target_authorized_keys = _configure_users_and_keys(session)
+
+    _configure_hostname(root)
+
+    if plan.distribution in ("arch", "manjaro"):
+        ui.info("Populating keys...")
+        chroot_bash(
+            root,
+            "yes | pacman-key --init\nyes | pacman-key --populate archlinuxarm\n",
+        )
+
+    _update_system(plan, root)
+
+    ui.info(f"Installing software for filesystem {plan.root_filesystem}...")
+    if plan.root_filesystem == "btrfs":
+        install_packages(plan.distribution, root, "btrfs-progs")
+    else:
+        ui.info("Skipped.")
+
+    if plan.encrypt_system:
+        configure_encryption(plan, session, target_authorized_keys)
+
+    ui.info("Running system specific procedures...")
+    if plan.distribution == "retropie":
+        _run_retropie_procedures(session, public_key_path)

lim/image/session.py

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+"""Mount/unmount lifecycle for working on an image on a block device."""
+
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.device import Device
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+
+class ImageSession:
+    """Working folder, partition paths and (chroot) mounts for one device.
+
+    Call ``destructor()`` in a finally block: it unmounts and removes
+    everything best-effort, mirroring partially completed setups.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, device: Device) -> None:
+        self.device = device
+        self.working_folder: Path | None = None
+        self.boot_mount_path: Path | None = None
+        self.root_mount_path: Path | None = None
+        self.boot_partition_path = device.partition(1)
+        self.root_partition_path = device.partition(2)
+        # Overridden by decrypt_root() when the root partition is LUKS.
+        self.root_mapper_path = self.root_partition_path
+        self.root_mapper_name: str | None = None
+        self.boot_partition_uuid: str | None = None
+        self.root_partition_uuid: str | None = None
+
+    def make_working_folder(self) -> None:
+        # Mount points must live on the root fs; mkdir() fails on collisions.
+        self.working_folder = Path(f"/tmp/linux-image-manager-{int(time.time())}")  # noqa: S108
+        ui.info(f"Create temporary working folder in {self.working_folder}")
+        self.working_folder.mkdir(parents=True)
+
+    def make_mount_folders(self) -> None:
+        if self.working_folder is None:
+            self.make_working_folder()
+        ui.info("Preparing mount paths...")
+        self.boot_mount_path = self.working_folder / "boot"
+        self.root_mount_path = self.working_folder / "root"
+        self.boot_mount_path.mkdir()
+        self.root_mount_path.mkdir()
+
+    def root_is_luks(self) -> bool:
+        return device_module.blkid_value(self.root_partition_path, "TYPE") == "crypto_LUKS"
+
+    def read_partition_uuids(self) -> None:
+        """Fetch partition UUIDs via blkid; derive the LUKS mapper name if unset."""
+        self.root_partition_uuid = device_module.blkid_value(self.root_partition_path, "UUID")
+        self.boot_partition_uuid = device_module.blkid_value(self.boot_partition_path, "UUID")
+        if self.root_mapper_name is None and self.root_is_luks():
+            # Same deterministic name decrypt_root() would have used.
+            self.root_mapper_name = f"linux-image-manager-{self.root_partition_uuid}"
+            self.root_mapper_path = f"/dev/mapper/{self.root_mapper_name}"
+
+    def decrypt_root(self) -> None:
+        if not self.root_is_luks():
+            return
+        self.root_partition_uuid = device_module.blkid_value(self.root_partition_path, "UUID")
+        self.root_mapper_name = f"linux-image-manager-{self.root_partition_uuid}"
+        self.root_mapper_path = f"/dev/mapper/{self.root_mapper_name}"
+        ui.info(f"Decrypting of {self.root_partition_path} is neccessary...")
+        runner.run(
+            [
+                "cryptsetup",
+                "-v",
+                "luksOpen",
+                self.root_partition_path,
+                self.root_mapper_name,
+            ],
+            sudo=True,
+        )
+
+    def mount_partitions(self) -> None:
+        if self.boot_mount_path is None:
+            raise LimError("Mount folders are not prepared yet.")
+        ui.info("Mount boot and root partition...")
+        runner.run(
+            ["mount", "-v", self.boot_partition_path, str(self.boot_mount_path)],
+            sudo=True,
+        )
+        runner.run(["mount", "-v", self.root_mapper_path, str(self.root_mount_path)], sudo=True)
+        ui.info("Setting uuid variables...")
+        self.read_partition_uuids()
+        ui.info("The following mounts refering this setup exist:")
+        runner.run(["findmnt", "-R", str(self.working_folder)], check=False)
+
+    def boot_bind_target(self) -> str:
+        """Where the FAT partition belongs inside the chroot.
+
+        Raspberry Pi OS Bookworm keeps it at /boot/firmware (the raspi-firmware
+        post-update hook syncs the initramfs there); older layouts use /boot.
+        Binding it wrong sends update-initramfs's output to the ext4 root, so the
+        firmware boots a stock initramfs without cryptsetup -> initramfs shell.
+        """
+        if (self.root_mount_path / "boot/firmware").is_dir():
+            return f"{self.root_mount_path}/boot/firmware"
+        return f"{self.root_mount_path}/boot"
+
+    def mount_chroot_binds(self) -> None:
+        ui.info("Mount chroot environments...")
+        root = self.root_mount_path
+        runner.run(
+            ["mount", "--bind", str(self.boot_mount_path), self.boot_bind_target()], sudo=True
+        )
+        runner.run(["mount", "--bind", "/dev", f"{root}/dev"], sudo=True)
+        runner.run(["mount", "--bind", "/sys", f"{root}/sys"], sudo=True)
+        runner.run(["mount", "--bind", "/proc", f"{root}/proc"], sudo=True)
+        runner.run(["mount", "--bind", "/dev/pts", f"{root}/dev/pts"], sudo=True)
+
+    def copy_qemu(self) -> None:
+        ui.info("Copy qemu binary...")
+        runner.run(
+            ["cp", "-v", "/usr/bin/qemu-arm-static", f"{self.root_mount_path}/usr/bin/"],
+            sudo=True,
+        )
+
+    def copy_resolv_conf(self) -> None:
+        ui.info("Copy resolv.conf...")
+        copied = runner.run(
+            [
+                "cp",
+                "--remove-destination",
+                "-v",
+                "/etc/resolv.conf",
+                f"{self.root_mount_path}/etc/",
+            ],
+            sudo=True,
+            check=False,
+        )
+        if copied.returncode != 0:
+            ui.warning("Failed. Probably there is no internet connection available.")
+
+    def _umount(self, path: str, *, lazy: bool = False) -> None:
+        flags = ["-lv"] if lazy else ["-v"]
+        result = runner.run(["umount", *flags, path], sudo=True, check=False)
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            ui.warning(f"Umounting {path} failed!")
+
+    def _rmdir(self, path: Path | None) -> None:
+        if path is None:
+            return
+        result = runner.run(["rmdir", "-v", str(path)], sudo=True, check=False)
+        if result.returncode != 0:
+            ui.warning(f"Removing {path} failed!")
+
+    def destructor(self) -> None:
+        ui.info("Cleaning up...")
+        ui.info("Unmounting everything...")
+        root = self.root_mount_path
+        if root is not None:
+            self._umount(f"{root}/dev/pts", lazy=True)
+            self._umount(f"{root}/dev", lazy=True)
+            self._umount(f"{root}/proc")
+            self._umount(f"{root}/sys")
+            self._umount(self.boot_bind_target())
+            self._umount(str(root))
+        if self.boot_mount_path is not None:
+            self._umount(str(self.boot_mount_path))
+        ui.info("Deleting mount folders...")
+        self._rmdir(self.root_mount_path)
+        self._rmdir(self.boot_mount_path)
+        self._rmdir(self.working_folder)
+        if self.root_mapper_name and self.root_is_luks():
+            ui.info(f"Trying to close decrypted {self.root_mapper_name}...")
+            closed = runner.run(
+                ["cryptsetup", "-v", "luksClose", self.root_mapper_name],
+                sudo=True,
+                check=False,
+            )
+            if closed.returncode != 0:
+                ui.warning("Failed.")
+
+
+# The host PATH leaks into the chroot; force one that includes the sbin dirs
+# where Debian keeps update-initramfs, useradd, chpasswd, ... (else code 127).
+_CHROOT_PATH = "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
+
+
+def chroot_bash(root_mount_path: Path | str, script: str, error_msg: str | None = None) -> None:
+    """Run a bash script inside the image via chroot (with a Debian-safe PATH)."""
+    runner.run(
+        ["chroot", str(root_mount_path), "/bin/bash"],
+        input_text=f"export PATH={_CHROOT_PATH}\n{script}",
+        sudo=True,
+        error_msg=error_msg,
+    )
+
+
+def install_packages(distribution: str, root_mount_path: Path, package_names: str) -> None:
+    """Install packages inside the image with the distribution's package manager."""
+    ui.info(f"Installing {package_names}...")
+    if distribution in ("arch", "manjaro"):
+        chroot_bash(root_mount_path, f"pacman --noconfirm -Sy --needed {package_names}")
+    elif distribution in ("moode", "retropie", "raspios"):
+        # apt-get update first: a stock image ships stale lists whose old .deb
+        # URLs 404 once the mirror has superseded them.
+        chroot_bash(
+            root_mount_path,
+            f"apt-get update\nDEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y {package_names}",
+        )
+    else:
+        raise LimError("Package manager not supported.")

lim/image/setup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+"""Interactive Linux image setup: download, verify, transfer, configure.
+
+Reference for encrypted Raspberry Pi images:
+https://wiki.polaire.nl/doku.php?id=archlinux-raspberry-encrypted
+"""
+
+import pwd
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import system, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image import choosers, transfer, verify
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+from lim.image.raspberry import configure_raspberry_image
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession
+
+
+def _prepare_image_folder(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    ui.info("Configure user...")
+    origin_username = ui.ask("Please type in a valid working username:")
+    try:
+        pwd.getpwnam(origin_username)
+    except KeyError:
+        raise LimError(f"User {origin_username} doesn't exist.") from None
+
+    ui.info("Image routine starts...")
+    plan.image_folder = Path(f"/home/{origin_username}/Software/Images")
+    ui.info(f'The images will be stored in "{plan.image_folder}".')
+    if not plan.image_folder.is_dir():
+        ui.info(f'Folder "{plan.image_folder}" doesn\'t exist. It will be created now.')
+        plan.image_folder.mkdir(parents=True)
+
+
+def _select_unmounted_device() -> device_module.Device:
+    device = device_module.select_device()
+    if device_module.is_mounted(device.path):
+        raise LimError(
+            f'Device {device.path} is allready mounted. Umount with "umount {device.path}*".'
+        )
+    return device
+
+
+def _choose_and_verify_image(plan: ImagePlan) -> None:
+    plan.operation_system = ui.ask(
+        "Which operation system would you like to use [linux,windows,...]?"
+    )
+    if plan.operation_system == "linux":
+        choosers.choose_linux_image(plan)
+        plan.encrypt_system = ui.confirm("Should the system be encrypted?")
+        if plan.encrypt_system:
+            plan.tor_unlock = ui.confirm(
+                "Should the system be remotely unlockable via a Tor onion service?"
+            )
+        ui.info("Generating os-image...")
+        transfer.download_image(plan)
+    else:
+        choosers.choose_local_image(plan)
+
+    ui.info("Verifying image...")
+    ui.info("Verifying checksum...")
+    if plan.image_checksum is None and plan.download_url is not None:
+        plan.image_checksum = verify.resolve_checksum(plan.download_url)
+    verify.verify_checksum(plan.image_path, plan.image_checksum)
+    if plan.download_url is not None:
+        verify.verify_signature(plan.download_url, plan.image_path, plan.image_folder)
+
+
+def run_setup() -> None:
+    ui.info("Setupscript for images started...")
+    ui.info("Checking if root...")
+    if not system.is_root():
+        raise LimError("This script must be executed as root!")
+
+    plan = ImagePlan()
+    _prepare_image_folder(plan)
+    device = _select_unmounted_device()
+    _choose_and_verify_image(plan)
+
+    session = ImageSession(device)
+    try:
+        session.make_working_folder()
+        session.make_mount_folders()
+
+        plan.root_filesystem = ui.ask("Which filesystem should be used? E.g.:btrfs,ext4... (none):")
+
+        if ui.confirm(f"Should the image be transfered to {device.path}?"):
+            transfer.transfer_image(plan, session)
+        else:
+            ui.info("Skipping image transfer...")
+
+        if plan.raspberry_pi_version:
+            configure_raspberry_image(plan, session)
+    finally:
+        session.destructor()
+
+    ui.success("Setup successfull :)")

lim/image/transfer.py

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+"""Download the selected image and transfer it onto the target device."""
+
+import shutil
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image import loopimg
+from lim.image.plan import DEFAULT_BOOT_SIZE, ImagePlan
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession
+
+
+def download_image(plan: ImagePlan, *, force_prompt: bool = True) -> None:
+    if force_prompt and ui.confirm("Should the image download be forced?"):
+        if plan.image_path.is_file():
+            ui.info(f"Removing image {plan.image_path}.")
+            plan.image_path.unlink()
+        else:
+            ui.info(f"Forcing download wasn't neccessary. File {plan.image_path} doesn't exist.")
+
+    ui.info("Start Download procedure...")
+    if plan.image_path.is_file():
+        ui.info("Image exist local. Download skipped.")
+        return
+    ui.info(f'Image "{plan.image_name}" doesn\'t exist under local path "{plan.image_path}".')
+    ui.info(f'Image "{plan.image_name}" gets downloaded from "{plan.download_url}"...')
+    runner.run(
+        ["wget", plan.download_url, "-O", str(plan.image_path)],
+        error_msg=f'Download from "{plan.download_url}" failed.',
+    )
+
+
+def arch_partition_input(boot_size: str) -> str:
+    """Fdisk answers: FAT32 boot partition of boot_size plus root partition."""
+    return (
+        "o\n"  # clear out any partitions on the drive
+        "p\n"  # list partitions (should be empty)
+        "n\np\n1\n\n"  # new primary partition 1, default start sector
+        f"{boot_size}\n"
+        "t\nc\n"  # set partition 1 to type W95 FAT32 (LBA)
+        "n\np\n2\n\n\n"  # new primary partition 2 over the remaining space
+        "w\n"  # write partition table
+    )
+
+
+def decompress_command(image_path: Path) -> list[str]:
+    """Build the command that streams the raw image to stdout for dd."""
+    suffix = image_path.suffix
+    if suffix == ".zip":
+        return ["unzip", "-p", str(image_path)]
+    if suffix == ".gz":
+        return ["gunzip", "-c", str(image_path)]
+    if suffix == ".iso":
+        return ["pv", str(image_path)]
+    if suffix == ".xz":
+        return ["unxz", "-c", str(image_path)]
+    raise LimError(f'Image transfer for "{image_path.name}" is not supported yet!')
+
+
+def _luks_format_root(plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    luks_format = [
+        "cryptsetup",
+        "-v",
+        "luksFormat",
+        "-c",
+        "aes-xts-plain64",
+        "-s",
+        "512",
+        "-h",
+        "sha512",
+        "--use-random",
+        "-i",
+        "1000",
+    ]
+    if plan.luks_memory_cost:
+        ui.info(
+            f"Formating {session.root_partition_path} with LUKS "
+            f"with --pbkdf-memory set to {plan.luks_memory_cost}"
+        )
+        luks_format += ["--pbkdf-memory", plan.luks_memory_cost]
+    else:
+        ui.info(f"Formating {session.root_partition_path} with LUKS")
+    runner.run([*luks_format, session.root_partition_path], sudo=True)
+
+
+def transfer_arch_image(plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    boot_size = plan.boot_size or DEFAULT_BOOT_SIZE
+    ui.info(f"The boot partition will be set to {boot_size}.")
+    ui.info("Creating partitions...")
+    runner.run(
+        ["fdisk", session.device.path],
+        input_text=arch_partition_input(boot_size),
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+
+    ui.info("Format boot partition...")
+    runner.run(["mkfs.vfat", session.boot_partition_path], sudo=True)
+
+    if plan.encrypt_system:
+        _luks_format_root(plan, session)
+        session.decrypt_root()
+
+    ui.info("Format root partition...")
+    runner.run([f"mkfs.{plan.root_filesystem}", "-f", session.root_mapper_path], sudo=True)
+    session.mount_partitions()
+
+    ui.info("Root files will be transfered to device...")
+    runner.run(
+        ["bsdtar", "-xpf", str(plan.image_path), "-C", str(session.root_mount_path)],
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+    runner.sync_disks()
+
+    ui.info("Boot files will be transfered to device...")
+    boot_source = session.root_mount_path / "boot"
+    for entry in sorted(boot_source.iterdir()):
+        runner.run(["mv", "-v", str(entry), str(session.boot_mount_path)], sudo=True)
+
+
+def _create_encrypted_layout(plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    """Partition the target, LUKS-format the root, format and mount both."""
+    boot_size = plan.boot_size or DEFAULT_BOOT_SIZE
+    ui.info(f"Creating partitions (boot {boot_size})...")
+    runner.run(
+        ["fdisk", session.device.path],
+        input_text=arch_partition_input(boot_size),
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+    runner.run(["mkfs.vfat", session.boot_partition_path], sudo=True)
+    _luks_format_root(plan, session)
+    session.decrypt_root()
+    runner.run([f"mkfs.{plan.root_filesystem}", "-F", session.root_mapper_path], sudo=True)
+    session.mount_partitions()
+
+
+def _copy_tree(source: str, target: str, flags: list[str]) -> None:
+    """Copy a directory's contents, showing progress when rsync is available."""
+    if shutil.which("rsync"):
+        runner.run(["rsync", *flags, "--info=progress2", f"{source}/", f"{target}/"], sudo=True)
+    else:
+        runner.run(["cp", "-a", f"{source}/.", target], sudo=True)
+
+
+def _fix_boot_fstab(session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    """Repoint the stock boot fstab line at the freshly created boot partition.
+
+    The copied image mounts /boot(/firmware) by the stock PARTUUID, which no
+    longer exists after repartitioning; swap in the new boot UUID, mount point
+    unchanged. No-op when the image carries no boot line.
+    """
+    fstab = session.root_mount_path / "etc/fstab"
+    if not fstab.is_file():
+        return
+    lines = []
+    for line in fstab.read_text().splitlines():
+        fields = line.split()
+        if not line.lstrip().startswith("#") and fields[1:2] and fields[1].startswith("/boot"):
+            fields[0] = f"UUID={session.boot_partition_uuid}"
+            lines.append("  ".join(fields))
+        else:
+            lines.append(line)
+    fstab.write_text("".join(f"{entry}\n" for entry in lines))
+
+
+def transfer_disk_image(plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession) -> None:
+    """Copy a full disk image (boot + root partitions) into a fresh encrypted layout.
+
+    Distributions that ship a partitioned .img rather than a rootfs tarball
+    (Raspberry Pi OS, moode, RetroPie, Manjaro ARM) are loop-mounted and their
+    first two partitions copied into a new LUKS container.
+    """
+    raw = plan.image_path.with_suffix("")
+    ui.info(f"Decompressing {plan.image_path} to {raw}...")
+    runner.pipeline(
+        decompress_command(plan.image_path),
+        ["dd", f"of={raw}", "bs=4M", "conv=fsync", "status=progress"],
+        error_msg=f"Decompressing {plan.image_path} failed.",
+    )
+    loop = loopimg.attach(raw)
+    source_boot = session.working_folder / "source-boot"
+    source_root = session.working_folder / "source-root"
+    try:
+        source_boot.mkdir()
+        source_root.mkdir()
+        runner.run(["mount", "-o", "ro", loopimg.partition(loop, 1), str(source_boot)], sudo=True)
+        runner.run(["mount", "-o", "ro", loopimg.partition(loop, 2), str(source_root)], sudo=True)
+
+        _create_encrypted_layout(plan, session)
+
+        ui.info("Copying the root filesystem into the encrypted container...")
+        _copy_tree(str(source_root), str(session.root_mount_path), ["-aHAX"])
+        ui.info("Copying the boot partition...")
+        _copy_tree(str(source_boot), str(session.boot_mount_path), ["-a"])
+        runner.sync_disks()
+        _fix_boot_fstab(session)
+    finally:
+        runner.run(["umount", "-v", str(source_boot)], sudo=True, check=False)
+        runner.run(["umount", "-v", str(source_root)], sudo=True, check=False)
+        loopimg.detach(loop)
+        for path in (source_boot, source_root):
+            runner.run(["rmdir", str(path)], sudo=True, check=False)
+
+
+def transfer_image(plan: ImagePlan, session: ImageSession, *, interactive: bool = True) -> None:
+    if interactive:
+        if ui.confirm(f"Should the partition table of {session.device.path} be deleted?"):
+            ui.info("Deleting...")
+            runner.run(["wipefs", "-a", session.device.path], sudo=True)
+        else:
+            ui.info("Skipping partition table deletion...")
+        device_module.overwrite_device(session.device)
+
+    ui.info("Starting image transfer...")
+    if plan.distribution == "arch":
+        transfer_arch_image(plan, session)
+        return
+    if plan.encrypt_system:
+        # Non-tarball distros ship a full .img; copy it into a LUKS container.
+        transfer_disk_image(plan, session)
+        return
+    blocksize = session.device.optimal_blocksize
+    ui.info(f"Transfering {plan.image_path.suffix} file...")
+    runner.pipeline(
+        decompress_command(plan.image_path),
+        [
+            "dd",
+            f"of={session.device.path}",
+            f"bs={blocksize}",
+            "conv=fsync",
+            "status=progress",
+        ],
+        sudo_last=True,
+        error_msg=f"DD {plan.image_path} to {session.device.path} failed.",
+    )
+    runner.sync_disks()

lim/image/unlock.py

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+"""Remote LUKS boot unlock over the initramfs SSH/dropbear session.
+
+Reaches the waiting initramfs either through a Tor onion address (wrapped in
+torsocks) or a plain host/IP, then either runs cryptroot-unlock (initramfs-tools
+targets) or drops into the passphrase prompt (mkinitcpio encryptssh).
+"""
+
+import json
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+RECORDS_SUBPATH = ".config/lim/unlocks"
+
+
+def records_dir(home: Path | None = None) -> Path:
+    return (home or Path.home()) / RECORDS_SUBPATH
+
+
+def build_unlock_argv(target: str, key: str, unlock_command: str) -> list[str]:
+    """SSH invocation for the unlock; torsocks-wrapped for .onion targets.
+
+    The initramfs dropbear key differs from the booted host key, so host-key
+    checking is disabled; a v3 onion address authenticates the endpoint itself.
+    """
+    ssh = ["ssh", "-o", "StrictHostKeyChecking=no", "-o", "UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null"]
+    if key:
+        ssh += ["-i", str(Path(key).expanduser())]
+    if unlock_command:
+        ssh += ["-t"]  # PTY so the remote passphrase prompt is interactive
+    ssh += [f"root@{target}"]
+    if unlock_command:
+        ssh += [unlock_command]
+    if target.endswith(".onion"):
+        return ["torsocks", *ssh]
+    return ssh
+
+
+def save_record(home: Path, uid: int, gid: int, name: str, record: dict) -> None:
+    """Persist an unlock target under the target user's home, owned by them."""
+    directory = records_dir(home)
+    directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    path = directory / f"{name}.json"
+    path.write_text(json.dumps(record, indent=2) + "\n")
+    try:
+        for entry in (path, directory, directory.parent, directory.parent.parent):
+            os.chown(entry, uid, gid)
+    except OSError:
+        pass
+
+
+def _read_record(path: Path) -> dict | None:
+    try:
+        return json.loads(path.read_text())
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return None
+
+
+def _load_records() -> list[tuple[str, dict]]:
+    directory = records_dir()
+    if not directory.is_dir():
+        return []
+    loaded = ((path.stem, _read_record(path)) for path in sorted(directory.glob("*.json")))
+    return [(name, record) for name, record in loaded if record is not None]
+
+
+def _select_record() -> dict | None:
+    records = _load_records()
+    if not records:
+        return None
+    ui.info("Saved unlock targets:")
+    for index, (name, record) in enumerate(records, 1):
+        ui.info(f"  {index}) {name} -> {record.get('target')}")
+    answer = ui.ask("Pick a number, or Enter for manual entry:")
+    if answer.isdigit() and 1 <= int(answer) <= len(records):
+        return records[int(answer) - 1][1]
+    return None
+
+
+def remote_unlock() -> None:
+    record = _select_record()
+    if record:
+        target = record["target"]
+        key = record.get("key", "")
+        unlock_command = record.get("unlock_command", "")
+    else:
+        target = ui.ask("Onion address or host/IP to unlock:")
+        if not target:
+            raise LimError("No target given.")
+        key = ui.ask("Path to the SSH private key (empty for ssh defaults):")
+        unlock_command = (
+            "cryptroot-unlock"
+            if ui.confirm("Debian / Raspberry Pi OS target (run cryptroot-unlock)?")
+            else ""
+        )
+    if target.endswith(".onion"):
+        ui.info("Routing through Tor (torsocks); a local tor must be running.")
+    runner.run(build_unlock_argv(target, key, unlock_command), check=False)

