Kevin Veen-BirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5
089f8dbb9f
Stream -> Radio gets one line per station with state, play and stop, autoplay and CSP refusals as row state and toast, and the speaking agent pulsing there and in the Orbit and Chord views. The composer sends on all seven channels; push-to-talk records with MediaRecorder, whisper.cpp transcribes off the request thread under per-minute and per-hour caps, and the recording travels only when "Aufnahme anhängen" is ticked. Every operator message, the mayday clear, the day and night board actions and a settings save that adds a stream origin take the passkey; the hub verifies each signature once against the pinned keys before it relays or acts. The container gets TMPDIR=/scratch so that verification no longer fails on the read-only root. A denial now signs its recipient: the inbox and the signing step resolve it through one function, a claim set naming several agents leaves a direct denial without recipient, and a recipient that changed after the inbox showed it is refused with 409. operator_message returns only the signed reason for a denial, never the agent's own words the radio row quotes, and the permission hook hashes the signed recipient too. 🎯 Fix: 95 % 💥 Break: 3 % 💸 Cost: 99 % ⏱️ Time: 68 % 🛡️ Security: 100 % 🏆 Score: 100 🚦 Gate: ✅ 90/5, cost and time <= 100, security 100 % Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
261 lines
14 KiB
Python
261 lines
14 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import secrets
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import time
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from .asking import ask_state
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from .cleanup import cleanup_request
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from .denying import DENIABLE, DENY_KEYS, denial_note, request_status, request_words
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from .errors import Conflict, Missing, ToolError
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from .fields import decode, expect, field
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from .offices import office_request
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from .records import digest, shown
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from .register import REGISTER, adder, operator_rows, read_register, runnable
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from .rules import rule_matches, subject_of
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from .signed import (
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ask_signed,
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operator_signed,
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passkey,
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request_signed,
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review_signed,
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signing,
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verifier,
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)
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BATCH_LIMIT = 100
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INBOX_KINDS = ("review", "ask", "decision", "operator", "rule")
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VERBS = ("approve", "reject")
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ITEM_KEYS = ("kind", "id", "verb", "label", "sha256")
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def inbox_item(raw: dict, label: str, title: str, gate: str, subject: dict | None, requester: str) -> dict:
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"""Args:
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raw: the page's entry, already checked for its keys and types.
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label: the chosen option of a decision, else empty.
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title: what the stream logs for the item.
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gate: the review gate, else empty.
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subject: what an approval signs; None for a decision.
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requester: the requesting agent's name for a denial, else empty.
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Returns:
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The batch item. A denial of a deniable kind signs its own item and
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carries the note that tells the requesting agent.
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"""
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note = denial_note(raw, requester) if raw["verb"] == "reject" and raw["kind"] in DENIABLE else None
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signed = subject if raw["verb"] == "approve" else None if note is None else signing.denial_item(subject, note["channel"], note["reason"], note["to"])
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sha256 = raw["sha256"] if raw["kind"] == "operator" else ""
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return {"kind": raw["kind"], "id": raw["id"], "verb": raw["verb"], "label": label, "sha256": sha256, "title": shown(title)[:200], "gate": gate, "signed": signed, "note": note}
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class Approving:
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def keys(self) -> list[dict]:
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try:
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entries = signing.load_pinned(self.approvers)
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except signing.Refused:
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return []
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return [{"id": entry["id"], "alg": signing.ALGORITHMS[entry["alg"]]} for entry in entries]
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def challenge_for(self, items: list[dict]) -> dict:
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"""Returns:
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The approval payload over the items, its WebAuthn challenge and the
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pinned credential ids; payload and challenge are None for no item.
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"""
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credentials = [key["id"] for key in self.keys()]
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if not items:
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return {"payload": None, "challenge": None, "credentials": credentials}
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request = signing.approval_payload([signing.item_hash(item) for item in items], secrets.token_hex(16), int(time.time()) + signing.LIFETIME)
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return {"payload": request, "challenge": signing.challenge(request), "credentials": credentials}
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def operator_proven(self, proof: object, item: dict) -> dict:
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"""Args:
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proof: {"payload", "assertion"} the page sends for an act the hub
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runs itself as the operator.
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item: the hub's own item for that act.
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Returns:
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The proof, once a pinned key signed an unexpired approval listing
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the item, used here for the first time.
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"""
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trust = verifier.Trust(approvers=self.approvers, replay=self.replay, origin=signing.origin_of(self.public_port))
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try:
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verifier.check(proof, item, "", trust, time.time())
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except signing.Refused as error:
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raise ToolError(f"nicht signiert: {error}") from None
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return proof
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def still_signed(self, proof: dict, item: dict) -> None:
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"""Raises:
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ToolError unless a pinned key signed the stored proof and it lists
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the item; expiry and replay held when the hub stored it.
