Files
skills/orchestrator/client/verifier.py
T
Kevin Veen-BirkenbachandClaude Opus 5.5 9742884308 feat(orchestrator): firewall view with signed settings changes (001 S6)
Requirement 001 S6: the hub gets a Firewall view of the Claude Code permission and sandbox settings. The operator signs each change with the passkey; a host settings writer (systemd path unit) applies only exact, signed changes to allowlisted settings files through O_NOFOLLOW directory and file descriptors, and a timer refreshes the view. Every signed text and every page sink refuses or marks hidden characters: Cc, Cf, Zl, Zp, every space but U+0020 and the Default_Ignorable set, with U+FE0E/U+FE0F allowed only after one of the 359 non-ASCII emoji bases of Unicode 16 (shared table, validated at import, the same pair rule on the page). Removal of a deny, ask or denyRead entry is exempt only as an exact single remove. The permission hook prints the hub's refusal reason, cleaned of hidden characters. Accepted MEDUSA false positives (independent review, operator pick): 38 this round, mainly the Unicode defence tables read as attack patterns, generic MM-SCAN-058 heuristics, WEB-FLASK-004 at view.py:213 (ints from the validated table via tojson), EXF26-TOOL-004 on the non-secret WebAuthn challenge, PRIV-SCAN-060 on the office-action shape check and PQC007 on a picker key.

🎯 Fix: 95 %
💥 Break: 3 %
💸 Cost: –
⏱️ Time: –
🛡️ Security: 100 %
🏆 Score: 92
🚦 Gate: ✅ 90/5, cost and time <= 100, security 100 %