lim/image/verify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+"""Image integrity (checksums) and authenticity (GPG signatures) checks."""
+
+import hashlib
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+ALGORITHM_BY_DIGEST_LENGTH = {
+    32: "md5",
+    40: "sha1",
+    64: "sha256",
+    128: "sha512",
+}
+
+
+def url_exists(url: str) -> bool:
+    return runner.succeeds(["wget", "-q", "--method=HEAD", url])
+
+
+def resolve_checksum(download_url: str) -> str | None:
+    """Try to fetch a published checksum next to the image download."""
+    for extension in ("sha1", "sha512", "md5"):
+        checksum_url = f"{download_url}.{extension}"
+        ui.info(
+            f"Image Checksum is not defined. Try to download image signature from {checksum_url}."
+        )
+        if url_exists(checksum_url):
+            content = runner.output(["wget", checksum_url, "-q", "-O", "-"])
+            checksum = content.split()[0] if content.split() else ""
+            if checksum:
+                ui.info(f"Defined image_checksum as {checksum}")
+                return checksum
+        ui.warning(f"No checksum found under {checksum_url}.")
+    return None
+
+
+def verify_checksum(image_path: str | Path, checksum: str | None) -> None:
+    """Verify the image against an md5/sha1/sha256/sha512 hex checksum."""
+    if not checksum:
+        ui.warning("No checksum is defined. Skipping checksum verification.")
+        return
+    algorithm = ALGORITHM_BY_DIGEST_LENGTH.get(len(checksum))
+    if algorithm is None:
+        raise LimError(
+            f"Checksum '{checksum}' has no recognized digest length "
+            "(expected md5, sha1, sha256 or sha512)."
+        )
+    ui.info(f"Checking {algorithm} checksum...")
+    digest = hashlib.new(algorithm)
+    with Path(image_path).open("rb") as handle:
+        while chunk := handle.read(1024 * 1024):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    if digest.hexdigest() != checksum.lower():
+        raise LimError("Verification failed. HINT: Force the download of the image.")
+    ui.info(f"{algorithm} checksum verified.")
+
+
+def verify_signature(download_url: str, image_path: str | Path, image_folder: Path) -> None:
+    """Best-effort GPG signature verification of the downloaded image."""
+    ui.info("Note: Checksums verify integrity but do not confirm authenticity.")
+    ui.info(
+        "Proceeding to signature verification, which ensures the file comes from a trusted source."
+    )
+    signature_url = f"{download_url}.sig"
+    ui.info(f"Attempting to download the image signature from: {signature_url}")
+    if not url_exists(signature_url):
+        ui.warning(f"No signature found under {signature_url}.")
+        return
+
+    signature_path = image_folder / (Path(str(image_path)).name + ".sig")
+    if not runner.succeeds(["wget", "-q", "-O", str(signature_path), signature_url]):
+        ui.warning("Failed to download the signature file.")
+        return
+
+    ui.info("Extract the key ID from the signature file")
+    verification = runner.output(
+        ["gpg", "--status-fd", "1", "--verify", str(signature_path), str(image_path)],
+        check=False,
+    )
+    missing_keys = re.findall(r"NO_PUBKEY (\S+)", verification)
+    if missing_keys:
+        key_id = missing_keys[-1]
+        if runner.succeeds(["gpg", "--list-keys", key_id]):
+            ui.info(f"Key {key_id} already in keyring.")
+        else:
+            ui.info("Import the public key")
+            runner.run(
+                ["gpg", "--keyserver", "keyserver.ubuntu.com", "--recv-keys", key_id],
+                check=False,
+            )
+
+    ui.info("Verify the signature")
+    if runner.succeeds(["gpg", "--verify", str(signature_path), str(image_path)]):
+        ui.info("Signature verification succeeded.")
+    else:
+        ui.warning("Signature verification failed.")

lim/image/wizard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+"""Guided setup: an encrypted, Tor-remote-unlockable Linux image on a device.
+
+All questions are asked up front (``_collect``); the build then runs unattended
+(``_execute``): pick a distribution and target block device (the internal SSD of
+a USB-booted Pi, or a spare stick to clone later), download the image, copy it
+into a LUKS container, create the login user, and bake the initramfs Tor onion
+unlock. Works for any distribution with an initramfs backend (Arch/Manjaro via
+mkinitcpio, Raspberry Pi OS/moode/RetroPie via initramfs-tools).
+"""
+
+import os
+import pwd
+import shlex
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+from lim.image import choosers, crossarch, transfer, unlock
+from lim.image.encryption import configure_encryption
+from lim.image.plan import ImagePlan
+from lim.image.session import ImageSession, chroot_bash
+
+
+@dataclass
+class _Answers:
+    host_user: str
+    device: device_module.Device
+    pubkey: Path
+    hostname: str
+    login_user: str
+    login_password: str
+
+
+def _intro() -> None:
+    ui.info("Guided encrypted Linux image setup with Tor remote unlock.")
+    ui.info("The TARGET must be an attached block device:")
+    ui.info("  - internal SSD: boot the Pi from USB, then target /dev/sda or /dev/nvme0n1")
+    ui.info("  - golden image: target a spare USB stick, clone it onto the SSD afterwards")
+    ui.warning("The target device will be COMPLETELY ERASED.")
+
+
+def _prepare_image_folder(plan: ImagePlan) -> str:
+    """Cache downloads under the invoking (sudo) user's home; return that user."""
+    host_user = os.environ.get("SUDO_USER") or "root"
+    try:
+        home = Path(pwd.getpwnam(host_user).pw_dir)
+    except KeyError:
+        host_user, home = "root", Path("/root")
+    plan.image_folder = home / "Software/Images"
+    plan.image_folder.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    ui.info(f"Images are cached in {plan.image_folder}.")
+    return host_user
+
+
+def _select_target() -> device_module.Device:
+    device = device_module.select_device()
+    if device_module.is_mounted(device.path):
+        raise LimError(f"{device.path} is mounted. Unmount it first (umount {device.path}*).")
+    ui.warning(f"Everything on {device.path} will be destroyed.")
+    answer = ui.ask(f"Retype the device name ({device.name}) to confirm ERASE of {device.path}:")
+    if answer.strip().removeprefix("/dev/") != device.name:
+        raise LimError("Confirmation did not match. Aborting.")
+    return device
+
+
+def _ask_pubkey() -> Path:
+    answer = ui.ask("Path to the SSH PUBLIC key (unlocks AND logs in):").strip()
+    if not answer:
+        raise LimError("No SSH public key path given.")
+    pubkey = Path(answer).expanduser()
+    if not pubkey.is_file():
+        raise LimError(f"SSH public key {pubkey} not found.")
+    return pubkey
+
+
+def _collect(plan: ImagePlan) -> _Answers | None:
+    """Ask everything up front so ``_execute`` can run without prompts."""
+    _intro()
+    if not ui.confirm("Continue?"):
+        return None
+    choosers.choose_linux_image(plan)
+    plan.root_filesystem = plan.root_filesystem or "ext4"
+    device = _select_target()
+    hostname = ui.ask("Hostname for the system:").strip()
+    login_user = ui.ask("Login username to create on the system (default pi):").strip() or "pi"
+    login_password = ui.ask(f"Login password for {login_user} (empty for key-only login):")
+    pubkey = _ask_pubkey()
+    host_user = _prepare_image_folder(plan)
+    crossarch.ensure_ready()  # may install qemu; done here, before the erase in _execute
+    ui.success("All questions answered — the build now runs unattended.")
+    return _Answers(host_user, device, pubkey, hostname, login_user, login_password)
+
+
+def _build_authorized_keys(session: ImageSession, pubkey: Path) -> Path:
+    authorized_keys = session.working_folder / "authorized_keys"
+    authorized_keys.write_text(pubkey.read_text())
+    return authorized_keys
+
+
+def _apply_system_config(session: ImageSession, hostname: str) -> str:
+    """Write the hostname and enable the post-boot SSH server; return the hostname."""
+    root = session.root_mount_path
+    if hostname:
+        (root / "etc/hostname").write_text(hostname + "\n")
+    # RPi OS enables sshd on first boot when this marker exists on the boot fs.
+    (session.boot_mount_path / "ssh").write_text("")
+    return (root / "etc/hostname").read_text().strip()
+
+
+def _configure_login_user(session: ImageSession, user: str, password: str, pubkey: Path) -> None:
+    """Rename a stock default user to the chosen one (or create it); add sudo + key.
+
+    Renaming pi/alarm reuses the account (uid, sudoers) and leaves no lingering
+    default; a fresh useradd covers images without one (e.g. RPi OS Bookworm).
+    """
+    key = shlex.quote(pubkey.read_text().strip())
+    ui.info(f"Configuring login user {user}...")
+    script = f"""\
+target={shlex.quote(user)}
+for old in pi alarm; do
+  id "$old" >/dev/null 2>&1 || continue
+  [ "$old" = "$target" ] && continue
+  id "$target" >/dev/null 2>&1 && continue
+  usermod -l "$target" "$old"
+  usermod -d "/home/$target" -m "$target"
+  groupmod -n "$target" "$old" 2>/dev/null || true
+  break
+done
+id "$target" >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd -m -s /bin/bash "$target"
+usermod -aG sudo "$target" 2>/dev/null || true
+install -d -m 700 "/home/$target/.ssh"
+printf '%s\\n' {key} > "/home/$target/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+chmod 600 "/home/$target/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+chown -R "$target:$target" "/home/$target/.ssh"
+"""
+    if password:
+        script += f"printf '%s' {shlex.quote(f'{user}:{password}')} | chpasswd\n"
+    chroot_bash(session.root_mount_path, script)
+
+
+def _save_unlock_record(
+    plan: ImagePlan, host_user: str, hostname: str, onion: str | None, pubkey: Path
+) -> None:
+    if not onion:
+        return
+    private_key = str(pubkey).removesuffix(".pub")
+    unlock_command = "" if plan.distribution in ("arch", "manjaro") else "cryptroot-unlock"
+    record = {
+        "target": onion,
+        "key": private_key,
+        "unlock_command": unlock_command,
+        "hostname": hostname,
+    }
+    entry = pwd.getpwnam(host_user)
+    try:
+        unlock.save_record(
+            Path(entry.pw_dir), entry.pw_uid, entry.pw_gid, hostname or "device", record
+        )
+        ui.info("Saved unlock target; run later with: lim --type remote-unlock")
+    except OSError as exc:
+        ui.warning(f"Could not save unlock record: {exc}")
+
+
+def _print_summary(answers: _Answers, hostname: str, onion: str | None) -> None:
+    ui.success("Encrypted Linux image is ready.")
+    ui.info(f"Target device : {answers.device.path}  (hostname: {hostname})")
+    if onion:
+        ui.info(f"Onion address : {onion}")
+        ui.info(f"Unlock later  : lim --type remote-unlock   (or: torsocks ssh root@{onion})")
+    ui.info(f"After unlock, log in: ssh {answers.login_user}@<the box>")
+    ui.info("Golden image? Clone this device onto the SSD, then grow it:")
+    ui.info("  parted <ssd> resizepart 2 100% && cryptsetup resize <mapper> && resize2fs <mapper>")
+
+
+def _execute(plan: ImagePlan, answers: _Answers) -> None:
+    transfer.download_image(plan, force_prompt=False)
+    session = ImageSession(answers.device)
+    authorized_keys = None
+    try:
+        session.make_working_folder()
+        session.make_mount_folders()
+        transfer.transfer_image(plan, session, interactive=False)
+        authorized_keys = _build_authorized_keys(session, answers.pubkey)
+        hostname = _apply_system_config(session, answers.hostname)
+        session.mount_chroot_binds()
+        session.copy_resolv_conf()
+        onion = configure_encryption(plan, session, authorized_keys)
+        _configure_login_user(session, answers.login_user, answers.login_password, answers.pubkey)
+        _save_unlock_record(plan, answers.host_user, hostname, onion, answers.pubkey)
+        _print_summary(answers, hostname, onion)
+    finally:
+        if authorized_keys is not None:
+            authorized_keys.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        session.destructor()
+
+
+def run_guided() -> None:
+    ui.header()
+    plan = ImagePlan(encrypt_system=True, tor_unlock=True)
+    answers = _collect(plan)
+    if answers is None:
+        ui.info("Aborted.")
+        return
+    _execute(plan, answers)

lim/luks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"""LUKS key management plus crypttab/fstab bookkeeping."""
+
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import fsutil, runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+LUKS_KEY_DIRECTORY = Path("/etc/luks-keys")
+CRYPTTAB_PATH = Path("/etc/crypttab")
+FSTAB_PATH = Path("/etc/fstab")
+
+
+def luks_uuid(partition_path: str) -> str:
+    dump = runner.output(["cryptsetup", "luksDump", partition_path], sudo=True)
+    match = re.search(r"UUID:\s*(\S+)", dump)
+    if not match:
+        raise LimError(f"Could not read LUKS UUID of {partition_path}.")
+    return match.group(1)
+
+
+def create_luks_key_and_update_crypttab(
+    mapper_name: str,
+    partition_path: str,
+    *,
+    key_directory: Path = LUKS_KEY_DIRECTORY,
+    crypttab_path: Path = CRYPTTAB_PATH,
+) -> None:
+    """Generate a random keyfile, register it with LUKS and /etc/crypttab."""
+    ui.info("Creating luks-key-directory...")
+    key_directory.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secret_key_path = key_directory / f"{mapper_name}.keyfile"
+    ui.info(f"Generate secret key under: {secret_key_path}")
+    if secret_key_path.exists():
+        ui.warning("File already exists. Overwriting!")
+    runner.run(
+        ["dd", "if=/dev/urandom", f"of={secret_key_path}", "bs=512", "count=8"],
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+    runner.sync_disks()
+
+    ui.info("Opening and closing device to verify that everything works fine...")
+    closed = runner.run(["cryptsetup", "-v", "luksClose", mapper_name], sudo=True, check=False)
+    if closed.returncode != 0:
+        ui.info(f"No need to luksClose {mapper_name}. Device isn't open.")
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksAddKey", partition_path, str(secret_key_path)], sudo=True)
+    runner.run(
+        [
+            "cryptsetup",
+            "-v",
+            "luksOpen",
+            partition_path,
+            mapper_name,
+            f"--key-file={secret_key_path}",
+        ],
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "-v", "luksClose", mapper_name], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.info("Reading UUID...")
+    uuid = luks_uuid(partition_path)
+    entry = f"{mapper_name} UUID={uuid} {secret_key_path} luks"
+    ui.info("Adding crypttab entry...")
+    fsutil.ensure_line_in_file(entry, crypttab_path)
+    ui.info(f"The file {crypttab_path} contains now the following:")
+    print(crypttab_path.read_text())
+
+
+def update_fstab(mapper_path: str, mount_path: str, *, fstab_path: Path = FSTAB_PATH) -> None:
+    entry = f"{mapper_path} {mount_path} btrfs   defaults   0       2"
+    ui.info("Adding fstab entry...")
+    fsutil.ensure_line_in_file(entry, fstab_path)
+    ui.info(f"The file {fstab_path} contains now the following:")
+    print(fstab_path.read_text())

lim/packages.py

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+"""Reads package collections from configuration/packages/."""
+
+from lim import config
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+
+def get_packages(*collections: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Package names from the given collections, comments stripped."""
+    names: list[str] = []
+    for collection in collections:
+        path = config.PACKAGE_PATH / f"{collection}.txt"
+        if not path.is_file():
+            raise LimError(f"Package collection {path} does not exist.")
+        for line in path.read_text().splitlines():
+            name = line.split("#", 1)[0].strip()
+            if name:
+                names.append(name)
+    return names

lim/runner.py

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+"""Thin wrapper around subprocess for all external commands.
+
+Every module calls external tools through this module so tests can
+replace ``run``/``output``/``succeeds``/``pipeline`` with fakes.
+
+Missing binaries never surface as tracebacks: actions (``check=True``,
+``pipeline``) abort with a clear LimError, tolerated calls
+(``check=False``, ``succeeds``) degrade to a warning plus shell-style
+exit code 127.
+"""
+
+import os
+import shlex
+import subprocess
+
+from lim import ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+COMMAND_NOT_FOUND = 127
+
+
+def _with_sudo(cmd: list[str], *, sudo: bool) -> list[str]:
+    parts = [str(part) for part in cmd]
+    if sudo and os.geteuid() != 0:
+        return ["sudo", *parts]
+    return parts
+
+
+def _not_found_message(cmd: list[str]) -> str:
+    return f"Command not found: {cmd[0]} — please install it."
+
+
+def run(
+    cmd: list[str],
+    *,
+    sudo: bool = False,
+    input_text: str | None = None,
+    check: bool = True,
+    error_msg: str | None = None,
+) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
+    """Run a command inheriting stdio so progress output stays visible."""
+    cmd = _with_sudo(cmd, sudo=sudo)
+    ui.info(f"Running: {shlex.join(cmd)}")
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(cmd, input=input_text, text=True, check=False)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        if check:
+            raise LimError(error_msg or _not_found_message(cmd)) from None
+        ui.warning(_not_found_message(cmd))
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(cmd, COMMAND_NOT_FOUND)
+    if check and result.returncode != 0:
+        raise LimError(
+            error_msg or f"Command failed with code {result.returncode}: {shlex.join(cmd)}"
+        )
+    return result
+
+
+def output(
+    cmd: list[str],
+    *,
+    sudo: bool = False,
+    check: bool = True,
+    error_msg: str | None = None,
+) -> str:
+    """Run a command and return its stripped stdout."""
+    cmd = _with_sudo(cmd, sudo=sudo)
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(cmd, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        if check:
+            raise LimError(error_msg or _not_found_message(cmd)) from None
+        ui.warning(_not_found_message(cmd))
+        return ""
+    if check and result.returncode != 0:
+        raise LimError(
+            error_msg
+            or f"Command failed with code {result.returncode}: {shlex.join(cmd)}"
+            + (f"\n{result.stderr.strip()}" if result.stderr else "")
+        )
+    return result.stdout.strip()
+
+
+def succeeds(cmd: list[str], *, sudo: bool = False) -> bool:
+    """Run a command silently, report whether it exited with 0."""
+    cmd = _with_sudo(cmd, sudo=sudo)
+    try:
+        return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=False).returncode == 0
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        ui.warning(_not_found_message(cmd))
+        return False
+
+
+def pipeline(
+    *cmds: list[str],
+    sudo_last: bool = False,
+    error_msg: str | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    """Run commands as a shell-style pipeline (cmd1 | cmd2 | ...)."""
+    prepared = [
+        _with_sudo(cmd, sudo=sudo_last and index == len(cmds) - 1) for index, cmd in enumerate(cmds)
+    ]
+    pretty = " | ".join(shlex.join(cmd) for cmd in prepared)
+    ui.info(f"Running: {pretty}")
+    processes: list[subprocess.Popen] = []
+    previous_stdout = None
+    try:
+        for index, cmd in enumerate(prepared):
+            last = index == len(prepared) - 1
+            process = subprocess.Popen(
+                cmd,
+                stdin=previous_stdout,
+                stdout=None if last else subprocess.PIPE,
+            )
+            if previous_stdout is not None:
+                previous_stdout.close()
+            previous_stdout = process.stdout
+            processes.append(process)
+    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+        if previous_stdout is not None:
+            previous_stdout.close()
+        for process in processes:
+            process.kill()
+            process.wait()
+        raise LimError(f"Command not found: {exc.filename} — please install it.") from None
+    for process in processes:
+        process.wait()
+    if any(process.returncode != 0 for process in processes):
+        raise LimError(error_msg or f"Pipeline failed: {pretty}")
+
+
+def sync_disks() -> None:
+    run(["sync"])

lim/storage/common.py

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+"""Shared path derivation for encrypted storage setups."""
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import ui
+from lim.device import Device
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class StorageTarget:
+    """An encrypted drive plus all derived mapper/mount/partition paths."""
+
+    device: Device
+
+    @property
+    def mapper_name(self) -> str:
+        return f"encrypteddrive-{self.device.name}"
+
+    @property
+    def mapper_path(self) -> str:
+        return f"/dev/mapper/{self.mapper_name}"
+
+    @property
+    def mount_path(self) -> str:
+        return f"/media/{self.mapper_name}"
+
+    @property
+    def partition_path(self) -> str:
+        return self.device.partition(1)
+
+
+def select_storage_target() -> StorageTarget:
+    target = StorageTarget(device_module.select_device())
+    ui.info(f"mapper name set to : {target.mapper_name}")
+    ui.info(f"mapper path set to : {target.mapper_path}")
+    ui.info(f"mount path set to : {target.mount_path}")
+    return target

lim/storage/raid1.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""Encrypted Btrfs RAID1 across two drives.
+
+See https://balaskas.gr/btrfs/raid1.html and
+https://mutschler.eu/linux/install-guides/ubuntu-btrfs-raid1/
+"""
+
+from lim import luks, runner, ui
+from lim.storage.common import StorageTarget, select_storage_target
+
+
+def _select_pair() -> tuple[StorageTarget, StorageTarget]:
+    ui.info("RAID1 partition 1...")
+    first = select_storage_target()
+    ui.info("RAID1 partition 2...")
+    second = select_storage_target()
+    return first, second
+
+
+def setup() -> None:
+    first, second = _select_pair()
+
+    ui.info(f"Encrypting {first.device.path}...")
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksFormat", first.device.path], sudo=True)
+    ui.info(f"Encrypting {second.device.path}...")
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksFormat", second.device.path], sudo=True)
+
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksOpen", first.device.path, first.mapper_name], sudo=True)
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksOpen", second.device.path, second.mapper_name], sudo=True)
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "status", first.mapper_path], sudo=True)
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "status", second.mapper_path], sudo=True)
+
+    runner.run(
+        [
+            "mkfs.btrfs",
+            "-m",
+            "raid1",
+            "-d",
+            "raid1",
+            first.mapper_path,
+            second.mapper_path,
+        ],
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+
+    ui.success("Encryption successfull :)")
+
+
+def _show_luks_devices() -> None:
+    for name in runner.output(["lsblk", "-dno", "NAME"], check=False).split():
+        if runner.succeeds(["cryptsetup", "isLuks", f"/dev/{name}"], sudo=True):
+            ui.info(f"/dev/{name} is a LUKS encrypted storage device.")
+
+
+def mount_on_boot() -> None:
+    ui.info("Activate Automount raid1 encrypted storages...")
+    _show_luks_devices()
+
+    first, second = _select_pair()
+
+    luks.create_luks_key_and_update_crypttab(first.mapper_name, first.device.path)
+    ui.info(f'Creating mount folder under "{first.mount_path}"...')
+    runner.run(["mkdir", "-vp", first.mount_path], sudo=True)
+    luks.create_luks_key_and_update_crypttab(second.mapper_name, second.device.path)
+    luks.update_fstab(first.mapper_path, first.mount_path)
+
+    ui.success("Installation finished. Please restart :)")