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"""
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try:
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if signing.item_hash(item) not in proof["payload"]["items"]:
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raise signing.Refused("the signature does not list this item")
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passkey.verify_assertion(proof["assertion"], proof["payload"], verifier.pinned(self.approvers), signing.origin_of(self.public_port))
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except signing.Refused as error:
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raise ToolError(f"nicht signiert: {error}") from None
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def covered(self, proof: object, signed: list[dict], now: float) -> dict | None:
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"""Args:
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proof: {"payload", "assertion"} from the page, or None.
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signed: the executor items the approval must list.
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now: the current time in epoch seconds.
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Returns:
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The proof to relay, None when nothing needs a signature. The hub
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verifies the signature of a denial itself, since it acts on it;
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of an approval it checks the shape, and the executors verify.
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"""
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if not signed:
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if proof is not None:
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raise ToolError("proof must be null when no item needs a signature")
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return None
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if not isinstance(proof, dict):
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raise ToolError("nicht signiert: an approval of an ask, review or operator command needs the passkey signature")
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expect(proof, ("payload", "assertion"))
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try:
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payload = signing.checked_approval(proof["payload"], now)
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except signing.Refused as error:
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raise ToolError(f"proof: {error}") from None
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if not isinstance(proof["assertion"], dict) or any(signing.item_hash(item) not in payload["items"] for item in signed):
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raise ToolError("proof must carry the assertion and list every approved item")
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for item in signed:
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if item["kind"] == "deny":
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self.operator_proven(proof, item)
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return {"payload": payload, "assertion": proof["assertion"]}
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def automate(self, kind_name: str, record: dict) -> None:
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now = time.time()
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subject = subject_of(kind_name, record)
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rule = next((rule for rule in self.rules.listed() if rule_matches(rule, kind_name, subject, now)), None)
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if rule is None:
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return
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title = {"review": record.get("title"), "ask": f"{record.get('tool')} {record.get('command')}", "decision": record.get("question")}[kind_name]
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signed = None if kind_name == "decision" else subject["item"]
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item = {"kind": kind_name, "id": record["id"], "verb": "approve", "label": record.get("recommended", ""), "sha256": "", "title": shown(title)[:200], "gate": record.get("gate", ""), "signed": signed, "note": None}
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batch = self.batches.add([item], f"rule:{rule['id']}", rule.get("proof"), self.apply)
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words = f"{rule['kind']} {rule['tool']} {rule['pattern']}".replace(" ", " ")
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self.log.add({"kind": "rule", "title": f"Regel gibt frei: {item['title']}", "text": words, "ref": {"rule": rule["id"], "batch": batch["id"], "item": item["id"]}})
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def apply(self, batch: dict) -> None:
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for item in batch["items"]:
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try:
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outcome = self.settle_item(item, batch["proof"] if item["signed"] is not None else None)
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except (OSError, ToolError) as error:
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outcome = f"fehlgeschlagen: {error}"
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verb = "Freigabe" if item["verb"] == "approve" else "Ablehnung"
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label = f" → {item['label']}" if item["label"] else ""
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ref = {"kind": item["kind"], "id": item["id"], "verb": item["verb"], "source": batch["source"], "outcome": outcome}
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self.log.add({"kind": "approval", "title": f"{verb} {item['kind']}: {item['title']}{label}", "text": f"{outcome} ({batch['source']})", "ref": ref})
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def settle_item(self, item: dict, proof: dict | None) -> str:
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approve = item["verb"] == "approve"
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if item["note"] is not None:
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return self.deny(item, proof)
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if item["kind"] == "operator":
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return self.queue_job(item, proof)
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if item["kind"] == "ask":
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record = self.asks.get(item["id"])
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if record is None or ask_state(record, time.time())["status"] == "expired":
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return "abgelaufen"
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record, changed = self.asks.decide(item["id"], {"status": "allowed" if approve else "denied", "proof": proof})
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elif item["kind"] == "review":
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record, changed = self.reviews.decide(item["id"], {"status": "approved" if approve else "rejected", "proof": proof})
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else:
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record, changed = self.decisions.decide(item["id"], {"status": "decided", "choice": item["label"]})
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if record is None:
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return "unbekannt"
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return record["status"] if changed else f"schon {record['status']}"
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def requester(self, raw: dict, who: str) -> str:
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"""Returns:
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The requester a denial addresses, empty for every other item.
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Raises:
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Conflict when it is no longer the one the inbox showed the
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operator, sent back as raw["to"].
