feat(orchestrator): tasks tab with register, inbox and queue

Add a Tasks tab that lists the kvb-org-rasci register next to the inbox
and the heavy-job queue, in list, board and RASCI matrix views, each
task with its roles, WSJF, open work and the merge flow of its worktree.

- Task priority pins and WSJF estimates are signed with the operator's
  passkey and applied by the runner through rasci.py; the hub verifies
  the signature itself before it queues a job or logs the change, the
  runner verifies it again and runs only the checked argv, from /, with
  a pinned PATH and a 30 s process-group limit.
- The runner refuses task changes into a council that is a symlink, not
  owned by its uid or given by a relative path, and while the installed
  council.py, nofollow.py or rasci.py differ from the tree.
- Only tasks the hub can sign whole are editable (task slug and length).
- Page lookups keyed by register text use Object.hasOwn, so a status or
  party named like an Object.prototype member cannot break the views.
- The inbox screen renders through the tasks screen, so its task filter
  shows with "Wartet auf Operator" pressed.

Tests: 604 unit tests OK, e2e 15/15 OK (Chromium and Firefox).

🎯 Fix: 93 %
💥 Break: 5 %
💸 Cost: 100 %
⏱️ Time: –
🛡️ Security: 100 %
🏆 Score: 88
🚦 Gate: ✅ 90/5, cost and time <= 100, security 100 %

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ The hub page loads nothing from the network: its icons come from Bootstrap Icons
 
 The Agents view "Hierarchie" draws the council's formal offices as a collapsible org chart: Operator, chair, dimensions with their line representatives, organisers (`cluster/<slug>`) and presidents (`work/<slug>`); the chair in every graph is the holder of the `chair` office, not a fixed name. Appointing, handing over or recalling an office there asks for the passkey signature; the hub writes a job (office, signed holder, successor session, work; no command) into `~/.local/state/kvb-orchestrator/offices/jobs`, and the `kvb-orchestrator-offices.path` user unit runs `client/offices.py` on the host, which verifies the signature, refuses a council directory others can write, a link on the path or a holder that changed since the signature. For a takeover or recall it moves the office aside and removes it only while the claim there still names the signed holder; an appoint or takeover then runs a plain `council.py claim <office>` for the successor by argv. council.py itself has no flag that overrides a live holder. The same view holds the operator's agent order as a drag list with up and down buttons: `rasci.py agents order` stores it in `agent-order.json` beside the register, where it breaks ties of equal task priority and orders the chair's grants without touching any task's `--prio` pin.
 
+The Tasks tab (key 4, `#tasks/list`, `#tasks/board`, `#tasks/rasci`) shows the `kvb-org-rasci` register as a list, a board by status and a RASCI matrix; queue jobs from `council/queue.json` appear as "wartet auf Freigabe", and the filter "Wartet auf Operator" is the inbox, which the Inbox entry under Stream opens. A task's sheet pins its priority (`rasci.py set <task> --prio <n>`) or sets and drops the operator's WSJF estimate (`rasci.py estimate <task> Operator --value <fib> --complexity <fib>` or `--drop`) after a passkey signature; the hub writes an argv-only job, and the runner, started with `--rasci <rasci.py> --council <council root>`, verifies it like an operator command and runs `rasci.py` from `/` without a shell, killing it after 30 s. Agent order stays untouched. The install copies the fresh runner unit and restarts the runner when it is enabled, and only while the installed `council.py`, `nofollow.py` and `rasci.py` match this tree: otherwise it disables the runner and asks for `make install`. The runner unit pins `PATH` to `/usr/bin:/bin`, so a signed command names any other program by its full path; a runner started without `--rasci` and `--council` keeps running signed commands and refuses task changes, and so does one whose council is a symlink or another uid's. Each worktree in the tree file may carry `"flow": {"pull": [...], "push": [...], "source": "file"}` or `null`, which the Tree, the Chord edges, the detail panel and the matching task show; a malformed flow shows as `invalid`. Worktrees and tasks with open work (uncommitted, unpushed, unmerged, task not done) carry a warning bar.
+
 Without reinstalling the skills, `make orchestrator-install` installs, builds and starts only the hub, `make orchestrator-check` checks the installed hub (image, container, logs, HTTP, pinned keys, hook, runner, tree timer, disk; exit 1 on a failure), `make orchestrator-pin CREDENTIAL=<blob>` pins the passkey that "Passkey registrieren" shows, `make orchestrator-runner` enables the runner service, and `make orchestrator-hook` registers the PermissionRequest hook in `~/.claude/settings.json`, replacing an earlier Agent Orchestrator entry and keeping the file mode, after a copy to `settings.json.before-kvb-orchestrator-hook` (Claude Code reads `~/.claude/settings.local.json` only in sessions started in the home directory). Agents that reach the Docker socket are root-equivalent: until the agent VMs of core requirement 093 isolate them, the signatures do not hold against such an agent. `make watch-check` shows whether the resource watch hook is stuck (running hooks, holders of the kept queue history, age of the stored stage).
 