lim/storage/single_drive.py

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+"""Single-drive LUKS + Btrfs storage: setup, mount, umount, mount-on-boot."""
+
+from lim import device as device_module
+from lim import luks, runner, system, ui
+from lim.storage.common import select_storage_target
+
+# fdisk answer sequences; empty lines accept the defaults.
+CREATE_GPT_TABLE_INPUT = "g\nw\n"
+CREATE_PARTITION_INPUT = "n\n\n\n\np\nw\n"
+
+
+def setup() -> None:
+    print("Setups disk encryption")
+    target = select_storage_target()
+
+    device_module.overwrite_device(target.device)
+
+    ui.info("Creating new GPT partition table...")
+    runner.run(
+        ["fdisk", "--wipe", "always", target.device.path],
+        input_text=CREATE_GPT_TABLE_INPUT,
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+    ui.info("Creating partition table...")
+    runner.run(
+        ["fdisk", "--wipe", "always", target.device.path],
+        input_text=CREATE_PARTITION_INPUT,
+        sudo=True,
+    )
+
+    ui.info(f"Encrypt {target.device.path}...")
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "-v", "-y", "luksFormat", target.partition_path], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.info("Unlock partition...")
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksOpen", target.partition_path, target.mapper_name], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.info("Create btrfs file system...")
+    runner.run(["mkfs.btrfs", target.mapper_path], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.info(f'Creating mount folder under "{target.mount_path}"...')
+    runner.run(["mkdir", "-p", target.mount_path], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.info("Mount partition...")
+    runner.run(["mount", target.mapper_path, target.mount_path], sudo=True)
+
+    user = system.real_user()
+    ui.info("Own partition by user...")
+    runner.run(["chown", "-R", f"{user}:{user}", target.mount_path], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.success("Encryption successfull :)")
+
+
+def mount() -> None:
+    print("Mounts encrypted storages")
+    target = select_storage_target()
+
+    ui.info("Unlock partition...")
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksOpen", target.partition_path, target.mapper_name], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.info("Mount partition...")
+    runner.run(["mount", target.mapper_path, target.mount_path], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.success("Mounting successfull :)")
+
+
+def umount() -> None:
+    print("Unmount encrypted storages")
+    target = select_storage_target()
+
+    ui.info(f"Unmount {target.mapper_path}...")
+    runner.run(["umount", target.mapper_path], sudo=True)
+    runner.run(["cryptsetup", "luksClose", target.mapper_name], sudo=True)
+
+    ui.success("Successfull :)")
+
+
+def mount_on_boot() -> None:
+    print("Automount encrypted storages")
+    target = select_storage_target()
+
+    luks.create_luks_key_and_update_crypttab(target.mapper_name, target.partition_path)
+    luks.update_fstab(target.mapper_path, target.mount_path)
+
+    ui.success("Installation finished. Please restart :)")

lim/system.py

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+"""Process-level helpers: privilege handling and user resolution."""
+
+import getpass
+import os
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from lim import ui
+
+
+def is_root() -> bool:
+    return os.geteuid() == 0
+
+
+def ensure_root() -> None:
+    """Re-execute the current command with sudo when not running as root."""
+    if is_root():
+        return
+    ui.info("Root privileges required. Re-executing with sudo...")
+    script = str(Path(sys.argv[0]).resolve())
+    # Deliberate privilege escalation: replace this process with sudo.
+    os.execvp("sudo", ["sudo", sys.executable, script, *sys.argv[1:]])  # noqa: S606
+
+
+def real_user() -> str:
+    """Return the invoking user, even when running under sudo."""
+    return os.environ.get("SUDO_USER") or getpass.getuser()
+
+
+def real_home() -> Path:
+    """Home directory of the invoking user, even when running under sudo."""
+    sudo_user = os.environ.get("SUDO_USER")
+    if sudo_user:
+        return Path("/home") / sudo_user
+    return Path.home()

lim/ui.py

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+"""Colored console messages and interactive prompts."""
+
+import sys
+
+_USE_COLOR = sys.stdout.isatty()
+
+
+def _color(code: str) -> str:
+    return f"\033[{code}m" if _USE_COLOR else ""
+
+
+COLOR_RED = _color("31")
+COLOR_GREEN = _color("32")
+COLOR_YELLOW = _color("33")
+COLOR_BLUE = _color("34")
+COLOR_MAGENTA = _color("35")
+COLOR_CYAN = _color("36")
+COLOR_WHITE = _color("37")
+COLOR_RESET = _color("0")
+
+
+def message(color: str, tag: str, text: str) -> None:
+    print(f"{color}[{tag}]:{COLOR_RESET} {text}")
+
+
+def question(text: str) -> None:
+    message(COLOR_MAGENTA, "QUESTION", text)
+
+
+def info(text: str) -> None:
+    message(COLOR_BLUE, "INFO", text)
+
+
+def warning(text: str) -> None:
+    message(COLOR_YELLOW, "WARNING", text)
+
+
+def success(text: str) -> None:
+    message(COLOR_GREEN, "SUCCESS", text)
+
+
+def error(text: str) -> None:
+    message(COLOR_RED, "ERROR", text)
+
+
+def ask(prompt: str) -> str:
+    question(prompt)
+    return input().strip()
+
+
+def confirm(prompt: str) -> bool:
+    return ask(f"{prompt}(y/N)") == "y"
+
+
+def header() -> None:
+    print(
+        f"\n{COLOR_YELLOW}The\n"
+        "LINUX IMAGE MANAGER\n"
+        "is an administration tool designed from and for Kevin Veen-Birkenbach.\n\n"
+        "Licensed under GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 3"
+        f"{COLOR_RESET}\n"
+    )

main.py

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Entry point for the Linux Image Manager (lim)."""
+
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
+
+from lim.cli import main
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

pyproject.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+[build-system]
+# 77+ for PEP 639 SPDX `license = "..."` + `license-files`.
+requires = ["setuptools>=77"]
+build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
+
+[project]
+name = "linux-image-manager"
+version = "2.2.0"
+description = "CLI (`lim`) for downloading, verifying and flashing Linux images, LUKS/Btrfs encrypted storage (single drive and RAID1), image backups and chroot maintenance"
+readme = "README.md"
+requires-python = ">=3.10"
+authors = [{ name = "Kevin Veen-Birkenbach", email = "kevin@veen.world" }]
+maintainers = [{ name = "Kevin Veen-Birkenbach", email = "kevin@veen.world" }]
+license = "GPL-3.0-only"
+license-files = ["LICENSE.txt"]
+urls = { Homepage = "https://veen.world", Repository = "https://github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/linux-image-manager" }
+classifiers = [
+  "Environment :: Console",
+  "Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux",
+  "Programming Language :: Python :: 3",
+]
+dependencies = ["PyYAML>=6"]
+
+[project.scripts]
+lim = "lim.cli:main"
+
+[tool.setuptools.packages.find]
+include = ["lim*"]
+
+[tool.setuptools.package-data]
+lim = [
+  "distributions.yml",
+  "configuration/packages/**/*.txt",
+  "configuration/initcpio/*",
+  "configuration/initramfs-tools/*",
+]
+
+[tool.pytest.ini_options]
+testpaths = ["tests"]
+
+[tool.ruff]
+target-version = "py310"
+line-length = 100
+
+[tool.ruff.lint]
+select = ["ALL"]
+ignore = [
+    # This tool's UI is print/prompt based and its purpose is orchestrating
+    # system commands — these rules contradict the design:
+    "T201",    # print used as console UI
+    "S603",    # subprocess without shell is exactly what runner.py wraps
+    "S607",    # system tools are resolved via PATH on purpose
+    # Style choices:
+    "D203",    # conflicts with D211 (blank line before class docstring)
+    "D213",    # conflicts with D212 (multi-line docstring summary position)
+    "D1",      # docstrings are not required on every symbol
+    "COM812",  # trailing commas are handled by the formatter
+    "TRY003",  # exception messages are written inline
+    "EM101",   # literal exception messages are fine
+    "EM102",   # f-string exception messages are fine
+]
+
+[tool.ruff.lint.per-file-ignores]
+"tests/*" = [
+    "S101",    # pytest asserts
+    "ANN",     # test signatures need no annotations
+    "PLR2004", # literal expectations in assertions
+    "ARG",     # fixtures are injected even when unused
+    "SLF001",  # tests may exercise internal helpers directly
+]

requirements.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+pacman:
+  - pv

scripts/base.sh

@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# This script contains the global program variables and functions
-#
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034 #Deactivate checking of unused variables
-# shellcheck disable=SC2003 #Deactivate "expr is antiquated"
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015 #Deactivate bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2005 #Remove useless echo hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2010 #Deactivate ls | grep hint
-REPOSITORY_PATH="$(readlink -f "${0}" | sed -e 's/\/scripts\/.*//g')"
-CONFIGURATION_PATH="$REPOSITORY_PATH""/configuration/"
-PACKAGE_PATH="$CONFIGURATION_PATH""packages/"
-TEMPLATE_PATH="$CONFIGURATION_PATH""templates/";
-HOME_TEMPLATE_PATH="$TEMPLATE_PATH""home/";
-ENCRYPTED_PATH="$REPOSITORY_PATH/.encrypted";
-DECRYPTED_PATH="$REPOSITORY_PATH/decrypted";
-SCRIPT_PATH="$REPOSITORY_PATH/scripts/";
-DATA_PATH="$DECRYPTED_PATH/data";
-BACKUP_PATH="$DECRYPTED_PATH/backup";
-
-COLOR_RED=$(tput setaf 1)
-COLOR_GREEN=$(tput setaf 2)
-COLOR_YELLOW=$(tput setaf 3)
-COLOR_BLUE=$(tput setaf 4)
-COLOR_MAGENTA=$(tput setaf 5)
-COLOR_CYAN=$(tput setaf 6)
-COLOR_WHITE=$(tput setaf 7)
-COLOR_RESET=$(tput sgr0)
-
-# FUNCTIONS
-
-message(){
-  echo "$1[$2]:${COLOR_RESET} $3 ";
-}
-
-question(){
-  message "${COLOR_MAGENTA}" "QUESTION" "$1";
-}
-
-info(){
-  message "${COLOR_BLUE}" "INFO" "$1";
-}
-
-warning(){
-  message "${COLOR_YELLOW}" "WARNING" "$1";
-}
-
-success(){
-  message "${COLOR_GREEN}" "SUCCESS" "$1";
-}
-
-error(){
-  if [ -z "$1" ]
-    then
-      message="Failed."
-    else
-      message="$1"
-  fi
-  message "${COLOR_RED}" "ERROR" "$message -> Leaving program."
-  if declare -f "destructor" > /dev/null
-    then
-      info "Calling destructor..."
-      destructor
-    else
-      warning "No destructor defined."
-      info "Can be that this script left some waste."
-  fi
-  exit 1;
-}
-
-# Routine to echo the full sd-card-path
-set_device_path(){
-  info "Available devices:"
-  ls -lasi /dev/ | grep -E "sd|mm"
-  question "Please type in the name of the device: /dev/" && read -r device
-  device_path="/dev/$device"
-  if [ ! -b "$device_path" ]
-    then
-      error "$device_path is not valid device."
-  fi
-  info "Device path set to: $device_path"
-  # @see https://www.heise.de/ct/hotline/Optimale-Blockgroesse-fuer-dd-2056768.html
-  PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE_PATH="/sys/block/$device/queue/physical_block_size"
-  if [ -f "$PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE_PATH" ]; then
-      PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE=$(sudo cat $PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE_PATH)
-      if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
-          OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE=$((64 * PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE)) || error
-      else
-          echo "Unable to read $PHYSICAL_BLOCK_SIZE_PATH"
-          OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE="4K"
-      fi
-  else
-      OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE="4K"
-  fi
-  info "Optimal blocksize set to: $OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE" || error
-}
-
-overwrite_device() {
-  question "Should $device_path be overwritten with zeros before copying? (y/N/block count)" && read -r copy_zeros_to_device
-  case "$copy_zeros_to_device" in
-    y)
-      info "Overwriting entire device..." &&
-      dd if=/dev/zero of="$device_path" bs="$OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE" status=progress || error "Overwriting $device_path failed."
-      ;;
-    N|'')
-      info "Skipping Overwriting..."
-      ;;
-    ''|*[!0-9]*)
-      error "Invalid input."
-      ;;
-    *)
-      if [[ "$copy_zeros_to_device" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
-        info "Overwriting $copy_zeros_to_device blocks..." &&
-        dd if=/dev/zero of="$device_path" bs="$OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE" count="$copy_zeros_to_device" status=progress || error "Overwriting $device_path failed."
-      else
-        error "Invalid input. Block count must be a number."
-      fi
-      ;;
-  esac
-}
-
-get_packages(){
-  for package_collection in "$@"
-  do
-    package_collection_path="$PACKAGE_PATH""$package_collection.txt" &&
-    echo "$(sed -e "/^#/d" -e "s/#.*//" "$package_collection_path" | tr '\n' ' ')" ||
-    error
-  done
-}
-
-HEADER(){
-  echo
-  echo "${COLOR_YELLOW}The"
-  echo "LINUX IMAGE MANAGER"
-  echo "is an administration tool designed from and for Kevin Veen-Birkenbach."
-  echo
-  echo "Licensed under GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE Version 3"
-  echo "${COLOR_RESET}"
-}
-
-HEADER

scripts/data/export-to-system.sh

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# Executes the import script in reverse mode
-# @author Kevin Veen-Birkenbach [aka. Frantz]
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-bash "$SCRIPT_PATH""data/import-from-system.sh" reverse
-info "Setting right permissions for importet files..." &&
-chmod -R 700 ~/.ssh &&
-chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_rsa &&
-chmod 600 ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub || error "Failed to set correct ssh permissions"
-chown -R "$USER":"$USER" ~ || warning "Not all files could be owned by user \"$USER\"..."

scripts/data/import-from-system.sh

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# Imports data from the system
-# @param $1 If the first parameter is "reverse" the data will be exported to the system
-#
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-# shellcheck disable=SC2143  # Comparing with -z allowed
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-
-declare -a BACKUP_LIST=("$HOME/.ssh/" \
-  "$HOME/.gitconfig" \
-  "$HOME/.atom/config.cson" \
-  "$HOME/.projectlibre/projectlibre.conf" \
-  "$HOME/.local/share/rhythmbox/rhythmdb.xml" \
-  "$HOME/.config/keepassxc/keepassxc.ini" \
-  "$HOME/Documents/certificates/" \
-  "$HOME/Documents/security/" \
-  "$HOME/Documents/identity/" \
-  "$HOME/Documents/health/" \
-  "$HOME/Documents/licenses/");
-
-if [ -z "$(mount | grep "$DECRYPTED_PATH")" ]
-  then
-    info "The decrypted folder $DECRYPTED_PATH is locked. You need to unlock it!" &&
-    bash "$SCRIPT_PATH""encryption/data/unlock.sh" || error "Unlocking failed.";
-fi
-if [ "$1" = "reverse" ]
-  then
-    MODE="export"
-  else
-    MODE="import"
-fi
-CONCRETE_BACKUP_FOLDER="$BACKUP_PATH/$MODE/$(date '+%Y%m%d%H%M%S')"
-mkdir -p "$CONCRETE_BACKUP_FOLDER" || error "Failed to create \"$CONCRETE_BACKUP_FOLDER\"."
-for system_item_path in "${BACKUP_LIST[@]}";
-do
-    data_item_path="$DATA_PATH$system_item_path"
-    if [ "$MODE" = "export" ]
-      then
-        destination="$system_item_path"
-        source="$data_item_path"
-        info "Export data from $source to $destination..."
-      else
-        source="$system_item_path"
-        destination="$data_item_path"
-        info "Import data from $source to $destination..."
-    fi
-    if [ -f "$destination" ]
-      then
-        info "The destination file allready exists!" &&
-        info "Difference:" &&
-        diff "$destination" "$source"
-    fi
-    destination_dir=$(dirname "$destination")
-    mkdir -p "$destination_dir" || error "Failed to create \"$destination_dir\"."
-    if [ -f "$source" ]
-      then
-        backup_dir=$(dirname "$CONCRETE_BACKUP_FOLDER/$system_item_path");
-        mkdir -p "$backup_dir" || error "Failed to create \"$backup_dir\"."
-        info "Copy data from $source to $destination..."
-        rsync -abcEPuvW --backup-dir="$backup_dir" "$source" "$destination" || error
-      else
-        if [ -d "$source" ]
-          then
-            mkdir -p "$destination" || error "Failed to create \"$destination\"."
-            backup_dir="$CONCRETE_BACKUP_FOLDER/$system_item_path";
-            mkdir -p "$backup_dir" || error "Failed to create \"$backup_dir\"."
-            info "Copy data from directory $source to directory $destination..."
-            rsync -abcEPuvW --delete --backup-dir="$backup_dir" "$source" "$destination" || error
-          else
-            warning "$source doesn't exist. Copying data is not possible."
-        fi
-    fi
-done

scripts/encryption/data/lock.sh

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# Locks the data
-# @author Kevin Veen-Birkenbach [aka. Frantz]
-#
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-info "Locking directory $DECRYPTED_PATH..." &&
-fusermount -u "$DECRYPTED_PATH" || error "Unmounting failed."
-info "Data is now encrypted."
-
-info "Removing directory $DECRYPTED_PATH..." &&
-rmdir "$DECRYPTED_PATH" || error

scripts/encryption/data/unlock.sh

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# Unlocks the data
-# @author Kevin Veen-Birkenbach [aka. Frantz]
-#
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-info "Unlocking directory $DECRYPTED_PATH..."
-if [ ! -d "$DECRYPTED_PATH" ]
-  then
-    info "Creating directory $DECRYPTED_PATH..." &&
-    mkdir "$DECRYPTED_PATH" || error
-fi
-info "Decrypting directory $DECRYPTED_PATH to $DECRYPTED_PATH..." &&
-encfs "$ENCRYPTED_PATH" "$DECRYPTED_PATH" || error
-echo "ATTENTION: DATA IS NOW DECRYPTED!"

scripts/encryption/storage/Readme.md

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-# Storage
-For security reasons storages **SHOULD** be encrypted with [LUKS](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dm-crypt#Erweiterung_mit_LUKS). To keep it standardized and easy this scripts will use [btrfs](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Btrfs) as file system.

scripts/encryption/storage/base.sh

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034  # Unused variables
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2001  # See if you can use ${variable//search/replace} instead
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../../../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-
-set_device_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths(){
-  set_device_path &&
-  mapper_name="encrypteddrive-$device" &&
-  mapper_path="/dev/mapper/$mapper_name" &&
-  mount_path="/media/$mapper_name" &&
-  partition_path="$device_path""1" &&
-  info "mapper name set to : $mapper_name" &&
-  info "mapper path set to : $mapper_path" &&
-  info "mount path set to : $mount_path" ||
-  error
-}
-
-# @var $1 mapper_path
-# @var $2 partition_path
-create_luks_key_and_update_cryptab(){
-  LUKS_KEY_DIRECTORY="/etc/luks-keys/"  &&
-  info "Creating luks-key-directory..." &&
-  sudo mkdir $LUKS_KEY_DIRECTORY || warning "Directory exists: $LUKS_KEY_DIRECTORY" || error
-  luks_key_name="$1.keyfile" &&
-  secret_key_path="$LUKS_KEY_DIRECTORY$luks_key_name" &&
-  info "Generate secret key under: $secret_key_path" || error
-  if [ -f "$secret_key_path" ]
-    then
-      warning "File already exists. Overwriting!"
-  fi
-  sudo dd if=/dev/urandom of="$secret_key_path" bs=512 count=8 &&
-  
-  info "Opening and closing device to verify that everything works fine..." &&
-  sudo cryptsetup -v luksClose "$1" || info "No need to luksClose $1. Device isn't open." &&
-  sudo cryptsetup luksAddKey $2 $secret_key_path &&
-  sudo cryptsetup -v luksOpen "$2" "$1" --key-file="$secret_key_path" &&
-  sudo cryptsetup -v luksClose "$1" &&
-  info "Reading UUID..." &&
-  uuid_line=$(sudo cryptsetup luksDump "$2" | grep "UUID") &&
-  uuid=$(echo "${uuid_line/UUID:/""}"|sed -e "s/[[:space:]]\+//g") &&
-  crypttab_path="/etc/crypttab" &&
-  crypttab_entry="$1 UUID=$uuid $secret_key_path luks" &&
-  info "Adding crypttab entry..." || error
-  if sudo grep -q "$crypttab_entry" "$crypttab_path";
-    then
-      warning "File $crypttab_path already contains the following entry:" &&
-      echo "$crypttab_entry" &&
-      info "Skipped." ||
-      error
-    else
-      sudo sh -c "echo '$crypttab_entry' >> $crypttab_path" ||
-      error
-  fi
-
-  info "The file $crypttab_path contains now the following:" &&
-  sudo cat $crypttab_path ||
-  error
-}
-
-
-# @var $1 mapper_name
-# @var $2 mount_path
-#
-# If mount doesn't work adapt it manually to
-# @see https://gist.github.com/MaxXor/ba1665f47d56c24018a943bb114640d7
-update_fstab(){
-  fstab_path="/etc/fstab"
-  fstab_entry="$1 $2 btrfs   defaults   0       2"
-  info "Adding fstab entry..."
-  if sudo grep -q "$fstab_entry" "$fstab_path"; then
-    warning "File $fstab_path contains allready a the following entry:" &&
-    echo "$fstab_entry" &&
-    info "Skipped." ||
-    error
-  else
-    sudo sh -c "echo '$fstab_entry' >> $fstab_path" ||
-    error
-  fi
-
-  info "The file $fstab_path contains now the following:" &&
-  sudo cat $fstab_path ||
-  error
-}

scripts/encryption/storage/raid1/base.sh

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034  # Unused variables
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-set_raid1_devices_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths(){
-  info "RAID1 partition 1..." &&
-  set_device_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths &&
-  partition_path_1=$partition_path &&
-  mapper_name_1=$mapper_name &&
-  mapper_path_1=$mapper_path &&
-  mount_path_1=$mount_path &&
-  device_path_1=$device_path &&
-  info "RAID1 partition 2..." &&
-  set_device_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths &&
-  partition_path_2=$partition_path &&
-  mapper_name_2=$mapper_name &&
-  mapper_path_2=$mapper_path &&
-  mount_path_2=$mount_path &&
-  device_path_2=$device_path || error
-}

scripts/encryption/storage/raid1/mount_on_boot.sh

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015 #Deactivate bool hint
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-info "Activate Automount raid1 encrypted storages..." &&
-echo ""
-for dev in $(lsblk -dno NAME); do
-    if sudo cryptsetup isLuks /dev/$dev 2>/dev/null; then
-        info "/dev/$dev is a LUKS encrypted storage device."
-    fi
-done
-set_raid1_devices_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths &&
-create_luks_key_and_update_cryptab "$mapper_name_1" "$device_path_1" &&
-info "Creating mount folder unter \"$mount_path_1\"..." &&
-sudo mkdir -vp "$mount_path_1" &&
-create_luks_key_and_update_cryptab "$mapper_name_2" "$device_path_2" &&
-update_fstab "$mapper_path_1" "$mount_path_1" &&
-success "Installation finished. Please restart :)" ||
-error

scripts/encryption/storage/raid1/setup.sh

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# @author Kevin Veen-Birkenbach [kevin@veen.world]
-# @see https://balaskas.gr/btrfs/raid1.html
-# @see https://mutschler.eu/linux/install-guides/ubuntu-btrfs-raid1/
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-
-set_raid1_devices_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths
-
-info "Encrypting $device_path_1..." &&
-cryptsetup luksFormat "$device_path_1" &&
-info "Encrypting $device_path_2..." &&
-cryptsetup luksFormat "$device_path_2" &&
-blkid | tail -2 &&
-cryptsetup luksOpen "$device_path_1" "$mapper_name_1" &&
-cryptsetup luksOpen "$device_path_2" "$mapper_name_2" &&
-cryptsetup status "$mapper_path_1" &&
-cryptsetup status "$mapper_path_2" &&
-mkfs.btrfs -m raid1 -d raid1 "$mapper_path_1" "$mapper_path_2" &&
-success "Encryption successfull :)" ||
-error

