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Kevin Veen-Birkenbach 9b7a34989d feat(image): distro-agnostic remote unlock via initramfs backends + Debian support
Split the mkinitcpio-only remote-LUKS-unlock path into an InitramfsBackend
ABC with a get_backend() dispatch, and add the initramfs-tools backend for
Debian / Raspberry Pi OS.

- base.py: six-step backend contract; encryption.py becomes a thin,
  distro-neutral sequencer (get_backend by distribution).
- initramfs_tools.py: crypttab `none luks,initramfs`, cmdline rewritten to
  root=/dev/mapper + ip=::::host:eth0:dhcp, dropbear-initramfs
  authorized_keys, update-initramfs -k all (no build-host uname leak).
- shipped hooks (configuration/initramfs-tools/*): single-hop non-anonymous
  onion, libnss DNS baking, sed-not-source DHCP, kill-tor-before-pivot.
- shared offline onion keygen in keygen.py; tor.py removed (logic moved to
  mkinitcpio.py).
- raspios added to the apt distro family (session.py, raspberry.py).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 18:15:54 +02:00

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# Tor configuration for the initramfs onion unlock service (initramfs-tools).
# Baked into the initramfs as /etc/tor/torrc by the "tor" hook; the onion keys
# come from /etc/tor/initramfs-onion on the system.
DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
HiddenServiceDir /etc/tor/onion
HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
SocksPort 0
# Single-hop, non-anonymous onion service. A boot-unlock onion needs
# reachability (behind NAT / a dynamic IP), NOT server-location anonymity, so
# it can skip the multi-hop, vanguards-restricted circuits that a fresh Tor
# with a limited relay view fails to build ("Giving up on launching a
# rendezvous circuit"). Single-hop builds trivial 1-hop circuits that publish
# and rendezvous reliably. Entry guards are likewise unnecessary here.
HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1
HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1
UseEntryGuards 0