 For approvals the hub is only a relay: every approval of an ask, a staged commit or an operator command is signed end to end with a WebAuthn passkey held in KeePassXC (through KeePassXC-Browser, relying party `localhost`, origin `http://localhost:<port>`; ES256, EdDSA and RS256, so a hardware key can be pinned beside it). To register, open the hub at `http://localhost:<port>/` (WebAuthn needs the domain; on `127.0.0.1` the page links there), choose "Passkey registrieren" in the settings and run the host command the page shows, `python3 ~/.local/share/kvb-orchestrator/client/approval.py pin --port <port> --approvers ~/.config/kvb-orchestrator/approvers.json --credential '<blob>'`, in a terminal outside every sandbox: it pins the key in `~/.config/kvb-orchestrator/approvers.json` with mode 0600, a file no sandboxed agent can write and the hub mounts read-only; the hub never pins. Each approval, or one bulk selection, is one signature over the hashes of every item, a nonce and an expiry; each auto-approval rule is signed once. In the inbox, an operator command run with "Ausführen" shows the runner's output in a console under its row until "Schließen". "Ablehnen" on an ask, an operator row or a rule request signs the denial with its channel and optional reason (a hash no approval shares) and, after the 3 s undo, tells the requesting agent by post or by the radio class picked, never mayday; the hub verifies that signature against the pinned keys before it stores or sends anything, the hook passes the reason on only when it verifies the signature too, and a denied operator row ends as `stopped`. Agents ask for an auto-approval rule with the MCP tool `rule_request` (the rules form's limits; a request stays open for the ask lifetime of one hour, at most 20 in all, and 3 per agent name, which only spreads the queue since MCP names no caller); its row shows a dry run over the last 7 days, and only "Annehmen" with the passkey stores it. The hub stores no rule, of any kind, whose passkey assertion it cannot verify. The executors verify it themselves against the pinned keys and fail closed: the runner (`client/runner.py`, the `kvb-orchestrator-runner` user service) runs only signed commands, each signature once, recorded in `~/.local/state/kvb-orchestrator-approvals/runner.json`; the PermissionRequest hook (`client/permission_hook.py --port <port> --timeout <seconds> --approvers ~/.config/kvb-orchestrator/approvers.json --replay ~/.local/state/kvb-orchestrator-approvals/hook.json`) allows only a signed item that matches its own tool, command, cwd and session, else it leaves the decision to Claude Code's own prompt; the commit skills run `approval.py verify` on the staged tree before committing, else they ask in the terminal. With no key pinned, every executor refuses; decisions and review rejections stay unsigned. A signed rule never covers a command holding `;`, `&`, `|`, a backtick, `$`, `<`, `>`, parentheses or a line break: such a command always asks. The hub page is trusted while it asks for a signature or shows the blob to pin: whoever controls the hub container can show one item and have another signed, or hand over a key of its own. Any local process, sandboxed agents included, can also send the unsigned operator actions (decision choices, the priority order, settings that add no stream origin, review rejections, the bare ask denial `/api/asks/<id>/deny`, console dismissals) with the hub's guard headers, and the container reads the host `/tmp` for the review pages in `/tmp/kvb-git-diff`. All three close with the agent VMs of core requirement 093, like the Docker-socket gap.