scripts/encryption/storage/single_drive/base.sh

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)

scripts/encryption/storage/single_drive/mount.sh

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-echo "Mounts encrypted storages"
-
-set_device_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths
-
-info "Unlock partition..." &&
-sudo cryptsetup luksOpen "$partition_path" "$mapper_name" ||
-error
-
-info "Mount partition..." &&
-sudo mount "$mapper_path" "$mount_path" ||
-error
-
-success "Mounting successfull :)"

scripts/encryption/storage/single_drive/mount_on_boot.sh

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-echo "Automount encrypted storages"
-echo
-set_device_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths
-
-create_luks_key_and_update_cryptab "$mapper_name" "$partition_path"
-
-update_fstab "$mapper_path" "$mount_path"
-
-success "Installation finished. Please restart :)"

scripts/encryption/storage/single_drive/setup.sh

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-echo "Setups disk encryption"
-
-set_device_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths
-
-overwrite_device
-
-info "Creating new GPT partition table..."
-(	echo "g"	# create a new empty GPT partition table
-  echo "w"  # Write partition table
-)| sudo fdisk --wipe always "$device_path" ||
-error
-
-info "Creating partition table..."
-(	echo "n"	# Create new partition
-  echo ""   # Accept default
-  echo ""   # Accept default
-  echo ""   # Accept default
-  echo "p"	# Create GPT partition table
-  echo "w"  # Write partition table
-)| sudo fdisk --wipe always "$device_path" ||
-error
-
-info "Encrypt $device_path..." &&
-sudo cryptsetup -v -y luksFormat "$partition_path" ||
-error
-
-info "Unlock partition..." &&
-sudo cryptsetup luksOpen "$partition_path" "$mapper_name" ||
-error
-
-info "Create btrfs file system..." &&
-sudo mkfs.btrfs "$mapper_path" || error
-
-info "Creating mount folder unter \"$mount_path\"..." &&
-sudo mkdir -p "$mount_path" || error
-
-info "Mount partition..." &&
-sudo mount "$mapper_path" "$mount_path" ||
-error
-
-info "Own partition by user..." &&
-sudo chown -R "$USER":"$USER" "$mount_path" ||
-error
-
-success "Encryption successfull :)"

scripts/encryption/storage/single_drive/umount.sh

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC1090  # Can't follow non-constant source. Use a directive to specify location.
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Referenced but not assigned
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-echo "Unmount encrypted storages"
-
-set_device_mount_partition_and_mapper_paths
-
-info "Unmount $mapper_path..."
-sudo umount "$mapper_path" &&
-sudo cryptsetup luksClose "$mapper_path" ||
-error
-
-success "Successfull :)"

scripts/image/backup.sh

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC2010  # ls  | grep allowed
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Deactivate not referenced link
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivate bools hints
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-info "Backupscript for memory devices started..."
-echo
-set_device_path
-while [ "$path" == "" ]
-	do
-		echo "Bitte Backupimagepfad+Namen zu $PWD eingeben:"
-		read -r path
-		if [ "${path:0:1}" == "/" ]
-			then
-				ofi="$path.img"
-			else
-				ofi="$PWD/$path.img"
-		fi
-done
-info "Input file: $device_path"
-info "Output file: $ofi"
-question "Please confirm by pushing \"Enter\". To cancel use \"Ctrl + Alt + C\""
-read -r bestaetigung && echo "$bestaetigung";
-
-info "Imagetransfer starts. This can take a while..." &&
-dd if="$device_path" of="$ofi" bs=1M status=progress || error "\"dd\" failed.";
-
-success "Imagetransfer successfull." && exit 0;

scripts/image/base.sh

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# Offers base functions for the image management
-#
-# shellcheck disable=SC2034 #Deactivate checking of unused variables
-# shellcheck disable=SC2010  # ls  | grep allowed
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivate bools hints
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Deactivate referenced but not assigned hints
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/../base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-
-# Writes the full partition name
-# @parameter $1 is device path
-# @parameter $2 is the partition number
-echo_partition_name(){
-  if [ "${device_path:5:1}" != "s" ]
-    then
-      echo "$device_path""p""$1"
-    else
-      echo "$device_path$1"
-  fi
-}
-
-set_partition_paths(){
-  info "Setting partition and mapper paths..."
-  boot_partition_path=$(echo_partition_name "1")
-  root_partition_path=$(echo_partition_name "2")
-  root_mapper_path=$root_partition_path
-}
-
-make_mount_folders(){
-  info "Preparing mount paths..." &&
-  boot_mount_path="$working_folder_path""boot/" &&
-  root_mount_path="$working_folder_path""root/" &&
-  mkdir -v "$boot_mount_path" &&
-  mkdir -v "$root_mount_path" ||
-  error
-}
-
-make_working_folder(){
-  working_folder_path="/tmp/linux-image-manager-$(date +%s)/" &&
-  info "Create temporary working folder in $working_folder_path" &&
-  mkdir -v "$working_folder_path" ||
-  error
-}
-
-decrypt_root(){
-  if [ "$(blkid "$root_partition_path" -s TYPE -o value)" == "crypto_LUKS" ]
-    then
-      root_partition_uuid=$(blkid "$root_partition_path" -s UUID -o value) &&
-      root_mapper_name="linux-image-manager-$root_partition_uuid" &&
-      root_mapper_path="/dev/mapper/$root_mapper_name" &&
-      info "Decrypting of $root_partition_path is neccessary..." &&
-      sudo cryptsetup -v luksOpen "$root_partition_path" "$root_mapper_name" || error
-  fi
-}
-
-mount_partitions(){
-  info "Mount boot and root partition..." &&
-  mount -v "$boot_partition_path" "$boot_mount_path" &&
-  mount -v "$root_mapper_path" "$root_mount_path" &&
-  info "Settind uuid variables..." &&
-  root_partition_uuid=$(blkid "$root_partition_path" -s UUID -o value) &&
-  boot_partition_uuid=$(blkid "$boot_partition_path" -s UUID -o value) &&
-  info "The following mounts refering this setup exist:" && mount | grep "$working_folder_path" ||
-  error
-}
-
-destructor(){
-  info "Cleaning up..."
-  info "Unmounting everything..."
-  umount -lv "$chroot_dev_pts_mount_path" || warning "Umounting $chroot_dev_pts_mount_path failed!"
-  umount -lv "$chroot_dev_mount_path" || warning "Umounting $chroot_dev_mount_path failed!"
-  umount -v "$chroot_proc_mount_path" || warning "Umounting $chroot_proc_mount_path failed!"
-  umount -v "$chroot_sys_mount_path" || warning "Umounting $chroot_sys_mount_path failed!"
-  umount -v "$root_mount_path""boot/" || warning "Umounting $root_mount_path""boot/ failed!"
-  umount -v "$root_mount_path" || warning "Umounting $root_mount_path failed!"
-  umount -v "$boot_mount_path" || warning "Umounting $boot_mount_path failed!"
-  info "Deleting mount folders..."
-  rmdir -v "$root_mount_path" || warning "Removing $root_mount_path failed!"
-  rmdir -v "$boot_mount_path" || warning "Removing $boot_mount_path failed!"
-  rmdir -v "$working_folder_path" || warning "Removing $working_folder_path failed!"
-  if [ "$(blkid "$root_partition_path" -s TYPE -o value)" == "crypto_LUKS" ]
-    then
-      info "Trying to close decrypted $root_mapper_name..." &&
-      sudo cryptsetup -v luksClose "$root_mapper_name" || warning "Failed."
-  fi
-}
-
-mount_chroot_binds(){
-  info "Mount chroot environments..." &&
-  chroot_sys_mount_path="$root_mount_path""sys/" &&
-  chroot_proc_mount_path="$root_mount_path""proc/" &&
-  chroot_dev_mount_path="$root_mount_path""dev/" &&
-  chroot_dev_pts_mount_path="$root_mount_path""dev/pts" &&
-  mount --bind "$boot_mount_path" "$root_mount_path""boot" &&
-  mount --bind /dev "$chroot_dev_mount_path" &&
-  mount --bind /sys "$chroot_sys_mount_path" &&
-  mount --bind /proc "$chroot_proc_mount_path" &&
-  mount --bind /dev/pts "$chroot_dev_pts_mount_path" ||
-  error
-}
-
-copy_qemu(){
-  info "Copy qemu binary..." &&
-  cp -v /usr/bin/qemu-arm-static "$root_mount_path""usr/bin/" ||
-  error
-}
-
-copy_resolve_conf(){
-  info "Copy resolve.conf..." &&
-  cp --remove-destination -v /etc/resolv.conf "$root_mount_path""etc/" ||
-  warning "Failed. Propably there is no internet connection available."
-}

scripts/image/chroot.sh

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivating bool hint
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Deactivate not referenced link
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-
-info "Starting chroot..."
-
-set_device_path
-
-make_working_folder
-
-make_mount_folders
-
-set_partition_paths
-
-decrypt_root
-
-mount_partitions
-
-mount_chroot_binds
-
-copy_qemu
-
-copy_resolve_conf
-
-info "Bash shell starts..." &&
-chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash ||
-error
-
-destructor