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"""
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if raw["verb"] != "reject" or raw["kind"] not in DENIABLE:
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return ""
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name = self.addressee(who)[0]
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if raw["to"] != name:
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raise Conflict({"id": raw["id"], "status": "recipient changed", "to": name})
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return name
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def item_of(self, raw: object, tasks: dict[str, dict]) -> dict:
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if not isinstance(raw, dict):
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raise ToolError("every item must be an object with kind, id, verb, label and sha256, and a denial also channel, reason and to")
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kind_name, verb = raw.get("kind"), raw.get("verb")
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expect(raw, (*ITEM_KEYS, *DENY_KEYS) if verb == "reject" and kind_name in DENIABLE else ITEM_KEYS)
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if kind_name not in INBOX_KINDS or verb not in VERBS or not isinstance(raw["label"], str) or not isinstance(raw["sha256"], str):
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raise ToolError(f"kind must be one of {', '.join(INBOX_KINDS)}, verb approve or reject, label and sha256 text")
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if kind_name == "operator":
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row = next((row for row in operator_rows(tasks) if row["task"] == raw["id"]), None)
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if row is None:
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raise Missing(str(raw["id"]))
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if verb == "approve" and not runnable(row):
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raise ToolError("an operator row is approved only when it holds a directory and a command")
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if digest(row["command"]) != raw["sha256"]:
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raise Conflict({"id": row["task"], "status": "changed"})
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if row["task"] in self.open_jobs():
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raise Conflict({"id": row["task"], "status": "queued"})
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return inbox_item(raw, "", row["command"], "", operator_signed(row), self.requester(raw, adder(tasks[row["task"]])))
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if kind_name == "rule" and verb == "approve":
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raise ToolError("a rule request is accepted in its row, with the passkey signature over the rule itself")
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item_id = field(raw, "id")
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record = {"review": self.reviews, "ask": self.asks, "decision": self.decisions, "rule": self.rule_requests}[kind_name].get(item_id)
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if record is None:
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raise Missing(item_id)
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status = ask_state(record, time.time())["status"] if kind_name == "ask" else request_status(record, time.time()) if kind_name == "rule" else record["status"]
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if status != "pending":
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raise Conflict({"id": item_id, "status": status})
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label = ""
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if kind_name == "decision":
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if verb != "approve" or raw["label"] not in [option["label"] for option in record["options"]]:
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raise ToolError("a decision is approved with one of its option labels")
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label = raw["label"]
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if kind_name == "rule":
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return inbox_item(raw, "", f"Regel {request_words(record)}", "", request_signed(record), self.requester(raw, record["agent"]))
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title = {"review": record.get("title"), "ask": f"{record.get('tool')} {record.get('command')}", "decision": record.get("question")}[kind_name]
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subject = {"review": review_signed, "ask": ask_signed}[kind_name](record) if kind_name != "decision" else None
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return inbox_item(raw, label, title, record.get("gate", ""), subject, self.requester(raw, record["session"] if kind_name == "ask" else ""))
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def checked(self, raw: object) -> list[dict]:
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if not isinstance(raw, list) or not 1 <= len(raw) <= BATCH_LIMIT:
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raise ToolError(f"items must be a list of 1 to {BATCH_LIMIT} objects")
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tasks = read_register(self.council / REGISTER)
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items = [self.item_of(entry, tasks) for entry in raw]
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keys = [(item["kind"], item["id"]) for item in items]
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if len(set(keys)) != len(keys):
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raise ToolError("items must be distinct")
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if len(items) > 1 and any(item["kind"] == "review" and item["verb"] == "approve" and item["gate"] != "pass" for item in items):
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raise ToolError("a review whose gate is not green is approved only on its own")
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if any(self.batches.holds(kind_name, item_id) for kind_name, item_id in keys):
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raise Conflict({"status": "held"})
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return items
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def sign(self, body: bytes) -> dict:
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payload = decode(body)
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expect(payload, ("items",))
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raw = payload["items"]
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if cleanup_request(raw):
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signed = self.deletable(raw)
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elif office_request(raw):
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signed = self.appointable(raw)
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else:
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signed = [item["signed"] for item in self.checked(raw) if item["signed"] is not None]
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return self.challenge_for(signed)
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def approve(self, body: bytes) -> dict:
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payload = decode(body)
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expect(payload, ("items", "proof"))
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items = self.checked(payload["items"])
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proof = self.covered(payload["proof"], [item["signed"] for item in items if item["signed"] is not None], time.time())
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return self.batches.add(items, "operator", proof, self.apply)
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def undo(self, batch_id: str) -> dict:
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batch = self.batches.undo(batch_id)
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titles = ", ".join(item["title"][:80] for item in batch["items"])
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self.log.add({"kind": "approval", "title": f"Rückgängig: {titles}", "text": batch["source"], "ref": {"batch": batch_id}})
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return {"id": batch_id, "status": "undone"}
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