scripts/image/setup.sh

@@ -1,696 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# shellcheck disable=SC2010  # ls  | grep allowed
-# shellcheck source=/dev/null # Deactivate SC1090
-# shellcheck disable=SC2015  # Deactivate bools hints
-# shellcheck disable=SC2154  # Deactivate not referenced link
-# @see https://wiki.polaire.nl/doku.php?id=archlinux-raspberry-encrypted
-source "$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${0}")")/base.sh" || (echo "Loading base.sh failed." && exit 1)
-
-install(){
-  info "Installing $1..."
-  case "$distribution" in
-    "arch"|"manjaro")
-      echo "pacman --noconfirm -S --needed $1" | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-      ;;
-    "moode"|"retropie")
-      echo "yes | apt install $1" | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-      ;;
-    *)
-      error "Package manager not supported."
-      ;;
-  esac
-}
-
-replace_in_file() {
-  # Assign the first function argument to the local variable search_string
-  local search_string=$1
-  # Assign the second function argument to the local variable replace_string
-  local replace_string=$2
-  # Assign the third function argument to the local variable file_path
-  local file_path=$3
-
-  # Create a temporary file and store its path in temp_file
-  temp_file=$(mktemp)
-
-  # Use sed to replace the search_string with replace_string in the file at file_path
-  # Write the output to the temporary file
-  sed "s/$search_string/$replace_string/g" "$file_path" > "$temp_file"
-
-  # Compare the original file with the temporary file
-  if cmp -s "$file_path" "$temp_file"; then
-    # If files are identical, remove the temporary file and signal an error
-    rm -f "$temp_file"
-    error "Error: Search string '$search_string' not found in $file_path."
-  else
-    # If files are different, move the temporary file to overwrite the original file
-    mv "$temp_file" "$file_path"
-  fi
-}
-
-info "Setupscript for images started..."
-
-info "Checking if root..."
-if [ "$(id -u)" != "0" ];then
-    error "This script must be executed as root!"
-fi
-
-make_working_folder
-
-info "Configure user..." &&
-question "Please type in a valid working username:" && read -r origin_username &&
-getent passwd "$origin_username" > /dev/null 2 || error "User $origin_username doesn't exist."
-origin_user_home="/home/$origin_username/"
-
-info "Image routine starts..."
-image_folder="$origin_user_home""Software/Images/";
-info "The images will be stored in \"$image_folder\"."
-if [ ! -d "$image_folder" ]; then
-  info "Folder \"$image_folder\" doesn't exist. It will be created now." &&
-  mkdir -v "$image_folder" ||
-  error
-fi
-
-set_device_path
-
-if mount | grep -q "$device_path"
-  then
-    error "Device $device_path is allready mounted. Umount with \"umount $device_path*\"."
-fi
-
-question "Which operation system would you like to use [linux,windows,...]?" && read -r operation_system || error
-
-case "$operation_system" in
-  "linux")
-    question "Which distribution should be used [arch,moode,retropie,manjaro,torbox...]?" && read -r distribution || error
-
-    case "$distribution" in
-      "android-x86")
-        base_download_url="https://www.fosshub.com/Android-x86.html?dwl=android-x86_64-9.0-r2.iso";
-        image_name="android-x86_64-9.0-r2.iso"
-        image_checksum="f7eb8fc56f29ad5432335dc054183acf086c539f3990f0b6e9ff58bd6df4604e"
-        boot_size="+500M"
-        ;;
-      "torbox")
-        base_download_url="https://www.torbox.ch/data/";
-        image_name="torbox-20220102-v050.gz"
-        image_checksum="0E1BA7FFD14AAAE5F0462C8293D95B62C3BF1D9E726E26977BD04772C55680D3"
-        boot_size="+200M"
-        ;;
-      "arch")
-        question "Which Raspberry Pi will be used (e.g.: 1, 2, 3b, 3b+, 4...):" && read -r raspberry_pi_version
-        boot_size="+500M"
-        base_download_url="http://os.archlinuxarm.org/os/";
-        case "$raspberry_pi_version" in
-          "1")
-            image_name="ArchLinuxARM-rpi-armv7-latest.tar.gz"
-            luks_memory_cost="64000"
-            ;;
-          "2")
-            image_name="ArchLinuxARM-rpi-armv7-latest.tar.gz"
-            luks_memory_cost="128000"
-            ;;
-           "3b" | "3b+")
-            image_name="ArchLinuxARM-rpi-aarch64-latest.tar.gz"
-            luks_memory_cost="128000"
-            ;;
-            "4" )
-            image_name="ArchLinuxARM-rpi-aarch64-latest.tar.gz"
-            luks_memory_cost="256000"
-            ;;
-          *)
-            error "Version $raspberry_pi_version isn't supported."
-            ;;
-        esac
-        ;;
-      "manjaro")
-        question "Which version(e.g.:architect,gnome) should be used:" && read -r gnome_version
-        boot_size="+500M"
-        case "$gnome_version" in
-          "architect")
-            image_checksum="6b1c2fce12f244c1e32212767a9d3af2cf8263b2"
-            base_download_url="https://osdn.net/frs/redir.php?m=dotsrc&f=%2Fstorage%2Fg%2Fm%2Fma%2Fmanjaro%2Farchitect%2F20.0%2F";
-            image_name="manjaro-architect-20.0-200426-linux56.iso"
-            ;;
-          "gnome")
-            question "Which release(e.g.:20,21,raspberrypi) should be used:" && read -r release
-            case "$release" in
-            "20")
-              image_checksum="2df3697908483550d4a473815b08c1377e6b6892"
-              base_download_url="https://osdn.net/projects/manjaro-archive/storage/gnome/20.0/"
-              image_name="manjaro-gnome-20.0-200426-linux56.iso"
-              ;;
-            "21")
-              base_download_url="https://download.manjaro.org/gnome/21.3.7/"
-              image_name="manjaro-gnome-21.3.7-220816-linux515.iso"
-              ;;
-            "22")
-              base_download_url="https://download.manjaro.org/gnome/22.1.3/"
-              image_name="manjaro-gnome-22.1.3-230529-linux61.iso"
-              ;;
-            "raspberrypi")
-              # at the moment just optimized for raspberry pi 4
-              base_download_url="https://github.com/manjaro-arm/rpi4-images/releases/download/23.02/"
-              image_name="Manjaro-ARM-gnome-rpi4-23.02.img.xz"
-              luks_memory_cost="256000"
-              raspberry_pi_version="4"
-              ;;
-            *)
-              error "Gnome Version $gnome_version isn't supported."
-              ;;
-            esac
-            ;;
-        esac
-        ;;
-      "moode")
-        boot_size="+200M"
-        image_checksum="185cbc9a4994534bb7a4bc2744c78197"
-        base_download_url="https://github.com/moode-player/moode/releases/download/r651prod/"
-        image_name="moode-r651-iso.zip";
-        ;;
-      "retropie")
-        boot_size="+500M"
-        question "Which version(e.g.:1,2,3,4) should be used:" && read -r raspberry_pi_version
-        base_download_url="https://github.com/RetroPie/RetroPie-Setup/releases/download/4.8/";
-        case "$raspberry_pi_version" in
-          "1")
-            image_checksum="95a6f84453df36318830de7e8507170e"
-            image_name="retropie-buster-4.8-rpi1_zero.img.gz"
-            ;;
-          "2" | "3")
-            image_checksum="224e64d8820fc64046ba3850f481c87e"
-            image_name="retropie-buster-4.8-rpi2_3_zero2w.img.gz"
-            ;;
-
-          "4")
-            image_checksum="b5daa6e7660a99c246966f3f09b4014b"
-            image_name="retropie-buster-4.8-rpi4_400.img.gz"
-            ;;
-        esac
-        ;;
-    esac
-
-    question "Should the system be encrypted?(y/N)" && read -r encrypt_system
-
-    info "Generating os-image..."
-    download_url="$base_download_url$image_name"
-    image_path="$image_folder$image_name"
-
-    question "Should the image download be forced?(y/N)" && read -r force_image_download
-    if [ "$force_image_download" = "y" ]
-      then
-        if [ -f "$image_path" ]
-          then
-            info "Removing image $image_path." &&
-            rm "$image_path" || error "Removing image \"$image_path\" failed."
-          else
-            info "Forcing download wasn't neccessary. File $image_path doesn't exist."
-        fi
-    fi
-
-    info "Start Download procedure..."
-    if [ -f "$image_path" ]
-      then
-        info "Image exist local. Download skipped."
-      else
-        info "Image \"$image_name\" doesn't exist under local path \"$image_path\"." &&
-        info "Image \"$image_name\" gets downloaded from \"$download_url\"..." &&
-        wget "$download_url" -O "$image_path" || error "Download from \"$download_url\" failed."
-    fi
-    ;;
-  *)
-    info "Available images:"
-    ls -l "$image_folder"
-    question "Which image would you like to use?" && read -r image_name || error
-    image_path="$image_folder$image_name"
-  ;;
-esac
-
-info "Verifying image..."
-info "Verifying checksum..."
-if [ -z "$image_checksum" ]; then
-    for ext in sha1 sha512 md5; do
-        sha_download_url="$download_url.$ext"
-        info "Image Checksum is not defined. Try to download image signature from $sha_download_url."
-        if wget -q --method=HEAD "$sha_download_url"; then
-            image_checksum="$(wget $sha_download_url -q -O - | cut -d ' ' -f1)"
-            info "Defined image_checksum as $image_checksum"
-            break
-        else
-            warning "No checksum found under $sha_download_url."
-        fi
-    done
-fi
-
-if [[ -v image_checksum ]]
-  then
-    (info "Checking md5 checksum..." && echo "$image_checksum $image_path"| md5sum -c -) ||
-    (info "Checking sha1 checksum..." && echo "$image_checksum $image_path"| sha1sum -c -) ||
-    (info "Checking sha256 checksum..." && echo "$image_checksum $image_path"| sha256sum -c -) ||
-    error "Verification failed. HINT: Force the download of the image."
-  else
-    warning "Verification is not possible. No checksum is defined."
-fi
-
-info "Verifying signature..."
-signature_download_url="$download_url.sig"
-info "Try to download image signature from $signature_download_url."
-
-if wget -q --method=HEAD "$signature_download_url"; then
-    signature_name="${image_name}.sig"
-    signature_path="${image_folder}${signature_name}"
-
-    info "Download the signature file"
-    if wget -q -O "$signature_path" "$signature_download_url"; then
-        info "Extract the key ID from the signature file"
-        key_id=$(gpg --status-fd 1 --verify "$signature_path" "$image_path" 2>&1 | grep 'NO_PUBKEY' | awk '{print $NF}')
-        
-        if [ -n "$key_id" ]; then
-            info "Check if the key is already in the keyring"
-            if gpg --list-keys "$key_id" > /dev/null 2>&1; then
-                info "Key $key_id already in keyring."
-            else
-                info "Import the public key"
-                gpg --keyserver keyserver.ubuntu.com --recv-keys "$key_id"
-            fi
-
-            info "Verify the signature again after importing the key"
-            if gpg --verify "$signature_path" "$image_path"; then
-                info "Signature verification succeeded."
-            else
-                warning "Signature verification failed."
-            fi
-        else
-            warning "No public key found in the signature file."
-        fi
-    else
-        warning "Failed to download the signature file."
-    fi
-else
-    warning "No signature found under $signature_download_url."
-fi
-
-
-make_mount_folders
-
-set_partition_paths
-
-question "Which filesystem should be used? E.g.:btrfs,ext4... (none):" && read -r root_filesystem
-
-question "Should the image be transfered to $device_path?(y/N)" && read -r transfer_image
-if [ "$transfer_image" = "y" ]
-  then
-
-    question "Should the partition table of $device_path be deleted?(y/N)" && read -r delete_partition_table
-    if [ "$delete_partition_table" = "y" ]
-      then
-        info "Deleting..." &&
-        wipefs -a "$device_path" || error
-      else
-        info "Skipping partition table deletion..."
-    fi
-
-    overwrite_device
-
-    info "Starting image transfer..."
-    if [ "$distribution" = "arch" ]
-      then
-        # Set default size of the boot partition
-        boot_size=${boot_size:-"+500M"}
-
-        # Use the provided size or the default size
-        info "The boot partition will be set to $boot_size."
-
-        # Partitioning with the specified size
-        info "Creating partitions..." &&
-        (
-          echo "o"       # Type o. This will clear out any partitions on the drive.
-          echo "p"       # Type p to list partitions. There should be no partitions left
-          echo "n"       # Type n,
-          echo "p"       # then p for primary,
-          echo "1"       # 1 for the first partition on the drive,
-          echo ""        # Default start sector
-          echo "$boot_size"  # Size of the boot partition
-          echo "t"       # Type t,
-          echo "c"       # then c to set the first partition to type W95 FAT32 (LBA).
-          echo "n"       # Type n,
-          echo "p"       # then p for primary,
-          echo "2"       # 2 for the second partition on the drive,
-          echo ""        # Default start sector
-          echo ""        # Default end sector
-          echo "w"       # Write the partition table and exit by typing w.
-        ) | fdisk "$device_path" || error
-
-        info "Format boot partition..." &&
-        mkfs.vfat "$boot_partition_path" || error
-
-        if [ "$encrypt_system" == "y" ]
-          then
-              # Check if luks_memory_cost is defined and set the luksAddKey command accordingly
-              # @see https://chatgpt.com/share/008ea5f1-670c-467c-8320-1ca67f25ac9a
-              if [ -n "$luks_memory_cost" ]; then
-                info "Formating $root_partition_path with LUKS with --pbkdf-memory set to $luks_memory_cost" &&
-                sudo cryptsetup -v luksFormat -c aes-xts-plain64 -s 512 -h sha512 --use-random -i 1000 --pbkdf-memory "$luks_memory_cost" "$root_partition_path" || error
-              else
-                info "Formating $root_partition_path with LUKS" &&
-                sudo cryptsetup -v luksFormat -c aes-xts-plain64 -s 512 -h sha512 --use-random -i 1000 "$root_partition_path" || error
-              fi
-            decrypt_root || error
-        fi
-
-        info "Format root partition..." &&
-        "mkfs.$root_filesystem" -f "$root_mapper_path" || error
-        mount_partitions;
-
-        info "Root files will be transfered to device..." &&
-        bsdtar -xpf "$image_path" -C "$root_mount_path" &&
-        sync ||
-        error
-
-        info "Boot files will be transfered to device..." &&
-        mv -v "$root_mount_path""boot/"* "$boot_mount_path" ||
-        error
-      elif [ "${image_path: -4}" = ".zip" ]
-        then
-          info "Transfering .zip file..." &&
-          unzip -p "$image_path" | sudo dd of="$device_path" bs="$OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE" conv=fsync status=progress || error "DD $image_path to $device_path failed." &&
-          sync ||
-          error
-      elif [ "${image_path: -3}" = ".gz" ]
-        then
-          info "Transfering .gz file..." &&
-          gunzip -c "$image_path" | sudo dd of="$device_path" bs="$OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE" conv=fsync status=progress &&
-          sync ||
-          error
-      elif [ "${image_path: -4}" = ".iso" ]
-        then
-          info "Transfering .iso file..." &&
-          sudo dd if="$image_path" of="$device_path" bs="$OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE" conv=fsync status=progress &&
-          sync ||
-          error
-      elif [ "${image_path: -3}" = ".xz" ]
-        then
-          info "Transferring .xz file..." &&
-          unxz -c "$image_path" | sudo dd of="$device_path" bs="$OPTIMAL_BLOCKSIZE" conv=fsync status=progress &&
-          sync ||
-          error
-      else
-        error "Image transfer for operation system \"$distribution\" is not supported yet!";
-      fi
-  else
-    info "Skipping image transfer..."
-fi
-
-# Execute Raspberry Pi specific procedures
-if [ -n "$raspberry_pi_version" ]
-  then
-  info "Start regular mounting procedure..."
-  if mount | grep -q "$boot_partition_path"
-    then
-      info "$boot_partition_path is allready mounted..."
-    else
-      if mount | grep -q "$root_mapper_path"
-        then
-          info "$root_mapper_path is allready mounted..."
-        else
-          decrypt_root
-          mount_partitions
-      fi
-  fi
-
-  fstab_path="$root_mount_path""etc/fstab" &&
-  fstab_search_string=$(echo "/dev/mmcblk0p1"| sed -e 's/[\/&]/\\&/g') &&
-  fstab_replace_string=$(echo "UUID=$boot_partition_uuid"| sed -e 's/[\/&]/\\&/g') &&
-  info "Seeding UUID to $fstab_path to avoid path conflicts..." &&
-  sed -i "s/$fstab_search_string/$fstab_replace_string/g" "$fstab_path" &&
-  info "Content of $fstab_path:$(cat "$fstab_path")" || error
-
-  info "Define target paths..." &&
-  administrator_username="administrator"
-  target_home_path="$root_mount_path""home/" &&
-  default_username=$(ls "$target_home_path") &&
-
-  question "Should the $default_username be renamed to $administrator_username? (y/N):" && read -r rename_decision
-  if [ "$rename_decision" == "y" ]; 
-    then
-      variable_old_username="$default_username" &&
-      target_username="$administrator_username" &&
-      info "Rename home directory from $target_home_path$variable_old_username to $target_home_path$target_username..." &&
-      mv -v "$target_home_path$variable_old_username" "$target_home_path$target_username" || error "Failed to rename home directory" 
-    else
-      target_username="$default_username"
-  fi
-
-  target_user_home_folder_path="$target_home_path$target_username/" &&
-  target_user_ssh_folder_path="$target_user_home_folder_path"".ssh/" &&
-  target_authorized_keys="$target_user_ssh_folder_path""authorized_keys" &&
-
-  # Activate later. Here was a bug
-  question "Should the $target_username have sudo rights? (y/N):" && read -r sudo_decision
-  if [ "$sudo_decision" == "y" ]; then
-    sudo_config_dir="$root_mount_path""etc/sudoers.d/"
-    sudo_config_file="$sudo_config_dir$target_username"
-    mkdir -vp $sudo_config_dir
-    echo "$target_username ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL" > "$sudo_config_file" || error "Failed to create sudoers file for $target_username"
-    chmod 440 "$sudo_config_file" || error "Failed to set permissions on sudoers file for $target_username"
-  fi
-
-  question "Enter the path to the SSH key to be added to the image (default: none):" && read -r origin_user_rsa_pub || error
-  if [ -z "$origin_user_rsa_pub" ]
-    then
-      info "Skipped SSH-key copying.."
-    else  
-        if [ -f "$origin_user_rsa_pub" ]
-          then
-            info "Copy ssh key to target..."
-            mkdir -v "$target_user_ssh_folder_path" || warning "Folder \"$target_user_ssh_folder_path\" exists. Can't be created."
-            cat "$origin_user_rsa_pub" > "$target_authorized_keys" &&
-            target_authorized_keys_content=$(cat "$target_authorized_keys") &&
-            info "$target_authorized_keys contains the following: $target_authorized_keys_content" &&
-            info "Set permissions with chmod..." &&
-            chmod -v 700 "$target_user_ssh_folder_path" &&
-            chmod -v 600 "$target_authorized_keys" || error "Failed to set ownership and permissions on ssh folder"
-          else
-            error "The ssh key \"$origin_user_rsa_pub\" can't be copied to \"$target_authorized_keys\" because it doesn't exist."
-        fi  
-  fi
-
-  info "Start chroot procedures..."
-
-  mount_chroot_binds
-
-  copy_qemu
-
-  copy_resolve_conf
-
-  chroot_user_home_path="/home/$target_username/"
-  chroot_user_ssh_folder_path="$chroot_user_home_path.ssh"
-  if [ "$rename_decision" == "y" ]; then
-    info "Delete old user and create new user" &&
-    (
-    echo "userdel -r $variable_old_username"
-    echo "useradd -m -d $chroot_user_home_path -s /bin/bash $target_username"
-    echo "chown -R $target_username:$target_username $chroot_user_home_path"
-    ) | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error "Failed to delete old user and create new user"
-  fi
-
-  if [ -n "$origin_user_rsa_pub" ]
-    then
-      info "Chroot to set ownership..." &&
-      ( echo "chown -vR $target_username:$target_username $chroot_user_ssh_folder_path" ) | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-  fi  
-  question "Type in new password for user root  and $target_username (leave empty to skip): " && read -r password_1
-
-  if [ -n "$password_1" ]; then
-    question "Repeat new password for \"$target_username\": " && read -r password_2
-    if [ "$password_1" = "$password_2" ]; then
-      info "Changing passwords on target system..."
-      (
-        echo "(
-              echo '$password_1'
-              echo '$password_1'
-              ) | passwd $target_username"
-        echo "(
-              echo '$password_1'
-              echo '$password_1'
-        ) | passwd"
-      ) | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error "Failed to change password."
-    else
-      error "Passwords didn't match."
-    fi
-  else
-    info "No password change requested, skipped password change..."
-  fi
-
-
-  hostname_path="$root_mount_path/etc/hostname"
-
-  question "Type in the hostname (leave empty to skip): " && read -r target_hostname
-
-  if [ -n "$target_hostname" ]; then
-    echo "$target_hostname" > "$hostname_path" || error "Failed to set hostname."
-  else
-    target_hostname=$(cat "$hostname_path")
-    info "No hostname change requested, skipped hostname change..."
-  fi
-
-  info "Used hostname is: $target_hostname"
-
-  case "$distribution" in
-    "arch"|"manjaro")
-      info "Populating keys..." &&
-      (
-      echo "yes | pacman-key --init"
-      echo "yes | pacman-key --populate archlinuxarm"
-      ) | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-    ;;
-  esac
-
-  question "Should the system be updated?(y/N)" && read -r update_system
-  if [ "$update_system" == "y" ]
-    then
-      info "Updating system..."
-      case "$distribution" in
-        "arch"|"manjaro")
-          echo "pacman --noconfirm -Syyu" | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-          ;;
-        "moode"|"retropie")
-          (
-          echo "yes | apt update"
-          echo "yes | apt upgrade"
-          ) | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-          ;;
-        *)
-          warning "System update for operation system \"$distribution\" is not supported yet. Skipped."
-          ;;
-      esac
-  fi
-
-  info "Installing software for filesystem $root_filesystem..."
-  if [ "$root_filesystem" == "btrfs" ]
-    then
-      install "btrfs-progs"
-    else
-      info "Skipped."
-  fi
-
-  if [ "$encrypt_system" == "y" ]
-    then
-      # Adapted this instruction for setting up encrypted systems 
-      # @see https://gist.github.com/gea0/4fc2be0cb7a74d0e7cc4322aed710d38
-      # @see https://gist.github.com/EnigmaCurry/2f9bed46073da8e38057fe78a61e7994
-      info "Setup encryption..." &&
-
-      info "Installing neccessary software..." &&
-      install "$(get_packages "server/luks")" &&
-
-      dropbear_root_key_path="$root_mount_path""etc/dropbear/root_key" &&
-      info "Adding $target_authorized_keys to dropbear..." &&
-      cp -v "$target_authorized_keys" "$dropbear_root_key_path" &&
-
-      # Concerning mkinitcpio warning 
-      # @see https://gist.github.com/imrvelj/c65cd5ca7f5505a65e59204f5a3f7a6d
-      mkinitcpio_path="$root_mount_path""etc/mkinitcpio.conf" &&
-      info "Configuring $mkinitcpio_path..." &&
-      mkinitcpio_search_modules="MODULES=()" || error
-
-      # Concerning which moduls to load 
-      # @see https://raspberrypi.stackexchange.com/questions/67051/raspberry-pi-3-with-archarm-and-encrypted-disk-will-not-boot-how-can-be-identif
-
-      case "$raspberry_pi_version" in
-        "1" | "2")
-          mkinitcpio_additional_modules=""
-          ;;
-          "3b")
-          mkinitcpio_additional_modules="smsc95xx"
-          ;;
-          "3b+" | "4")
-          mkinitcpio_additional_modules="lan78xx"
-          ;;
-        *)
-          warning "Version $raspberry_pi_version isn't supported."
-          ;;
-      esac
-
-      mkinitcpio_replace_modules="MODULES=(g_cdc usb_f_acm usb_f_ecm $mkinitcpio_additional_modules g_ether)" || error
-
-      
-      mkinitcpio_search_binaries="BINARIES=()" &&
-      mkinitcpio_replace_binaries=$(echo "BINARIES=(/usr/lib/libgcc_s.so.1)"| sed -e 's/[\/&]/\\&/g') &&
-      mkinitcpio_encrypt_hooks="sleep netconf dropbear encryptssh" &&
-      mkinitcpio_hooks_prefix="base udev autodetect microcode modconf kms keyboard keymap consolefont block"
-      mkinitcpio_hooks_suffix="filesystems fsck"
-      mkinitcpio_search_hooks="HOOKS=($mkinitcpio_hooks_prefix $mkinitcpio_hooks_suffix)" &&
-      mkinitcpio_replace_hooks="HOOKS=($mkinitcpio_hooks_prefix $mkinitcpio_encrypt_hooks $mkinitcpio_hooks_suffix)" &&
-      replace_in_file "$mkinitcpio_search_modules" "$mkinitcpio_replace_modules" "$mkinitcpio_path" &&
-      replace_in_file "$mkinitcpio_search_binaries" "$mkinitcpio_replace_binaries" "$mkinitcpio_path" &&
-      replace_in_file "$mkinitcpio_search_hooks" "$mkinitcpio_replace_hooks" "$mkinitcpio_path" &&
-      info "Content of $mkinitcpio_path:$(cat "$mkinitcpio_path")" &&
-      info "Generating mkinitcpio..." &&
-      echo "mkinitcpio -vP" | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash &&
-
-      fstab_insert_line="UUID=$root_partition_uuid  / $root_filesystem    defaults,noatime  0  1" &&
-      info "Configuring $fstab_path..." || error
-      if grep -q "$fstab_insert_line" "$fstab_path"
-        then
-          warning "$fstab_path contains allready $fstab_insert_line - Skipped."
-        else
-          echo "$fstab_insert_line" >> "$fstab_path" || error
-      fi
-      info "Content of $fstab_path:$(cat "$fstab_path")" &&
-
-      crypttab_path="$root_mount_path""etc/crypttab" &&
-      crypttab_insert_line="$root_mapper_name UUID=$root_partition_uuid none luks" &&
-      info "Configuring $crypttab_path..." || error
-      if grep -q "$crypttab_insert_line" "$crypttab_path"
-        then
-          warning "$crypttab_path contains allready $crypttab_insert_line - Skipped."
-        else
-          echo "$crypttab_insert_line" >> "$crypttab_path" || error
-      fi
-      info "Content of $crypttab_path:$(cat "$crypttab_path")" &&
-
-      boot_txt_path="$boot_mount_path""boot.txt" &&
-      cryptdevice_configuration="cryptdevice=UUID=$root_partition_uuid:$root_mapper_name root=$root_mapper_path" || error
-      if [ -f "$boot_txt_path" ];
-        then
-          info "Configuring $boot_txt_path..." &&
-          boot_txt_delete_line=$(echo "part uuid \${devtype} \${devnum}:2 uuid" | sed -e 's/[]\/$*.^[]/\\&/g') &&
-          boot_txt_setenv_origin=$(echo "setenv bootargs console=ttyS1,115200 console=tty0 root=PARTUUID=\${uuid} rw rootwait smsc95xx.macaddr=\"\${usbethaddr}\"" | sed -e 's/[]\/$*.^[]/\\&/g') &&
-          # Concerning issues with network adapter names;
-          # @see https://forum.iobroker.net/topic/40542/raspberry-pi4-kein-eth0-mehr/16
-          boot_txt_setenv_replace=$(echo "setenv bootargs console=ttyS1,115200 console=tty0 ip=::::$target_hostname:eth0:dhcp $cryptdevice_configuration rw rootwait smsc95xx.macaddr=\"\${usbethaddr}\" net.ifnames=0 biosdevname=0"| sed -e 's/[\/&]/\\&/g') &&
-          replace_in_file "$boot_txt_delete_line" "" "$boot_txt_path" &&
-          replace_in_file "$boot_txt_setenv_origin" "$boot_txt_setenv_replace" "$boot_txt_path" &&
-          info "Content of $boot_txt_path:$(cat "$boot_txt_path")" &&
-          info "Generating..." &&
-          echo "cd /boot/ && ./mkscr || exit 1" | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-        else
-          cmdline_txt_path="$boot_mount_path""cmdline.txt" &&
-          info "Configuring $cmdline_txt_path..." &&
-          cmdline_search_string=$(echo "root=/dev/mmcblk0p2" | sed -e 's/[\/&]/\\&/g') &&
-          cmdline_replace_string=$(echo "$cryptdevice_configuration rootfstype=$root_filesystem"| sed -e 's/[\/&]/\\&/g') &&
-          replace_in_file "$cmdline_search_string" "$cmdline_replace_string" "$cmdline_txt_path" &&
-          info "Content of $cmdline_txt_path:$(cat "$cmdline_txt_path")" || error
-        fi
-  fi
-
-  info "Running system specific procedures..."
-  if [ "$distribution" = "retropie" ]
-    then
-      if [ -n "$origin_user_rsa_pub" ]
-        then
-          ssh_file="$boot_mount_path""ssh" &&
-          echo "" > "$ssh_file"
-      fi
-      question "Should the RetroFlag specific procedures be executed?(y/N)" && read -r setup_retroflag
-      if [ "$setup_retroflag" == "y" ]
-        then
-          info "Executing RetroFlag specific procedures..." &&
-          (
-          echo 'wget -O - "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RetroFlag/retroflag-picase/master/install_gpi.sh" | bash'
-          ) | chroot "$root_mount_path" /bin/bash || error
-      fi
-  fi
-fi
-destructor
-success "Setup successfull :)" && exit 0

tests/conftest.py

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from lim import runner, ui
+from lim.errors import LimError
+
+
+class FakeRunner:
+    """Records every command instead of executing it.
+
+    ``outputs``/``success_by_fragment``/``failures`` map a substring of the
+    joined command to the canned behavior.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.calls: list[tuple[str, list, str | None]] = []
+        self.outputs: dict[str, str] = {}
+        self.failures: set[str] = set()
+        self.success_by_fragment: dict[str, bool] = {}
+        self.sudo_log: list[tuple[list[str], bool]] = []
+
+    def _fails(self, cmd: list[str]) -> bool:
+        joined = " ".join(cmd)
+        return any(fragment in joined for fragment in self.failures)
+
+    def run(self, cmd, *, sudo=False, input_text=None, check=True, error_msg=None):
+        cmd = [str(part) for part in cmd]
+        self.calls.append(("run", cmd, input_text))
+        self.sudo_log.append((cmd, sudo))
+        returncode = 1 if self._fails(cmd) else 0
+        if check and returncode != 0:
+            raise LimError(error_msg or f"Command failed: {' '.join(cmd)}")
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(cmd, returncode)
+
+    def output(self, cmd, *, sudo=False, check=True, error_msg=None):
+        cmd = [str(part) for part in cmd]
+        self.calls.append(("output", cmd, None))
+        joined = " ".join(cmd)
+        for fragment, value in self.outputs.items():
+            if fragment in joined:
+                return value
+        return ""
+
+    def succeeds(self, cmd, *, sudo=False):
+        cmd = [str(part) for part in cmd]
+        self.calls.append(("succeeds", cmd, None))
+        joined = " ".join(cmd)
+        for fragment, value in self.success_by_fragment.items():
+            if fragment in joined:
+                return value
+        return False
+
+    def pipeline(self, *cmds, sudo_last=False, error_msg=None):
+        cmds = [[str(part) for part in cmd] for cmd in cmds]
+        self.calls.append(("pipeline", cmds, None))
+        for cmd in cmds:
+            if self._fails(cmd):
+                raise LimError(error_msg or "Pipeline failed")
+
+    def sync_disks(self):
+        self.calls.append(("run", ["sync"], None))
+
+    def commands(self) -> list[list[str]]:
+        return [cmd for _, cmd, _ in self.calls]
+
+    def find(self, *fragments: str) -> list[list[str]]:
+        """All recorded commands whose joined form contains every fragment."""
+        result = []
+        for command in self.commands():
+            joined = " ".join(
+                " ".join(part) if isinstance(part, list) else part for part in command
+            )
+            if all(fragment in joined for fragment in fragments):
+                result.append(command)
+        return result
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fake_runner(monkeypatch):
+    fake = FakeRunner()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "run", fake.run)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "output", fake.output)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "succeeds", fake.succeeds)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "pipeline", fake.pipeline)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(runner, "sync_disks", fake.sync_disks)
+    return fake
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def answers(monkeypatch):
+    """Feed scripted answers to ui.ask (and thereby ui.confirm)."""
+    queue: list[str] = []
+
+    def fake_ask(prompt: str) -> str:
+        assert queue, f"No scripted answer left for prompt: {prompt}"
+        return queue.pop(0)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(ui, "ask", fake_ask)
+
+    def feed(*items: str) -> None:
+        queue.extend(items)
+
+    return feed

tests/e2e/qemu/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# Virtualized end-to-end Tor unlock harness
+
+This harness models the **entire** encrypted-image process in a virtual
+machine: it builds a LUKS image carrying the real `lim` Tor-in-initramfs
+artifacts, boots it in QEMU, lets the real `netconf → tor → dropbear →
+encryptssh` chain run in early userspace, then unlocks the root over Tor and
+proves the real system booted.
+
+It complements the lightweight, always-rootless
+[`test_tor_unlock_e2e.py`](../test_tor_unlock_e2e.py): that one round-trips a
+passphrase through Tor against a dropbear *stand-in*; this one runs the real
+dropbear, real cryptsetup, real mkinitcpio initramfs, and a real tor daemon in
+a booted machine.
+
+## Why a virtio machine and not an emulated Raspberry Pi
+
+QEMU's `raspi3b`/`raspi4b` machines do not emulate the Pi's USB-gadget
+Ethernet — exactly the network path the Pi images use in the initramfs
+(`g_ether`/`smsc95xx`/`lan78xx`). Without early networking there is no Tor and
+no unlock, so emulating the literal board is pointless here. Instead we
+reproduce the same *software stack* (same HOOKS chain, same tor hook, same
+torrc and onion keys) on a QEMU-friendly `virt`/`q35` machine with
+`virtio-net`. The only deltas from a real Pi image are the NIC driver and the
+CPU architecture.
+
+## Stages
+
+| Stage | File | Privilege |
+|---|---|---|
+| Build encrypted image (Arch) | `build_image.sh` | **root** (loop, cryptsetup, chroot) |
+| Build encrypted image (Debian) | `build_image_debian.sh` | **root** (debootstrap, loop, cryptsetup, chroot) |
+| Tor network | `tor_net.py` | rootless |
+| Boot + unlock | `boot_unlock.py` | rootless (QEMU user-mode net) |
+| Orchestration | `harness.py` | mixed (uses `sudo` for the build only) |
+| Pure command builders | `config.py` | none — unit-tested offline |
+
+## Keeping the host rootless
+
+Only `build_image.sh` needs root (there is no rootless dm-crypt). To keep your
+host unprivileged, run the whole harness **inside a throwaway VM** that has
+`/dev/kvm`, and drive it from there. QEMU itself, the tor client and the unlock
+are rootless: user-mode networking (`-netdev user`) needs no tap device, and a
+Tor onion service needs no inbound port forward (its rendezvous is outbound
+from both ends).
+
+When run directly on the host, `harness.py` invokes the build via `sudo -E`
+and then `chown`s the artifacts back so rootless QEMU can read them.
+
+## Requirements
+
+- `qemu-system-x86_64` (or `-aarch64` for `LIM_E2E_ARCH=aarch64`)
+- `arch-install-scripts` (`pacstrap`, `arch-chroot`)
+- `cryptsetup`, `mkinitcpio`, `tor`, `openssh`, `ncat` (SOCKS5 ProxyCommand)
+- Network access to the public Tor network, **or** `chutney` for a private one
+- `/dev/kvm` recommended (TCG works but is slow; aarch64-on-x86 is always TCG)
+
+For the Debian build (`LIM_E2E_OS=debian`), additionally: `debootstrap` and
+network access to a Debian mirror. The guest uses the initramfs-tools backend
+(cryptsetup-initramfs + dropbear-initramfs), so the unlock SSH session runs
+`cryptroot-unlock` instead of Arch's login-time encryptssh prompt.
+
+## Unlock transport: direct vs Tor
+
+`LIM_E2E_TRANSPORT` (default `direct`) selects how the passphrase reaches the
+guest's dropbear:
+
+- **direct** — QEMU forwards a host port to the guest's dropbear (`:22`) and the
+  passphrase is delivered over a plain SSH. Deterministic; it verifies the whole
+  LUKS-unlock stack (cryptsetup-initramfs + dropbear-initramfs + cryptroot-unlock
+  + LUKS + boot). This is what CI/`make` runs.
+- **tor** — the full onion path: the guest publishes its onion and the host
+  reaches it through Tor. Representative of production but **flaky over public
+  Tor inside QEMU** (fresh guest Tor + user-mode net make the onion rendezvous
+  unreliable), so it is opt-in. The onion transport itself is covered
+  deterministically by the rootless `test_tor_unlock_e2e.py`.
+
+## Running
+
+```bash
+# Arch (mkinitcpio), direct transport (deterministic, default):
+LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
+
+# Debian (initramfs-tools) via debootstrap, direct transport:
+LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 LIM_E2E_OS=debian pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
+
+# Full onion transport (opt-in, flaky over public Tor):
+LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 LIM_E2E_TRANSPORT=tor pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
+```
+
+`make test-qemu` / `make test-qemu-debian` wrap the direct-transport runs.
+
+Environment knobs: `LIM_E2E_ARCH` (`x86_64` default, or `aarch64`),
+`CHUTNEY_PATH` (enables the private network), `CHUTNEY_PATH` unset → public.
+
+## Determinism note (chutney)
+
+For a fully private loop the **guest image** must trust the same authorities as
+the host client. `ChutneyNetwork.test_network_conf()` distils the
+`TestingTorNetwork`/`DirAuthority` lines (rewriting `127.0.0.1` to the QEMU
+user-net host alias `10.0.2.2`) into a file, which `build_image.sh` appends to
+the baked-in torrc via `TOR_TEST_NETWORK_CONF`. The offline onion key
+generation is unaffected — it never touches the network either way.
+
+## What runs in CI without any of this
+
+The pure logic (`config.py`, the env parser, the chutney torrc parsing) and the
+drift guards that keep `build_image.sh` aligned with what the harness expects
+are covered by [`test_qemu_harness_unit.py`](../test_qemu_harness_unit.py),
+which runs in the normal `pytest` suite — no QEMU, root, or network.

tests/e2e/qemu/boot_unlock.py

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+"""Boot a built image in QEMU and unlock its LUKS root over Tor.
+
+This is the live half of the harness. QEMU runs rootless (user-mode net);
+the passphrase is delivered exactly as an operator would: SSH through Tor to
+the initramfs dropbear, piping the passphrase into the encryptssh prompt.
+Success is observed on the serial console, not inferred.
+"""
+
+import contextlib
+import subprocess
+import threading
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from tests.e2e.qemu import config
+from tests.e2e.qemu.config import QemuSpec
+
+# One generous budget covers guest boot + tor bootstrap + onion publish +
+# unlock. TCG (no KVM) is slow, so keep it roomy.
+UNLOCK_TIMEOUT = 480
+DELIVERY_INTERVAL = 8
+# Hold off the first delivery until the guest onion has had time to publish.
+# A connect to a not-yet-published onion makes the client Tor cache the failed
+# descriptor fetch and back off, so early hammering can lock us out for
+# minutes; waiting until the onion is up means the first fetch succeeds.
+INITIAL_DELIVERY_DELAY = 100
+_SSH_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT = 45
+_POLL_INTERVAL = 2
+_PROMPT_WAIT = 4  # let the encryptssh prompt appear before sending
+
+
+def _serial_contains(spec: QemuSpec, needle: str) -> bool:
+    log = spec.serial_log
+    return log.is_file() and needle in log.read_text(errors="replace")
+
+
+def _stream_new_serial(spec: QemuSpec, offset: int) -> int:
+    """Print serial output written since ``offset``; return the new offset.
+
+    Streams the guest's boot messages (netconf, the tor hook, dropbear,
+    encryptssh) live so the operator sees the VM working, not a black box.
+    """
+    log = spec.serial_log
+    if not log.is_file():
+        return offset
+    data = log.read_bytes()
+    if len(data) > offset:
+        print(data[offset:].decode(errors="replace"), end="", flush=True)
+    return len(data)
+
+
+def _serial_tail(spec: QemuSpec, lines: int = 15) -> str:
+    if not spec.serial_log.is_file():
+        return "(no serial output captured)"
+    tail = spec.serial_log.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()[-lines:]
+    return "serial tail:\n  " + "\n  ".join(tail)
+
+
+def _qemu_stderr_path(spec: QemuSpec) -> Path:
+    return spec.work_dir / "qemu.stderr.log"
+
+
+def _qemu_stderr_tail(spec: QemuSpec, lines: int = 10) -> str:
+    path = _qemu_stderr_path(spec)
+    if not path.is_file() or not path.read_text(errors="replace").strip():
+        return ""
+    tail = path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()[-lines:]
+    return "\nqemu stderr:\n  " + "\n  ".join(tail)
+
+
+def _ssh_log_path(spec: QemuSpec) -> Path:
+    return spec.work_dir / "ssh-delivery.log"
+
+
+def _ssh_log_tail(spec: QemuSpec, lines: int = 15) -> str:
+    path = _ssh_log_path(spec)
+    if not path.is_file() or not path.read_text(errors="replace").strip():
+        return ""
+    tail = path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()[-lines:]
+    return "\nssh delivery log:\n  " + "\n  ".join(tail)
+
+
+def _client_tor_tail(spec: QemuSpec, lines: int = 20) -> str:
+    """Return the host Tor client's HS log — onion descriptor fetch/rendezvous."""
+    path = spec.work_dir / "tor-client-hs.log"
+    if not path.is_file() or not path.read_text(errors="replace").strip():
+        return ""
+    lines_out = [
+        line
+        for line in path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines()
+        if any(k in line.lower() for k in ("desc", "rend", "intro", "hs_", "onion"))
+    ][-lines:]
+    return "\nclient tor HS log:\n  " + "\n  ".join(lines_out)
+
+
+def _deliver_worker(spec: QemuSpec) -> None:
+    """Feed the passphrase over an SSH-through-Tor session, held open.
+
+    Runs in a background thread so the main loop keeps streaming serial. The
+    channel is deliberately kept OPEN after sending: closing stdin immediately
+    (as a plain pipe does) tears the session down before cryptsetup finishes
+    its argon2 KDF, killing the unlock mid-flight. Session output is appended to
+    ssh-delivery.log so a failed unlock (onion unreachable, cryptroot-unlock
+    error) is diagnosable.
+    """
+    log_file = _ssh_log_path(spec).open("a")
+    log_file.write("--- delivery attempt ---\n")
+    log_file.flush()
+    proc = subprocess.Popen(
+        config.ssh_argv(spec),
+        stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
+        stdout=log_file,
+        stderr=log_file,
+        text=True,
+    )
+    try:
+        time.sleep(_PROMPT_WAIT)
+        if proc.poll() is None and proc.stdin is not None:
+            try:
+                proc.stdin.write(spec.passphrase + "\n")
+                proc.stdin.flush()
+            except OSError:
+                pass
+        proc.wait(timeout=_SSH_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT)
+    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+        proc.kill()
+    finally:
+        if proc.stdin is not None:
+            with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
+                proc.stdin.close()
+        log_file.close()
+
+
+def boot_and_unlock(spec: QemuSpec) -> None:
+    """Boot the image, unlock it over Tor, and confirm the real system booted.
+
+    Returns normally only when the boot-ok marker appears on the serial
+    console; the passphrase is (re)delivered on each poll until then. Raises
+    with the serial tail on QEMU death or timeout.
+    """
+    if spec.serial_log.exists():
+        spec.serial_log.unlink()
+    if spec.direct_ssh_port:
+        target = f"127.0.0.1:{spec.direct_ssh_port} -> guest dropbear (direct)"
+        # dropbear comes up within seconds; no need to wait for an onion.
+        initial_delay = 15
+    else:
+        target = f"{spec.onion_address}:22 (Tor onion)"
+        initial_delay = INITIAL_DELIVERY_DELAY
+    print(f"\n========== booting in QEMU ({spec.arch}, accel={spec.accel}) ==========")
+    print(f"Unlock target: {target}  (budget {UNLOCK_TIMEOUT}s)")
+    print("---- guest serial console ----", flush=True)
+    # QEMU's own diagnostics (bad -machine/-cpu, /dev/kvm denied, image busy)
+    # go to stderr; capture them so an early exit is debuggable, not opaque.
+    qemu_stderr = _qemu_stderr_path(spec).open("wb")
+    qemu = subprocess.Popen(
+        config.qemu_argv(spec),
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=qemu_stderr,
+    )
+    try:
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + UNLOCK_TIMEOUT
+        offset = 0
+        # Hold off the first delivery until the unlock endpoint is up (see above).
+        next_delivery = time.monotonic() + initial_delay
+        print(
+            f"[harness] waiting {initial_delay}s for the unlock endpoint before delivering...",
+            flush=True,
+        )
+        delivery: threading.Thread | None = None
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            offset = _stream_new_serial(spec, offset)
+            if _serial_contains(spec, config.BOOT_OK_MARKER):
+                print("\n[harness] boot-ok marker seen — LUKS root unlocked and booted.")
+                return
+            if qemu.poll() is not None:
+                raise RuntimeError(
+                    f"QEMU exited early (code {qemu.returncode}).\n"
+                    f"{_serial_tail(spec)}{_qemu_stderr_tail(spec)}"
+                )
+            # One delivery at a time; each holds its SSH session open in the
+            # background while we keep streaming serial and watching the marker.
+            idle = delivery is None or not delivery.is_alive()
+            if idle and time.monotonic() >= next_delivery:
+                print("\n[harness] delivering passphrase (holding session open) ...", flush=True)
+                delivery = threading.Thread(target=_deliver_worker, args=(spec,), daemon=True)
+                delivery.start()
+                next_delivery = time.monotonic() + DELIVERY_INTERVAL
+            time.sleep(_POLL_INTERVAL)
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Boot-ok marker never appeared within {UNLOCK_TIMEOUT}s.\n"
+            f"{_serial_tail(spec, lines=45)}{_qemu_stderr_tail(spec)}"
+            f"{_ssh_log_tail(spec)}{_client_tor_tail(spec)}"
+        )
+    finally:
+        qemu.terminate()
+        try:
+            qemu.wait(timeout=15)
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+            qemu.kill()
+            qemu.wait(timeout=10)
+        qemu_stderr.close()
+
+
+def parse_env_file(path: Path) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Read the KEY=VALUE image.env written by build_image.sh into a dict."""
+    result: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for line in path.read_text().splitlines():
+        if "=" in line and not line.startswith("#"):
+            key, value = line.split("=", 1)
+            result[key.strip()] = value.strip()
+    return result

tests/e2e/qemu/build_image.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Build a QEMU-bootable, LUKS-encrypted image that reproduces lim's Tor
+# unlock stack: the REAL initcpio files from lim/configuration/initcpio/,
+# the tor hook wired between netconf and dropbear, offline onion keys, and
+# a boot-ok marker service. Boots on a virtio machine (we model the stack,
+# not the Raspberry Pi board, whose USB-gadget net QEMU cannot emulate).
+#
+# Needs root (loop device, cryptsetup, chroot). To keep a host rootless,
+# run this inside a throwaway VM — see tests/e2e/qemu/README.md.
+#
+# Required environment:
+#   WORK_DIR      writable scratch directory (outputs land here)
+#   REPO_ROOT     linux-image-manager checkout (for the real initcpio files)
+#   ARCH          x86_64 (default) or aarch64
+#   PASSPHRASE    LUKS passphrase the harness will send over Tor
+#   SSH_PUBKEY    path to the public key authorized for dropbear
+#
+# Writes $WORK_DIR/image.env with LUKS_UUID / MAPPER_NAME / KERNEL / INITRAMFS
+# / IMAGE for the Python harness to consume.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+: "${WORK_DIR:?set WORK_DIR}"
+: "${REPO_ROOT:?set REPO_ROOT}"
+: "${PASSPHRASE:?set PASSPHRASE}"
+: "${SSH_PUBKEY:?set SSH_PUBKEY}"
+ARCH="${ARCH:-x86_64}"
+MAPPER_NAME="cryptroot"
+
+ROOTFS="$WORK_DIR/rootfs"
+IMAGE="$WORK_DIR/image.raw"
+INITCPIO_SRC="$REPO_ROOT/lim/configuration/initcpio"
+
+case "$ARCH" in
+  x86_64)  KERNEL_PKG=linux; CONSOLE=ttyS0 ;;
+  aarch64) KERNEL_PKG=linux; CONSOLE=ttyAMA0 ;;
+  *) echo "Unsupported ARCH: $ARCH" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+esac
+
+banner() { printf "\n========== %s ==========\n" "$1"; }
+
+cleanup() {
+  set +e
+  mountpoint -q "$WORK_DIR/mnt" && umount -R "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+  [ -e "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME" ] && cryptsetup close "$MAPPER_NAME"
+  [ -n "${LOOP:-}" ] && losetup -d "$LOOP"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+banner "bootstrapping rootfs with pacstrap"
+mkdir -p "$ROOTFS"
+# -c reuses the host package cache (fast). If a cached package is corrupt,
+# clear it first: sudo rm -f /var/cache/pacman/pkg/<pkg>-*.pkg.tar.zst*
+# A file of blank lines on stdin takes the default answer for every provider
+# and confirmation prompt (e.g. the `linux` virtual package), keeping the
+# bootstrap non-interactive without the SIGPIPE/pipefail pitfalls of `yes`.
+printf '\n%.0s' $(seq 100) > "$WORK_DIR/pacman-answers"
+pacstrap -c "$ROOTFS" \
+  base "$KERNEL_PKG" mkinitcpio cryptsetup \
+  busybox tor openssh \
+  mkinitcpio-utils mkinitcpio-netconf mkinitcpio-dropbear \
+  < "$WORK_DIR/pacman-answers"
+
+banner "configuring mkinitcpio (virtio modules, tor between netconf/dropbear)"
+# No `autodetect`: it narrows the initramfs to the *build host's* modules and
+# would strip the virtio drivers the guest VM needs for early networking.
+cat > "$ROOTFS/etc/mkinitcpio.conf" <<EOF
+MODULES=(virtio_pci virtio_blk virtio_net)
+BINARIES=(/usr/lib/libgcc_s.so.1)
+FILES=()
+HOOKS=(base udev modconf keyboard block ptsmount netconf tor dropbear encryptssh filesystems fsck)
+EOF
+
+banner "adding a devpts-mount hook (dropbear needs a PTY for encryptssh)"
+# Without a mounted devpts, dropbear cannot allocate /dev/pts/0, so the
+# interactive encryptssh passphrase prompt never runs and the SSH session
+# just exits ("TIOCSCTTY: Input/output error", "/dev/pts/0: No such file").
+cat > "$ROOTFS/etc/initcpio/install/ptsmount" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/bash
+build() { add_runscript; }
+help() { echo "Mount devpts so dropbear can allocate PTYs for encryptssh."; }
+EOF
+cat > "$ROOTFS/etc/initcpio/hooks/ptsmount" <<'EOF'
+#!/usr/bin/ash
+run_hook() {
+    mkdir -p /dev/pts
+    mount -t devpts devpts /dev/pts -o mode=620,gid=5,ptmxmode=666 2>/dev/null
+    [ -e /dev/ptmx ] || ln -s /dev/pts/ptmx /dev/ptmx
+}
+EOF
+
+banner "installing the real lim initcpio files"
+install -D -m0644 "$INITCPIO_SRC/tor_install" "$ROOTFS/etc/initcpio/install/tor"
+install -D -m0644 "$INITCPIO_SRC/tor_hook"    "$ROOTFS/etc/initcpio/hooks/tor"
+install -D -m0644 "$INITCPIO_SRC/torrc"       "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-torrc"
+
+if [ -n "${TOR_TEST_NETWORK_CONF:-}" ]; then
+  banner "wiring the image to a private (chutney) Tor network"
+  cat "$TOR_TEST_NETWORK_CONF" >> "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-torrc"
+fi
+
+banner "generating onion keys offline"
+install -d -m0700 "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion"
+: > "$WORK_DIR/keygen-torrc"
+tor -f "$WORK_DIR/keygen-torrc" --DisableNetwork 1 \
+    --DataDirectory "$WORK_DIR/keygen-data" \
+    --HiddenServiceDir "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion" \
+    --HiddenServicePort "22 127.0.0.1:22" \
+    --SocksPort 0 --RunAsDaemon 0 --Log "notice stderr" &
+keygen_pid=$!
+for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+  [ -s "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion/hostname" ] && break
+  sleep 1
+done
+kill "$keygen_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+ONION_ADDRESS="$(cat "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion/hostname")"
+
+banner "authorizing the ssh key for dropbear"
+install -D -m0600 "$SSH_PUBKEY" "$ROOTFS/etc/dropbear/root_key"
+
+banner "baking the boot-ok marker service"
+cat > "$ROOTFS/etc/systemd/system/lim-boot-ok.service" <<'EOF'
+[Unit]
+Description=Signal a successful LUKS-unlock boot to the serial console
+After=multi-user.target
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=/bin/sh -c 'echo LIM_UNLOCK_BOOT_OK > /dev/console'
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+EOF
+ln -sf /etc/systemd/system/lim-boot-ok.service \
+  "$ROOTFS/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/lim-boot-ok.service"
+ln -sf "/usr/lib/systemd/system/getty@.service" \
+  "$ROOTFS/etc/systemd/system/getty.target.wants/getty@$CONSOLE.service"
+
+banner "generating the initramfs"
+# arch-chroot binds /proc, /sys, /dev itself; no pre-mount needed.
+arch-chroot "$ROOTFS" mkinitcpio -P
+
+banner "creating the LUKS image"
+truncate -s 4G "$IMAGE"
+LOOP="$(losetup -f --show "$IMAGE")"
+# Cap the argon2 memory so the unlock fits in the guest's RAM (see QemuSpec).
+printf '%s' "$PASSPHRASE" | cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 --batch-mode \
+  --pbkdf-memory 262144 "$LOOP" -
+LUKS_UUID="$(cryptsetup luksUUID "$LOOP")"
+printf '%s' "$PASSPHRASE" | cryptsetup open "$LOOP" "$MAPPER_NAME" -
+mkfs.ext4 -q "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME"
+
+banner "copying the rootfs into the encrypted volume"
+mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+mount "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME" "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+cp -a "$ROOTFS/." "$WORK_DIR/mnt/"
+echo "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME / ext4 defaults,noatime 0 1" > "$WORK_DIR/mnt/etc/fstab"
+# Kernel/initramfs filenames differ per distro (Arch: vmlinuz-linux /
+# initramfs-linux.img; Manjaro: vmlinuz-6.1-x86_64 / initramfs-6.1-x86_64.img).
+# Discover them instead of hard-coding, and skip the larger fallback image.
+KERNEL_IMG="$(find "$ROOTFS/boot" -maxdepth 1 -name 'vmlinuz-*' | sort | head -1)"
+INITRAMFS_IMG="$(find "$ROOTFS/boot" -maxdepth 1 -name 'initramfs-*.img' \
+  ! -name '*fallback*' | sort | head -1)"
+[ -n "$KERNEL_IMG" ] || { echo "No kernel image in $ROOTFS/boot" >&2; exit 1; }
+[ -n "$INITRAMFS_IMG" ] || { echo "No initramfs in $ROOTFS/boot" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "Using kernel $KERNEL_IMG and initramfs $INITRAMFS_IMG"
+cp "$KERNEL_IMG" "$WORK_DIR/kernel"
+cp "$INITRAMFS_IMG" "$WORK_DIR/initramfs"
+sync
+umount -R "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+cryptsetup close "$MAPPER_NAME"
+losetup -d "$LOOP"
+LOOP=""
+
+banner "writing image.env"
+cat > "$WORK_DIR/image.env" <<EOF
+LUKS_UUID=$LUKS_UUID
+MAPPER_NAME=$MAPPER_NAME
+ONION_ADDRESS=$ONION_ADDRESS
+IMAGE=$IMAGE
+KERNEL=$WORK_DIR/kernel
+INITRAMFS=$WORK_DIR/initramfs
+EOF
+echo "Build complete. Onion address: $ONION_ADDRESS"

tests/e2e/qemu/build_image_debian.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# Build a QEMU-bootable, LUKS-encrypted Debian image that reproduces lim's Tor
+# unlock stack for the initramfs-tools backend: the REAL hooks from
+# lim/configuration/initramfs-tools/, cryptsetup-initramfs + dropbear-initramfs,
+# offline onion keys, and a boot-ok marker service. Boots on a virtio machine
+# (models the software stack, not the Raspberry Pi board).
+#
+# Debian amd64 on an x86_64 host — no qemu-user needed. Needs root (debootstrap,
+# loop device, cryptsetup, chroot). See tests/e2e/qemu/README.md.
+#
+# Same env contract and image.env output as build_image.sh.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+: "${WORK_DIR:?set WORK_DIR}"
+: "${REPO_ROOT:?set REPO_ROOT}"
+: "${PASSPHRASE:?set PASSPHRASE}"
+: "${SSH_PUBKEY:?set SSH_PUBKEY}"
+SUITE="${DEBIAN_SUITE:-bookworm}"
+MIRROR="${DEBIAN_MIRROR:-http://deb.debian.org/debian}"
+MAPPER_NAME="cryptroot"
+
+ROOTFS="$WORK_DIR/rootfs"
+IMAGE="$WORK_DIR/image.raw"
+HOOK_SRC="$REPO_ROOT/lim/configuration/initramfs-tools"
+
+banner() { printf "\n========== %s ==========\n" "$1"; }
+
+# Debian keeps tools in /usr/sbin, which an Arch host's PATH (merged /usr/bin)
+# omits, so chroot can't find update-initramfs. Force a Debian-style PATH.
+in_chroot() {
+  chroot "$ROOTFS" /usr/bin/env \
+    PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin "$@"
+}
+
+cleanup() {
+  set +e
+  for m in dev/pts dev proc sys; do
+    mountpoint -q "$ROOTFS/$m" && umount -l "$ROOTFS/$m"
+  done
+  mountpoint -q "$WORK_DIR/mnt" && umount -R "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+  [ -e "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME" ] && cryptsetup close "$MAPPER_NAME"
+  [ -n "${LOOP:-}" ] && losetup -d "$LOOP"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+banner "bootstrapping Debian rootfs with debootstrap ($SUITE)"
+mkdir -p "$ROOTFS"
+debootstrap --arch=amd64 --variant=minbase \
+  --include=linux-image-amd64,cryptsetup,cryptsetup-initramfs,dropbear-initramfs,tor,busybox,systemd-sysv,udev,ifupdown,isc-dhcp-client \
+  "$SUITE" "$ROOTFS" "$MIRROR"
+
+banner "binding chroot filesystems"
+cp /etc/resolv.conf "$ROOTFS/etc/resolv.conf"
+for m in proc sys dev dev/pts; do
+  mkdir -p "$ROOTFS/$m"
+  mount --bind "/$m" "$ROOTFS/$m"
+done
+
+banner "creating the LUKS image (UUID must exist before update-initramfs)"
+truncate -s 6G "$IMAGE"
+LOOP="$(losetup -f --show "$IMAGE")"
+printf '%s' "$PASSPHRASE" | cryptsetup luksFormat --type luks2 --batch-mode \
+  --pbkdf-memory 262144 "$LOOP" -
+LUKS_UUID="$(cryptsetup luksUUID "$LOOP")"
+
+banner "configuring crypttab / fstab / networking"
+# `initramfs` bakes the mapping in so cryptsetup-initramfs unlocks before pivot.
+echo "$MAPPER_NAME UUID=$LUKS_UUID none luks,initramfs" > "$ROOTFS/etc/crypttab"
+echo "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME / ext4 defaults,noatime 0 1" > "$ROOTFS/etc/fstab"
+echo "lim-e2e" > "$ROOTFS/etc/hostname"
+# initramfs-tools includes virtio via MODULES=most (default); be explicit.
+sed -i 's/^MODULES=.*/MODULES=most/' "$ROOTFS/etc/initramfs-tools/initramfs.conf"
+
+banner "authorizing the ssh key for dropbear-initramfs"
+install -D -m0600 "$SSH_PUBKEY" "$ROOTFS/etc/dropbear/initramfs/authorized_keys"
+
+banner "installing the real lim initramfs-tools tor hooks"
+install -D -m0755 "$HOOK_SRC/tor_hook"     "$ROOTFS/etc/initramfs-tools/hooks/tor"
+install -D -m0755 "$HOOK_SRC/tor_premount" "$ROOTFS/etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-premount/tor"
+install -D -m0755 "$HOOK_SRC/tor_bottom"   "$ROOTFS/etc/initramfs-tools/scripts/init-bottom/tor"
+install -D -m0644 "$HOOK_SRC/torrc"        "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-torrc"
+if [ -n "${TOR_TEST_NETWORK_CONF:-}" ]; then
+  cat "$TOR_TEST_NETWORK_CONF" >> "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-torrc"
+fi
+
+banner "generating onion keys offline"
+install -d -m0700 "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion"
+: > "$WORK_DIR/keygen-torrc"
+tor -f "$WORK_DIR/keygen-torrc" --DisableNetwork 1 \
+    --DataDirectory "$WORK_DIR/keygen-data" \
+    --HiddenServiceDir "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion" \
+    --HiddenServicePort "22 127.0.0.1:22" \
+    --SocksPort 0 --RunAsDaemon 0 --Log "notice stderr" &
+keygen_pid=$!
+for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
+  [ -s "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion/hostname" ] && break
+  sleep 1
+done
+kill "$keygen_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
+ONION_ADDRESS="$(cat "$ROOTFS/etc/tor/initramfs-onion/hostname")"
+
+banner "baking the boot-ok marker service + serial getty"
+cat > "$ROOTFS/etc/systemd/system/lim-boot-ok.service" <<'EOF'
+[Unit]
+Description=Signal a successful LUKS-unlock boot to the serial console
+After=multi-user.target
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=/bin/sh -c 'echo LIM_UNLOCK_BOOT_OK > /dev/console'
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+EOF
+in_chroot systemctl enable lim-boot-ok.service serial-getty@ttyS0.service
+
+banner "generating the initramfs (update-initramfs)"
+in_chroot update-initramfs -c -k all || in_chroot update-initramfs -u -k all
+
+banner "exporting kernel + initramfs"
+KERNEL_IMG="$(find "$ROOTFS/boot" -maxdepth 1 -name 'vmlinuz-*' | sort | tail -1)"
+INITRAMFS_IMG="$(find "$ROOTFS/boot" -maxdepth 1 -name 'initrd.img-*' | sort | tail -1)"
+[ -n "$KERNEL_IMG" ] || { echo "No kernel in $ROOTFS/boot" >&2; exit 1; }
+[ -n "$INITRAMFS_IMG" ] || { echo "No initramfs in $ROOTFS/boot" >&2; exit 1; }
+echo "Using kernel $KERNEL_IMG and initramfs $INITRAMFS_IMG"
+cp "$KERNEL_IMG" "$WORK_DIR/kernel"
+cp "$INITRAMFS_IMG" "$WORK_DIR/initramfs"
+
+banner "unbinding chroot filesystems"
+for m in dev/pts dev proc sys; do umount -l "$ROOTFS/$m"; done
+
+banner "copying the rootfs into the encrypted volume"
+printf '%s' "$PASSPHRASE" | cryptsetup open "$LOOP" "$MAPPER_NAME" -
+mkfs.ext4 -q "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME"
+mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+mount "/dev/mapper/$MAPPER_NAME" "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+cp -a "$ROOTFS/." "$WORK_DIR/mnt/"
+sync
+umount -R "$WORK_DIR/mnt"
+cryptsetup close "$MAPPER_NAME"
+losetup -d "$LOOP"
+LOOP=""
+
+banner "writing image.env"
+cat > "$WORK_DIR/image.env" <<EOF
+LUKS_UUID=$LUKS_UUID
+MAPPER_NAME=$MAPPER_NAME
+ONION_ADDRESS=$ONION_ADDRESS
+IMAGE=$IMAGE
+KERNEL=$WORK_DIR/kernel
+INITRAMFS=$WORK_DIR/initramfs
+EOF
+echo "Build complete. Onion address: $ONION_ADDRESS"

tests/e2e/qemu/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+"""Pure, side-effect-free builders for the QEMU unlock harness.
+
+Everything here is deterministic string/list construction so it can be
+unit-tested without QEMU, root, or a network (see test_qemu_harness_unit.py).
+The stages that actually touch the system live in build_image.sh,
+chutney.py and boot_unlock.py.
+"""
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+
+# Printed to /dev/console by a oneshot service baked into the image; its
+# appearance on the serial log is the proof that the LUKS root actually
+# unlocked and the real system finished booting.
+BOOT_OK_MARKER = "LIM_UNLOCK_BOOT_OK"
+
+# The HOOKS the built image must carry — the tor hook sits between netconf
+# and dropbear, exactly as lim.image.encryption wires it for real images.
+EXPECTED_HOOKS_ORDER = ("netconf", "tor", "dropbear", "encryptssh")
+
+# Serial console device per architecture (kernel console= and getty).
+_SERIAL_CONSOLE = {"x86_64": "ttyS0", "aarch64": "ttyAMA0"}
+_QEMU_BINARY = {"x86_64": "qemu-system-x86_64", "aarch64": "qemu-system-aarch64"}
+
+
+@dataclass
+class QemuSpec:
+    """Everything needed to boot one built image and unlock it."""
+
+    arch: str
+    work_dir: Path
+    image_path: Path
+    kernel_path: Path
+    initramfs_path: Path
+    luks_uuid: str
+    mapper_name: str
+    passphrase: str
+    ssh_key_path: Path
+    onion_address: str = ""
+    socks_port: int = 9050
+    # 2 GiB so the LUKS argon2 KDF has enough memory to unlock in the guest
+    # (build_image.sh also caps --pbkdf-memory to keep this headroom).
+    memory_mb: int = 2048
+    accel: str = "tcg"  # "kvm" when the host arch matches and /dev/kvm exists
+    # "arch" (mkinitcpio/encryptssh) or "debian" (initramfs-tools/cryptroot-unlock).
+    os_family: str = "arch"
+    # Remote command the unlock SSH session runs; empty means the session
+    # presents the passphrase prompt itself (Arch encryptssh).
+    unlock_command: str = ""
+    # >0 selects the deterministic direct transport: QEMU forwards this host
+    # port to the guest's dropbear (:22) and the passphrase is delivered over a
+    # plain SSH (no Tor). 0 uses the Tor onion transport (onion_address).
+    direct_ssh_port: int = 0
+
+    @property
+    def serial_log(self) -> Path:
+        return self.work_dir / "serial.log"
+
+
+def qemu_binary(arch: str) -> str:
+    """Return the qemu-system-* binary for an arch (raises on unsupported)."""
+    if arch not in _QEMU_BINARY:
+        raise ValueError(f"Unsupported arch: {arch}")
+    return _QEMU_BINARY[arch]
+
+
+def kernel_cmdline(spec: QemuSpec) -> str:
+    """Kernel command line unlocking the LUKS root over the mkinitcpio hooks.
+
+    ``ip=dhcp`` is what the netconf hook consumes to bring up virtio-net in
+    early userspace; the Pi images use USB-gadget networking instead, which
+    QEMU cannot emulate — hence virtio here (we model the stack, not the board).
+    """
+    console = _SERIAL_CONSOLE[spec.arch]
+    # Arch's mkinitcpio encrypt/encryptssh finds the LUKS device from the
+    # cryptdevice= param; Debian's cryptsetup-initramfs reads /etc/crypttab
+    # baked into the initramfs, so it needs only root=/dev/mapper/<name>.
+    if spec.os_family == "debian":
+        crypt = f"root=/dev/mapper/{spec.mapper_name} rw"
+    else:
+        crypt = (
+            f"cryptdevice=UUID={spec.luks_uuid}:{spec.mapper_name} "
+            f"root=/dev/mapper/{spec.mapper_name} rw"
+        )
+    # The netconf/dropbear-initramfs hooks need the explicit ip= form
+    # <client>:<server>:<gw>:<netmask>:<host>:<device>:<proto> — the device
+    # name is mandatory; a bare "ip=dhcp" leaves netconf looping on
+    # "SIOCGIFFLAGS: No such device". net.ifnames=0 keeps the NIC named eth0.
+    # The LAST console= owns /dev/console, which the boot-ok marker echoes to
+    # and QEMU captures via -serial file, so the serial console must come last.
+    return f"{crypt} ip=::::lim-e2e:eth0:dhcp net.ifnames=0 console=tty0 console={console}"
+
+
+def qemu_argv(spec: QemuSpec) -> list[str]:
+    """Full QEMU command: direct kernel boot, virtio disk/net, serial to log.
+
+    User-mode networking (``-netdev user``) needs no root and no tap device;
+    it is enough for a Tor onion service, whose rendezvous is outbound from
+    both ends, so no inbound host port forward is required.
+    """
+    argv = [qemu_binary(spec.arch)]  # validates the arch
+    net_device = "virtio-net-pci" if spec.arch == "x86_64" else "virtio-net-device"
+    if spec.arch == "x86_64":
+        argv += ["-machine", "q35"]
+    else:
+        argv += ["-machine", "virt", "-cpu", "cortex-a72"]
+    if spec.accel == "kvm":
+        argv += ["-cpu", "host", "-accel", "kvm"]
+    elif spec.arch == "x86_64":
+        argv += ["-cpu", "max", "-accel", "tcg"]
+    netdev = "user,id=net0"
+    if spec.direct_ssh_port:
+        # Forward a host port to the guest's dropbear for the direct transport.
+        netdev += f",hostfwd=tcp:127.0.0.1:{spec.direct_ssh_port}-:22"
+    argv += [
+        "-m",
+        str(spec.memory_mb),
+        "-kernel",
+        str(spec.kernel_path),
+        "-initrd",
+        str(spec.initramfs_path),
+        "-append",
+        kernel_cmdline(spec),
+        "-drive",
+        f"file={spec.image_path},if=virtio,format=raw",
+        "-netdev",
+        netdev,
+        "-device",
+        f"{net_device},netdev=net0",
+        "-nographic",
+        "-serial",
+        f"file:{spec.serial_log}",
+        "-no-reboot",
+    ]
+    return argv
+
+
+def ssh_proxy_command(socks_port: int) -> str:
+    """ncat-based SOCKS5 ProxyCommand routing the SSH stream through Tor."""
+    return f"ncat --proxy 127.0.0.1:{socks_port} --proxy-type socks5 %h %p"
+
+
+def ssh_argv(spec: QemuSpec) -> list[str]:
+    """Non-interactive SSH into the initramfs dropbear to feed the passphrase.
+
+    ``-tt`` forces a pty so the askpass inside the session reads the passphrase
+    we pipe on stdin. Host-key checking is off (throwaway host key). On Debian
+    the session runs ``cryptroot-unlock``; on Arch encryptssh presents the
+    prompt on login. The direct transport connects to a forwarded host port;
+    the Tor transport routes through the onion via a SOCKS ProxyCommand.
+    """
+    argv = [
+        "ssh",
+        "-tt",
+        "-o",
+        "StrictHostKeyChecking=no",
+        "-o",
+        "UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null",
+        "-o",
+        "BatchMode=yes",
+        "-i",
+        str(spec.ssh_key_path),
+    ]
+    if spec.direct_ssh_port:
+        argv += ["-p", str(spec.direct_ssh_port), "root@127.0.0.1"]
+    else:
+        argv += [
+            "-o",
+            f"ProxyCommand={ssh_proxy_command(spec.socks_port)}",
+            f"root@{spec.onion_address}",
+        ]
+    if spec.unlock_command:
+        argv.append(spec.unlock_command)
+    return argv

tests/e2e/qemu/harness.py

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+"""Orchestrate the full virtualized unlock: build -> tor net -> boot -> unlock.
+
+Wires the stages together and owns their teardown. Kept thin so each stage
+stays independently testable; the pure command construction lives in
+config.py and is unit-tested without any of this running.
+"""
+
+import os
+import platform
+import socket
+import subprocess
+import threading
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from tests.e2e.qemu import boot_unlock, tor_net
+from tests.e2e.qemu.config import QemuSpec
+
+IMAGE_ENV_NAME = "image.env"
+_SUDO_REFRESH_INTERVAL = 60
+
+DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE = "lim-e2e-luks-passphrase"  # noqa: S105 (throwaway test secret)
+DEFAULT_ARCH = "x86_64"
+DEFAULT_SOCKS_PORT = 9052
+
+
+@dataclass
+class HarnessConfig:
+    repo_root: Path
+    work_dir: Path
+    arch: str = DEFAULT_ARCH
+    passphrase: str = DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE
+    chutney_path: Path | None = None
+    chutney_network: str = "networks/basic"
+    os_family: str = "arch"  # "arch" (pacstrap) or "debian" (debootstrap)
+    # "direct" (deterministic; QEMU port-forward to dropbear) or "tor" (full
+    # onion transport, opt-in — flaky over public Tor inside QEMU).
+    unlock_transport: str = "direct"
+
+
+class _NullNet:
+    """Stand-in tor network for the direct transport: no Tor needed."""
+
+    socks_port = 0
+    test_network_conf: Path | None = None
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+
+def _free_port() -> int:
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
+        sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+        return sock.getsockname()[1]
+
+
+# Per-OS build script and the remote command that delivers the passphrase.
+_BUILD_SCRIPT = {"arch": "build_image.sh", "debian": "build_image_debian.sh"}
+_UNLOCK_COMMAND = {"arch": "", "debian": "cryptroot-unlock"}
+
+
+def choose_accel(arch: str) -> str:
+    """Use KVM only when the guest arch matches the host and /dev/kvm exists."""
+    host = "x86_64" if platform.machine() in ("x86_64", "AMD64") else platform.machine()
+    if arch == host and Path("/dev/kvm").exists():
+        return "kvm"
+    return "tcg"
+
+
+def _generate_ssh_key(work_dir: Path) -> Path:
+    key_path = work_dir / "unlock_key"
+    subprocess.run(
+        ["ssh-keygen", "-t", "ed25519", "-N", "", "-f", str(key_path), "-q"],
+        check=True,
+    )
+    return key_path
+
+
+class _SudoKeepalive:
+    """Refresh the cached sudo credential so the long build never re-prompts.
+
+    The password is entered once, up front (before the slow tor bootstrap),
+    then a background thread keeps the timestamp warm until stop().
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self._stop = threading.Event()
+        self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._loop, daemon=True)
+
+    def _loop(self) -> None:
+        while not self._stop.wait(_SUDO_REFRESH_INTERVAL):
+            subprocess.run(["sudo", "-n", "-v"], check=False)
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        self._thread.start()
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        self._stop.set()
+        self._thread.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+def _acquire_sudo() -> _SudoKeepalive | None:
+    """Prompt for sudo once now; return a keepalive (None when already root)."""
+    if os.geteuid() == 0:
+        return None
+    print("\n[harness] The build stage needs root — enter your sudo password now.")
+    subprocess.run(["sudo", "-v"], check=True)
+    keepalive = _SudoKeepalive()
+    keepalive.start()
+    return keepalive
+
+
+def _build_image(cfg: HarnessConfig, ssh_key: Path, test_network_conf: Path | None) -> None:
+    script = cfg.repo_root / "tests/e2e/qemu" / _BUILD_SCRIPT[cfg.os_family]
+    env = {
+        **os.environ,
+        "WORK_DIR": str(cfg.work_dir),
+        "REPO_ROOT": str(cfg.repo_root),
+        "ARCH": cfg.arch,
+        "PASSPHRASE": cfg.passphrase,
+        "SSH_PUBKEY": f"{ssh_key}.pub",
+    }
+    if test_network_conf is not None:
+        env["TOR_TEST_NETWORK_CONF"] = str(test_network_conf)
+    # -n: never prompt here; the credential was primed by _acquire_sudo().
+    prefix = [] if os.geteuid() == 0 else ["sudo", "-n", "-E"]
+    subprocess.run([*prefix, "bash", str(script)], env=env, check=True)
+    # Hand the root-built artifacts back so rootless QEMU can read them.
+    _reclaim_work_dir(cfg, required=True)
+
+
+def _reclaim_work_dir(cfg: HarnessConfig, *, required: bool = False) -> None:
+    """Reclaim the root-built work dir for the invoking user via chown.
+
+    Needed before boot so rootless QEMU can read the image, and again in the
+    finally so a failed build never leaves root-owned files that the pytest
+    tmp cleanup then cannot remove.
+    """
+    if os.geteuid() == 0 or not cfg.work_dir.exists():
+        return
+    subprocess.run(
+        ["sudo", "-n", "chown", "-R", str(os.getuid()), str(cfg.work_dir)],
+        check=required,
+    )
+
+
+def _make_tor_net(cfg: HarnessConfig):
+    if cfg.unlock_transport == "direct":
+        return _NullNet()
+    if cfg.chutney_path is not None:
+        return tor_net.ChutneyNetwork(cfg.chutney_path, cfg.work_dir, cfg.chutney_network)
+    return tor_net.PublicTorClient(cfg.work_dir, DEFAULT_SOCKS_PORT)
+
+
+def _load_spec(cfg: HarnessConfig, ssh_key: Path, socks_port: int) -> QemuSpec:
+    env = boot_unlock.parse_env_file(cfg.work_dir / IMAGE_ENV_NAME)
+    direct_port = _free_port() if cfg.unlock_transport == "direct" else 0
+    return QemuSpec(
+        arch=cfg.arch,
+        work_dir=cfg.work_dir,
+        image_path=Path(env["IMAGE"]),
+        kernel_path=Path(env["KERNEL"]),
+        initramfs_path=Path(env["INITRAMFS"]),
+        luks_uuid=env["LUKS_UUID"],
+        mapper_name=env["MAPPER_NAME"],
+        onion_address=env["ONION_ADDRESS"],
+        passphrase=cfg.passphrase,
+        ssh_key_path=ssh_key,
+        socks_port=socks_port,
+        accel=choose_accel(cfg.arch),
+        os_family=cfg.os_family,
+        unlock_command=_UNLOCK_COMMAND[cfg.os_family],
+        direct_ssh_port=direct_port,
+    )
+
+
+def run(cfg: HarnessConfig) -> QemuSpec:
+    """Execute every stage; return the QemuSpec on a fully verified unlock.
+
+    A chutney network must exist before the build so the image can be wired
+    to its authorities; a public client only needs to be up before boot.
+    """
+    cfg.work_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    ssh_key = _generate_ssh_key(cfg.work_dir)
+    # Prime sudo before the slow tor bootstrap so the prompt is the first thing
+    # the operator sees, not a surprise five minutes in.
+    sudo = _acquire_sudo()
+    net = _make_tor_net(cfg)
+    try:
+        if cfg.unlock_transport != "direct":
+            print("\n[harness] bootstrapping Tor client (~30-60s)...", flush=True)
+        net.start()
+        print(
+            f"[harness] transport={cfg.unlock_transport}, building encrypted "
+            "image (several minutes)...",
+            flush=True,
+        )
+        _build_image(cfg, ssh_key, net.test_network_conf)
+        spec = _load_spec(cfg, ssh_key, net.socks_port)
+        boot_unlock.boot_and_unlock(spec)
+        return spec
+    finally:
+        # Reclaim ownership FIRST so a slow/failing teardown can never leave
+        # root-owned files behind, and isolate each step so none masks the
+        # real error propagating out of the try or skips the others.
+        _reclaim_work_dir(cfg)
+        try:
+            net.stop()
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - teardown must not mask the real failure
+            print(f"[harness] tor network teardown failed: {exc}", flush=True)
+        if sudo is not None:
+            try:
+                sudo.stop()
+            except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - teardown must not mask the real failure
+                print(f"[harness] sudo keepalive teardown failed: {exc}", flush=True)

tests/e2e/qemu/tor_net.py

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+"""Tor network providers for the QEMU unlock harness.
+
+Two interchangeable ways to give the harness a working SOCKS port that can
+reach the guest's onion service:
+
+* PublicTorClient - a local tor client on the public network (default, both
+  the guest's baked-in torrc and this client use the real Tor authorities).
+* ChutneyNetwork - a private, deterministic, offline Tor network via the
+  official `chutney` tool. Fully private operation also needs the image
+  built against the same authorities; test_network_conf() emits the file
+  build_image.sh consumes for that (see README.md).
+
+Both expose ``socks_port``, ``start()`` and ``stop()``.
+"""
+
+import subprocess
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT = 300  # public Tor bootstrap can stall on slow guards
+_GUEST_HOST_ALIAS = "10.0.2.2"  # QEMU user-net alias for the host's 127.0.0.1
+
+
+class PublicTorClient:
+    """A throwaway tor client bootstrapped against the public network."""
+
+    def __init__(self, work_dir: Path, socks_port: int) -> None:
+        self.socks_port = socks_port
+        self.test_network_conf: Path | None = None
+        self._work_dir = work_dir
+        self._log = work_dir / "tor-client.log"
+        self._data = work_dir / "tor-client-data"
+        self._process: subprocess.Popen | None = None
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        self._data.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+        self._data.chmod(0o700)
+        # An empty -f keeps the system /etc/tor/torrc (User tor, ...) out of
+        # this rootless client, which would otherwise refuse to start.
+        empty_torrc = self._work_dir / "tor-client-torrc"
+        empty_torrc.write_text("")
+        self._process = subprocess.Popen(
+            [
+                "tor",
+                "-f",
+                str(empty_torrc),
+                "--SocksPort",
+                str(self.socks_port),
+                "--DataDirectory",
+                str(self._data),
+                "--Log",
+                f"notice file {self._log}",
+                # HS-level log so onion descriptor fetch / rendezvous is visible.
+                "--Log",
+                f"[rend]info file {self._work_dir / 'tor-client-hs.log'}",
+            ],
+            stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+            stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        )
+        _wait_for_bootstrap(self._log, self._process)
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        if self._process is None:
+            return
+        self._process.terminate()
+        try:
+            self._process.wait(timeout=15)
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+            # Never leak a tor holding the fixed SOCKS port into the next run.
+            self._process.kill()
+            self._process.wait(timeout=5)
+
+
+class ChutneyNetwork:
+    """A private Tor network managed by the chutney tool."""
+
+    def __init__(self, chutney_path: Path, work_dir: Path, network: str) -> None:
+        self._chutney = chutney_path
+        self._network = network
+        self._work_dir = work_dir
+        self.socks_port = 0
+        self.test_network_conf: Path | None = None
+
+    def _run(self, *args: str) -> None:
+        subprocess.run(
+            [str(self._chutney / "chutney"), *args, self._network],
+            cwd=self._chutney,
+            check=True,
+        )
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        self._run("configure")
+        self._run("start")
+        self._run("wait_for_bootstrap")
+        client_torrc = _find_client_torrc(self._chutney / "net" / "nodes")
+        self.socks_port = _parse_socks_port(client_torrc)
+        self.test_network_conf = self._emit_network_conf(client_torrc)
+
+    def _emit_network_conf(self, client_torrc: Path) -> Path:
+        """Distil the authority/test-network lines the guest image needs.
+
+        127.0.0.1 authority addresses are rewritten to the QEMU user-net host
+        alias so the guest's initramfs tor can reach them through user-mode
+        networking.
+        """
+        wanted = ("TestingTorNetwork", "DirAuthority", "DirServer", "AlternateDirAuthority")
+        lines = [
+            line.replace("127.0.0.1", _GUEST_HOST_ALIAS)
+            for line in client_torrc.read_text().splitlines()
+            if line.strip().startswith(wanted)
+        ]
+        conf = self._work_dir / "tor-test-network.conf"
+        conf.write_text("\n".join(lines) + "\n")
+        return conf
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        self._run("stop")
+
+
+def _wait_for_bootstrap(log_path: Path, process: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if process.poll() is not None:
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"tor exited early (code {process.returncode}).\n{_log_tail(log_path)}"
+            )
+        if log_path.is_file() and "Bootstrapped 100%" in log_path.read_text():
+            return
+        time.sleep(1)
+    raise RuntimeError(f"tor client did not bootstrap in time.\n{_log_tail(log_path)}")
+
+
+def _log_tail(log_path: Path, lines: int = 8) -> str:
+    if not log_path.is_file():
+        return "(no tor log written)"
+    tail = log_path.read_text().splitlines()[-lines:]
+    return "tor log:\n  " + "\n  ".join(tail)
+
+
+def _find_client_torrc(nodes_dir: Path) -> Path:
+    for torrc in sorted(nodes_dir.glob("*/torrc")):
+        if _parse_socks_port(torrc):
+            return torrc
+    raise RuntimeError(f"No chutney client with a SocksPort under {nodes_dir}.")
+
+
+def _parse_socks_port(torrc: Path) -> int:
+    if not torrc.is_file():
+        return 0
+    for line in torrc.read_text().splitlines():
+        parts = line.split()
+        if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[0] == "SocksPort" and parts[1].isdigit():
+            port = int(parts[1])
+            if port:
+                return port
+    return 0

tests/e2e/test_qemu_harness_unit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+"""Always-on unit tests for the QEMU harness logic.
+
+No QEMU, root, or network: they exercise the pure command builders and guard
+the root build script against drifting away from what the harness expects.
+Run as part of the normal suite.
+"""
+
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from lim import config as lim_config
+from tests.e2e.qemu import boot_unlock, config, harness, tor_net
+from tests.e2e.qemu.config import EXPECTED_HOOKS_ORDER, QemuSpec
+
+BUILD_SCRIPT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "tests/e2e/qemu/build_image.sh"
+
+
+def _spec(**overrides) -> QemuSpec:
+    base = {
+        "arch": "x86_64",
+        "work_dir": Path("/work"),
+        "image_path": Path("/work/image.raw"),
+        "kernel_path": Path("/work/kernel"),
+        "initramfs_path": Path("/work/initramfs"),
+        "luks_uuid": "1111-UUID",
+        "mapper_name": "cryptroot",
+        "passphrase": "secret",
+        "ssh_key_path": Path("/work/unlock_key"),
+        "onion_address": "abcd.onion",
+        "socks_port": 9052,
+    }
+    base.update(overrides)
+    return QemuSpec(**base)
+
+
+class TestKernelCmdline:
+    def test_unlocks_the_luks_root_over_dhcp(self):
+        line = config.kernel_cmdline(_spec())
+        assert "cryptdevice=UUID=1111-UUID:cryptroot" in line
+        assert "root=/dev/mapper/cryptroot" in line
+        # Explicit device in the ip= form, else netconf loops on "No such device".
+        assert ":eth0:dhcp" in line
+        assert "console=ttyS0" in line
+
+    def test_serial_console_is_last_so_marker_reaches_serial_log(self):
+        line = config.kernel_cmdline(_spec())
+        assert line.index("console=tty0") < line.index("console=ttyS0")
+
+    def test_aarch64_uses_amba_serial(self):
+        assert "console=ttyAMA0" in config.kernel_cmdline(_spec(arch="aarch64"))
+
+    def test_debian_uses_crypttab_not_cryptdevice(self):
+        # Debian's cryptsetup-initramfs reads /etc/crypttab, so the cmdline
+        # carries only root=/dev/mapper/<name>, no cryptdevice= param.
+        line = config.kernel_cmdline(_spec(os_family="debian"))
+        assert "cryptdevice=" not in line
+        assert "root=/dev/mapper/cryptroot" in line
+        assert ":eth0:dhcp" in line
+        assert line.index("console=tty0") < line.index("console=ttyS0")
+
+
+class TestQemuArgv:
+    def test_x86_uses_virtio_net_and_direct_kernel_boot(self):
+        argv = config.qemu_argv(_spec())
+        assert argv[0] == "qemu-system-x86_64"
+        assert "virtio-net-pci,netdev=net0" in argv
+        assert "-kernel" in argv
+        assert "/work/kernel" in argv
+        assert "-initrd" in argv
+        assert "/work/initramfs" in argv
+        assert "file=/work/image.raw,if=virtio,format=raw" in argv
+        assert f"file:{_spec().serial_log}" in argv
+        assert "user,id=net0" in argv
+
+    def test_aarch64_uses_virt_machine_and_net_device(self):
+        argv = config.qemu_argv(_spec(arch="aarch64"))
+        assert argv[0] == "qemu-system-aarch64"
+        assert "virt" in argv
+        assert "virtio-net-device,netdev=net0" in argv
+
+    def test_kvm_accel_is_emitted_when_requested(self):
+        assert "kvm" in config.qemu_argv(_spec(accel="kvm"))
+        assert "kvm" not in config.qemu_argv(_spec(accel="tcg"))
+
+    def test_unknown_arch_raises(self):
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsupported arch"):
+            config.qemu_argv(_spec(arch="riscv64"))
+
+
+class TestQemuBinary:
+    def test_derives_binary_per_arch(self):
+        assert config.qemu_binary("x86_64") == "qemu-system-x86_64"
+        assert config.qemu_binary("aarch64") == "qemu-system-aarch64"
+
+    def test_unknown_arch_raises(self):
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unsupported arch"):
+            config.qemu_binary("riscv64")
+
+
+class TestSshInvocation:
+    def test_proxy_command_routes_through_socks5(self):
+        proxy = config.ssh_proxy_command(9052)
+        assert "--proxy 127.0.0.1:9052" in proxy
+        assert "--proxy-type socks5" in proxy
+
+    def test_ssh_argv_targets_onion_via_key_and_proxy(self):
+        argv = config.ssh_argv(_spec())
+        assert "root@abcd.onion" in argv
+        assert "-i" in argv
+        assert "/work/unlock_key" in argv
+        assert any("ProxyCommand=" in part for part in argv)
+        assert "StrictHostKeyChecking=no" in argv
+
+    def test_arch_session_runs_no_remote_command(self):
+        assert config.ssh_argv(_spec())[-1] == "root@abcd.onion"
+
+    def test_debian_session_runs_cryptroot_unlock(self):
+        argv = config.ssh_argv(_spec(unlock_command="cryptroot-unlock"))
+        assert argv[-1] == "cryptroot-unlock"
+
+
+class TestDirectTransport:
+    def test_qemu_forwards_a_host_port_to_dropbear(self):
+        argv = config.qemu_argv(_spec(direct_ssh_port=2222))
+        assert "user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp:127.0.0.1:2222-:22" in argv
+
+    def test_tor_transport_adds_no_hostfwd(self):
+        argv = config.qemu_argv(_spec())
+        assert "user,id=net0" in argv
+        assert not any("hostfwd" in part for part in argv)
+
+    def test_ssh_argv_direct_connects_to_forwarded_port(self):
+        argv = config.ssh_argv(_spec(direct_ssh_port=2222))
+        assert "root@127.0.0.1" in argv
+        assert "-p" in argv
+        assert "2222" in argv
+        assert not any("ProxyCommand" in part for part in argv)
+
+
+class TestBuildScriptStaysAligned:
+    """Guards: the root build script must match what the harness assumes."""
+
+    def _script(self) -> str:
+        return BUILD_SCRIPT.read_text()
+
+    def test_hooks_place_tor_between_netconf_and_dropbear(self):
+        hooks_line = next(line for line in self._script().splitlines() if line.startswith("HOOKS="))
+        positions = [hooks_line.index(hook) for hook in EXPECTED_HOOKS_ORDER]
+        assert positions == sorted(positions), hooks_line
+
+    def test_installs_the_real_lim_initcpio_files(self):
+        script = self._script()
+        for name in ("tor_install", "tor_hook", "torrc"):
+            assert f"$INITCPIO_SRC/{name}" in script
+        assert "etc/dropbear/root_key" in script
+
+    def test_uses_virtio_net_and_emits_boot_marker(self):
+        script = self._script()
+        assert "virtio_net" in script
+        assert config.BOOT_OK_MARKER in script
+
+    def test_mounts_devpts_before_dropbear_for_pty(self):
+        hooks_line = next(line for line in self._script().splitlines() if line.startswith("HOOKS="))
+        assert "ptsmount" in hooks_line
+        assert hooks_line.index("ptsmount") < hooks_line.index("dropbear")
+        assert "mount -t devpts" in self._script()
+
+    def test_real_initcpio_source_directory_exists(self):
+        assert (lim_config.CONFIGURATION_PATH / "initcpio" / "tor_hook").is_file()
+
+
+class TestDebianBuildScript:
+    """Guards for the debootstrap build script and the OS dispatch."""
+
+    def _script(self) -> str:
+        path = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] / "tests/e2e/qemu/build_image_debian.sh"
+        return path.read_text()
+
+    def test_installs_the_real_initramfs_tools_hooks(self):
+        script = self._script()
+        for name in ("tor_hook", "tor_premount", "tor_bottom", "torrc"):
+            assert f"$HOOK_SRC/{name}" in script
+        assert "etc/dropbear/initramfs/authorized_keys" in script
+
+    def test_crypttab_uses_initramfs_option_and_emits_marker(self):
+        script = self._script()
+        assert "none luks,initramfs" in script
+        assert config.BOOT_OK_MARKER in script
+
+    def test_harness_maps_os_family_to_script_and_unlock_command(self):
+        assert harness._BUILD_SCRIPT["debian"] == "build_image_debian.sh"
+        assert harness._BUILD_SCRIPT["arch"] == "build_image.sh"
+        assert harness._UNLOCK_COMMAND["debian"] == "cryptroot-unlock"
+        assert harness._UNLOCK_COMMAND["arch"] == ""
+
+    def test_real_initramfs_tools_source_directory_exists(self):
+        hook = lim_config.CONFIGURATION_PATH / "initramfs-tools" / "tor_premount"
+        assert hook.is_file()
+
+
+class TestOrchestratorGlue:
+    def test_load_spec_reads_image_env(self, tmp_path):
+        (tmp_path / "image.env").write_text(
+            "LUKS_UUID=abc-123\n"
+            "MAPPER_NAME=cryptroot\n"
+            "ONION_ADDRESS=xyz.onion\n"
+            "IMAGE=/w/image.raw\n"
+            "KERNEL=/w/kernel\n"
+            "INITRAMFS=/w/initramfs\n"
+        )
+        cfg = harness.HarnessConfig(repo_root=Path("/repo"), work_dir=tmp_path)
+        spec = harness._load_spec(cfg, ssh_key=tmp_path / "k", socks_port=9052)
+        assert spec.luks_uuid == "abc-123"
+        assert spec.onion_address == "xyz.onion"
+        assert spec.image_path == Path("/w/image.raw")
+        assert spec.socks_port == 9052
+
+    def test_env_parser_ignores_comments_and_blanks(self, tmp_path):
+        env = tmp_path / "image.env"
+        env.write_text("# a comment\n\nKEY=value\n")
+        assert boot_unlock.parse_env_file(env) == {"KEY": "value"}
+
+    def test_choose_accel_falls_back_to_tcg_for_foreign_arch(self):
+        assert harness.choose_accel("riscv64") == "tcg"
+
+
+class TestChutneyParsing:
+    def test_parse_socks_port_picks_first_nonzero(self, tmp_path):
+        torrc = tmp_path / "torrc"
+        torrc.write_text("SocksPort 0\nSocksPort 9008\n")
+        assert tor_net._parse_socks_port(torrc) == 9008
+
+    def test_find_client_torrc_skips_relays(self, tmp_path):
+        (tmp_path / "000a").mkdir()
+        (tmp_path / "000a" / "torrc").write_text("SocksPort 0\n")
+        (tmp_path / "001c").mkdir()
+        (tmp_path / "001c" / "torrc").write_text("SocksPort 9010\n")
+        found = tor_net._find_client_torrc(tmp_path)
+        assert found == tmp_path / "001c" / "torrc"

tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+"""Full virtualized end-to-end test: build -> boot in QEMU -> unlock over Tor.
+
+Models the whole process the way lim runs it, on a QEMU-bootable virtio
+machine (the Raspberry Pi's USB-gadget net can't be emulated, so we model
+the software stack, not the board):
+
+  1. build a LUKS image carrying the REAL lim initcpio tor artifacts,
+  2. boot it in QEMU (rootless, user-mode net),
+  3. its initramfs runs the real netconf/tor/dropbear/encryptssh chain and
+     publishes the onion service,
+  4. deliver the LUKS passphrase by SSHing to that onion through Tor,
+  5. assert the boot-ok marker appears on the serial console — i.e. the real
+     root actually unlocked and booted.
+
+Heavy and privileged (QEMU + a tor network; the build needs root, ideally in
+a throwaway VM). Opt-in and skipped unless LIM_E2E_QEMU=1:
+
+    LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 pytest tests/e2e/test_qemu_unlock_e2e.py -v -s
+
+Environment knobs: LIM_E2E_ARCH (x86_64|aarch64), CHUTNEY_PATH (use a private
+chutney network instead of the public one). See tests/e2e/qemu/README.md.
+"""
+
+import os
+import shutil
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+from tests.e2e.qemu import config as qemu_config
+from tests.e2e.qemu.harness import HarnessConfig, run
+
+REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]
+
+# The QEMU binary is arch-specific, so derive it from LIM_E2E_ARCH instead of
+# hardcoding x86_64 — otherwise the documented aarch64 run is never reachable.
+_ARCH = os.environ.get("LIM_E2E_ARCH", "x86_64")
+# The OS family selects the build tool: pacstrap (Arch) or debootstrap (Debian).
+_OS = os.environ.get("LIM_E2E_OS", "arch")
+# "direct" (deterministic port-forward) is the default; "tor" runs the full,
+# opt-in onion transport (flaky over public Tor inside QEMU).
+_TRANSPORT = os.environ.get("LIM_E2E_TRANSPORT", "direct")
+_BUILD_TOOL = {"arch": "pacstrap", "debian": "debootstrap"}
+_REQUIRED = [
+    qemu_config.qemu_binary(_ARCH),
+    _BUILD_TOOL.get(_OS, "pacstrap"),
+    "cryptsetup",
+    "ssh",
+]
+if _TRANSPORT == "tor":  # the onion transport also needs a Tor client + ncat
+    _REQUIRED += ["tor", "ncat"]
+
+
+def _missing_tools() -> list[str]:
+    return [tool for tool in _REQUIRED if shutil.which(tool) is None]
+
+
+pytestmark = pytest.mark.skipif(
+    os.environ.get("LIM_E2E_QEMU") != "1" or bool(_missing_tools()),
+    reason=(
+        "needs LIM_E2E_QEMU=1 and " + ", ".join(_REQUIRED) + " (build stage needs root; slow)."
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def test_full_build_boot_and_unlock(tmp_path):
+    chutney_path = os.environ.get("CHUTNEY_PATH")
+    cfg = HarnessConfig(
+        repo_root=REPO_ROOT,
+        work_dir=tmp_path / "qemu-e2e",
+        arch=_ARCH,
+        os_family=_OS,
+        unlock_transport=_TRANSPORT,
+        chutney_path=Path(chutney_path) if chutney_path else None,
+    )
+
+    spec = run(cfg)
+
+    # run() only returns after the boot-ok marker was observed on the console.
+    serial = spec.serial_log.read_text(errors="replace")
+    assert qemu_config.BOOT_OK_MARKER in serial

tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+"""End-to-end test of the Tor onion LUKS-unlock path (rootless).
+
+It reproduces the operator-visible half of the decryption process that the
+"tor" mkinitcpio hook drives at boot:
+
+  1. generate the v3 onion keys offline (as lim.image.initramfs.keygen does in the chroot),
+  2. start a real Tor onion service from a torrc mirroring the baked-in one,
+     forwarding the virtual port 22 to a local dropbear stand-in,
+  3. connect to the .onion address through Tor and deliver the passphrase,
+  4. assert the passphrase reached the unlock endpoint and it "unlocked".
+
+The physical flashing half (loop device, cryptsetup, mount, chroot,
+mkinitcpio) needs root and is out of scope here by design.
+
+Requires the real `tor` binary and live Tor network access, so it is
+opt-in and skipped unless LIM_E2E_TOR=1:
+
+    LIM_E2E_TOR=1 pytest tests/e2e/test_tor_unlock_e2e.py -v
+"""
+
+import os
+import shutil
+import time
+
+import pytest
+
+from lim.image.initramfs import keygen
+from tests.e2e import tor_harness
+
+# The offline checks only need the tor binary (no network) and are
+# deterministic, so they run in CI whenever tor is installed. Only the live
+# onion round-trip needs the public Tor network, so it stays opt-in behind
+# LIM_E2E_TOR=1 to keep an external, occasionally-flaky dependency out of the
+# blocking gate.
+_needs_tor = pytest.mark.skipif(shutil.which("tor") is None, reason="needs the tor binary")
+_needs_tor_network = pytest.mark.skipif(
+    shutil.which("tor") is None or os.environ.get("LIM_E2E_TOR") != "1",
+    reason="needs the tor binary and LIM_E2E_TOR=1 (live Tor network, slow)",
+)
+
+PASSPHRASE = b"correct horse battery staple"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def workdir(tmp_path):
+    (tmp_path / "onion").mkdir()
+    (tmp_path / "data").mkdir()
+    return tmp_path
+
+
+def test_offline_keygen_matches_production_flags():
+    """Guard: the harness keygen mirrors the flags production actually runs."""
+    script = keygen._KEYGEN_SCRIPT
+    assert "--DisableNetwork 1" in script
+    assert "HiddenServicePort" in script
+    assert "22 127.0.0.1:22" in script
+    assert "--SocksPort 0" in script
+
+
+@_needs_tor
+def test_onion_keygen_is_deterministic_and_offline(workdir):
+    """Keys generate without network and the .onion address is stable."""
+    address = tor_harness.generate_onion_keys(workdir / "onion", workdir / "data")
+    assert address.endswith(".onion")
+    assert len(address) == len("v" * 56) + len(".onion")  # v3 = 56 base32 chars
+    for name in ("hs_ed25519_secret_key", "hs_ed25519_public_key", "hostname"):
+        assert (workdir / "onion" / name).is_file()
+
+
+@_needs_tor_network
+def test_unlock_passphrase_travels_over_onion(workdir):
+    """Full rootless round-trip: client -> Tor -> onion -> dropbear stand-in."""
+    onion_dir = workdir / "onion"
+    data_dir = workdir / "data"
+    onion_address = tor_harness.generate_onion_keys(onion_dir, data_dir)
+
+    backend_port = tor_harness.free_port()
+    socks_port = tor_harness.free_port()
+    torrc = workdir / "torrc"
+    log_path = workdir / "tor.log"
+    tor_harness.write_test_torrc(torrc, data_dir, onion_dir, backend_port)
+
+    dropbear = tor_harness.FakeDropbear(backend_port)
+    dropbear.start()
+    service = tor_harness.start_onion_service(torrc, socks_port, log_path)
+    try:
+        tor_harness.wait_bootstrapped(log_path, service)
+
+        # Onion descriptors need a moment to publish after bootstrap; retry.
+        last_error = None
+        for _ in range(5):
+            try:
+                stream = tor_harness.socks5_connect(socks_port, onion_address, 22)
+                break
+            except (OSError, RuntimeError) as exc:
+                last_error = exc
+                time.sleep(2)
+        else:
+            pytest.fail(f"Could not reach {onion_address} via Tor: {last_error}")
+
+        with stream:
+            stream.sendall(PASSPHRASE + b"\n")
+            reply = stream.recv(64)
+    finally:
+        service.terminate()
+        service.wait(timeout=15)
+        dropbear.stop()
+
+    assert reply.strip() == b"UNLOCKED"
+    assert dropbear.received == PASSPHRASE

tests/e2e/tor_harness.py

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+"""Rootless helpers to stand up a real Tor onion service and reach it.
+
+These reproduce, without root/block-devices/chroot, what the "tor"
+mkinitcpio hook does at LUKS-decryption time: generate v3 onion keys
+offline, run a real Tor onion service that forwards the virtual port 22
+to a local "dropbear", and let a client reach that service through Tor.
+"""
+
+import socket
+import struct
+import subprocess
+import threading
+import time
+from pathlib import Path
+
+# Matches lim.image.initramfs.keygen._KEYGEN_SCRIPT: an empty -f torrc keeps the host's
+# /etc/tor/torrc out of the run, --DisableNetwork 1 makes the keys appear
+# without ever touching the network.
+KEYGEN_TIMEOUT = 30
+BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT = 180
+ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT = 90
+
+
+def free_port() -> int:
+    with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as sock:
+        sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+        return sock.getsockname()[1]
+
+
+def generate_onion_keys(onion_dir: Path, data_dir: Path) -> str:
+    """Create v3 onion keys offline; return the .onion hostname.
+
+    Mirrors lim.image.initramfs.keygen._KEYGEN_SCRIPT, run directly on the host instead
+    of inside the image chroot (the tor invocation is identical).
+    """
+    onion_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    onion_dir.chmod(0o700)
+    empty_torrc = data_dir.parent / "keygen-torrc"
+    empty_torrc.write_text("")
+    process = subprocess.Popen(
+        [
+            "tor",
+            "-f",
+            str(empty_torrc),
+            "--DisableNetwork",
+            "1",
+            "--DataDirectory",
+            str(data_dir),
+            "--HiddenServiceDir",
+            str(onion_dir),
+            "--HiddenServicePort",
+            "22 127.0.0.1:22",
+            "--SocksPort",
+            "0",
+            "--RunAsDaemon",
+            "0",
+            "--Log",
+            "notice stderr",
+        ],
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    )
+    hostname = onion_dir / "hostname"
+    try:
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + KEYGEN_TIMEOUT
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            if hostname.is_file() and hostname.read_text().strip():
+                break
+            time.sleep(0.5)
+    finally:
+        process.terminate()
+        process.wait(timeout=10)
+    if not (hostname.is_file() and hostname.read_text().strip()):
+        raise RuntimeError("Offline onion key generation produced no hostname.")
+    return hostname.read_text().strip()
+
+
+def start_onion_service(torrc_path: Path, socks_port: int, log_path: Path) -> subprocess.Popen:
+    """Start Tor with the given torrc (service side) plus a SOCKS port.
+
+    The torrc carries the HiddenServiceDir/HiddenServicePort just like the
+    baked-in image torrc; --SocksPort lets the same instance also act as the
+    client's entry point so the test needs only one bootstrap.
+    """
+    return subprocess.Popen(
+        [
+            "tor",
+            "-f",
+            str(torrc_path),
+            "--SocksPort",
+            str(socks_port),
+            "--Log",
+            f"notice file {log_path}",
+        ],
+        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
+    )
+
+
+def wait_bootstrapped(log_path: Path, process: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
+    deadline = time.monotonic() + BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT
+    while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+        if process.poll() is not None:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"Tor exited early (code {process.returncode}).")
+        if log_path.is_file() and "Bootstrapped 100%" in log_path.read_text():
+            return
+        time.sleep(1)
+    raise RuntimeError("Tor did not bootstrap in time.")
+
+
+def _socks5_handshake(sock: socket.socket, onion_host: str, onion_port: int) -> None:
+    sock.sendall(b"\x05\x01\x00")  # VER, 1 method, no-auth
+    if sock.recv(2) != b"\x05\x00":
+        raise RuntimeError("SOCKS5 handshake rejected.")
+    host = onion_host.encode()
+    request = b"\x05\x01\x00\x03" + bytes([len(host)]) + host + struct.pack(">H", onion_port)
+    sock.settimeout(ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
+    sock.sendall(request)
+    header = sock.recv(4)
+    if len(header) < 2 or header[1] != 0x00:
+        code = header[1] if len(header) >= 2 else -1
+        raise RuntimeError(f"SOCKS5 CONNECT failed (reply code {code}).")
+    # Drain the bound-address tail so the stream starts at real payload.
+    atyp = header[3]
+    tail = {0x01: 4, 0x04: 16}.get(atyp)
+    if tail is None:  # domain name
+        tail = sock.recv(1)[0]
+    sock.recv(tail + 2)
+
+
+def socks5_connect(socks_port: int, onion_host: str, onion_port: int) -> socket.socket:
+    """Open a stream to onion_host:onion_port through Tor's SOCKS5 proxy."""
+    sock = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", socks_port), timeout=30)
+    try:
+        _socks5_handshake(sock, onion_host, onion_port)
+    except (OSError, RuntimeError):
+        sock.close()
+        raise
+    return sock
+
+
+class FakeDropbear:
+    r"""Stand-in for the initramfs dropbear+cryptsetup unlock endpoint.
+
+    Accepts one connection on 127.0.0.1:<port>, reads a passphrase line, and
+    replies "UNLOCKED\n" — the observable proof that a passphrase delivered
+    over the onion connection reached the unlock shell.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, port: int) -> None:
+        self.port = port
+        self.received: bytes | None = None
+        self._server = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+        self._server.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
+        self._server.bind(("127.0.0.1", port))
+        self._server.listen(1)
+        self._thread = threading.Thread(target=self._serve, daemon=True)
+
+    def start(self) -> None:
+        self._thread.start()
+
+    def _serve(self) -> None:
+        try:
+            self._server.settimeout(BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT + ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
+            conn, _ = self._server.accept()
+            with conn:
+                conn.settimeout(ONION_CONNECT_TIMEOUT)
+                self.received = conn.recv(4096).strip()
+                conn.sendall(b"UNLOCKED\n")
+        except OSError:
+            pass
+
+    def stop(self) -> None:
+        self._server.close()
+        self._thread.join(timeout=5)
+
+
+def write_test_torrc(path: Path, data_dir: Path, onion_dir: Path, backend_port: int) -> None:
+    """Write a torrc mirroring the baked-in one, with test-writable paths.
+
+    The virtual onion port stays 22 (as in production); only the loopback
+    backend and the data/key directories move to rootless temp locations.
+    """
+    path.write_text(
+        f"DataDirectory {data_dir}\n"
+        f"HiddenServiceDir {onion_dir}\n"
+        f"HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:{backend_port}\n"
+        "SocksPort 0\n"
+    )