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-13 18:14:17 +00:00

310 lines
12 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import contextlib
import datetime
import errno
import fcntl
import json
import os
import secrets
import shutil
import stat
import sys
from collections.abc import Callable, Iterator
from pathlib import Path
from typing import NamedTuple
from passkey import verify_assertion
from signing import (
Refused,
checked_approval,
checked_rule,
item_hash,
load_pinned,
rule_allows,
)
FOLDER = os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_CLOEXEC
FILE = os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_NONBLOCK | os.O_CLOEXEC
READ_LIMIT = 1 << 20
class Trust(NamedTuple):
approvers: Path
replay: Path
origin: str
def pinned(path: Path) -> list[dict]:
entries = load_pinned(path)
if not entries:
raise Refused("no key is pinned")
return entries
def write_at(folder: int, name: str, data: dict) -> None:
"""Args:
folder: the open directory the file goes into.
name: the file's name there; a link of that name is replaced, never
followed.
data: written as JSON with mode 0600, by rename.
"""
temp = f".{name}-{secrets.token_hex(8)}"
descriptor = os.open(temp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | os.O_NOFOLLOW | os.O_CLOEXEC, 0o600, dir_fd=folder)
try:
with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
json.dump(data, handle, indent=1, sort_keys=True)
handle.flush()
os.fsync(handle.fileno())
os.replace(temp, name, src_dir_fd=folder, dst_dir_fd=folder)
except OSError:
with contextlib.suppress(FileNotFoundError):
os.unlink(temp, dir_fd=folder)
raise
def write_private(path: Path, data: dict) -> None:
path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
folder = os.open(path.parent, os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_CLOEXEC)
try:
write_at(folder, path.name, data)
finally:
os.close(folder)
def read_regular(name: str | Path, dir_fd: int | None) -> bytes:
"""Args:
name: the file, relative to dir_fd or a path; a link, FIFO or other
non-regular file raises OSError, so does one over READ_LIMIT bytes.
dir_fd: the open directory name is relative to, or None.
Returns:
The file's bytes.
"""
fd = os.open(name, FILE, dir_fd=dir_fd)
with open(fd, "rb") as handle:
if not stat.S_ISREG(os.fstat(fd).st_mode):
raise OSError(errno.EINVAL, "not a regular file", str(name))
data = handle.read(READ_LIMIT + 1)
if len(data) > READ_LIMIT:
raise OSError(errno.EFBIG, f"larger than {READ_LIMIT} bytes", str(name))
return data
def descend(folder: int, part: str, create: bool, follow: bool) -> int:
"""Args:
folder: an open directory, closed once part is open.
part: one name in it.
create: make a missing part with mode 0700.
follow: follow part when it is a link.
Returns:
The open directory part.
"""
try:
child = os.open(part, FOLDER, dir_fd=folder)
except FileNotFoundError:
if not create:
raise
with contextlib.suppress(FileExistsError):
os.mkdir(part, 0o700, dir_fd=folder)
child = os.open(part, FOLDER, dir_fd=folder)
except OSError as error:
if error.errno not in (errno.ELOOP, errno.ENOTDIR) or not follow:
raise
child = os.open(part, FOLDER & ~os.O_NOFOLLOW, dir_fd=folder)
os.close(folder)
return child
@contextlib.contextmanager
def private_dir(path: Path, create: bool) -> Iterator[int]:
"""Args:
path: the directory, opened from / one name at a time by descend();
a link is followed only by a process other than root, and only
while every directory entered so far is root's and no one else
can write it.
create: make missing directories with mode 0700.
Returns:
The open directory, closed on exit.
Raises:
Refused unless it is a directory of this effective uid that no one
else can write, reached without a link descend() did not follow.
"""
folder = os.open("/", FOLDER)
rooted = os.geteuid() != 0
try:
for part in path.absolute().parts[1:]:
held = os.fstat(folder)
rooted = rooted and held.st_uid == 0 and not held.st_mode & 0o022
folder = descend(folder, part, create, rooted)
found = os.fstat(folder)
except OSError as error:
os.close(folder)
raise Refused(f"{path}: {error.filename}: {error.strerror or error}") from error
if found.st_uid != os.geteuid() or found.st_mode & 0o022:
os.close(folder)
raise Refused(f"{path} is no directory of uid {os.geteuid()}, or others can write it")
try:
yield folder
finally:
os.close(folder)
def remove_at(folder: int, name: str) -> None:
"""Args:
folder: the open directory.
name: the entry to remove: a real directory with all below it through
shutil.rmtree, which refuses a link swapped in; anything else as
the name itself, never what a link names.
"""
try:
if stat.S_ISDIR(os.lstat(name, dir_fd=folder).st_mode):
shutil.rmtree(name, dir_fd=folder)
else:
os.unlink(name, dir_fd=folder)
except FileNotFoundError:
return
def unreported(folder: int, out: int, name: str, result: dict, error: OSError) -> None:
"""Args:
folder: the open jobs directory.
out: the open results directory.
name: the job whose result could not be written; it moves to
.<id>.unreported in out, or is removed where that move fails, so
it never runs again.
result: its result, printed on stderr as one line.
error: why the result could not be written.
"""
kept = f".{Path(name).stem}.unreported"
print(f"no result for {name}: {error}; the job is kept as {kept} beside the results: {json.dumps(result, sort_keys=True)}", file=sys.stderr)
try:
os.rename(name, kept, src_dir_fd=folder, dst_dir_fd=out)
except OSError:
try:
remove_at(folder, name)
except OSError as stuck:
print(f"kept {name}: {stuck}", file=sys.stderr)
def drain(jobs: Path, results: Path, run: Callable[[int, str], dict | None]) -> int:
"""Args:
jobs: the directory the hub writes jobs into.
results: the directory each result goes to under its job's name;
made when missing.
run: called with the open jobs directory and each entry's name, in
sorted order; returns the entry's result, or None for no job.
Returns:
The number of results written. Every entry is removed after its
result, each write and removal relative to the open directories; a
result that cannot be written goes to unreported(), a removal that
fails prints one line on stderr, and the cycle goes on; a refused
directory changes nothing and prints one line.
"""
with contextlib.ExitStack() as stack:
try:
folder = stack.enter_context(private_dir(jobs, False))
out = stack.enter_context(private_dir(results, True))
except Refused as error:
print(f"refused, nothing done: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
return 0
with os.scandir(folder) as entries:
names = sorted(entry.name for entry in entries)
handled = 0
for name in names:
result = run(folder, name)
if result is not None:
try:
write_at(out, name, result)
handled += 1
except OSError as error:
unreported(folder, out, name, result, error)
continue
try:
remove_at(folder, name)
except OSError as error:
print(f"kept {name}: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
return handled
def pin(path: Path, entry: dict, now: float) -> list[dict]:
stamp = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(now, datetime.UTC).isoformat(timespec="seconds")
entries = [old for old in load_pinned(path) if old["id"] != entry["id"]] + [{**entry, "pinned": stamp}]
write_private(path, {"credentials": entries})
return entries
def read_store(store: Path) -> dict:
try:
data = json.loads(store.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except FileNotFoundError:
return {"used": {}, "counts": {}}
except (OSError, ValueError, RecursionError) as error:
raise Refused(f"the replay store {store} is unreadable") from error
counts = data.get("counts") if isinstance(data, dict) else None
shaped = isinstance(counts, dict) and all(isinstance(last, dict) and isinstance(last.get("count"), int) and isinstance(last.get("nonce"), str) for last in counts.values())
if not shaped or not isinstance(data.get("used"), dict):
raise Refused(f"the replay store {store} is malformed")
return data
def consume(store: Path, key: str, expires: int, credential: str, count: int, nonce: str, now: float) -> None:
"""Args:
store: the executor's own replay store, outside the hub's reach.
key: the one-time id, nonce and item hash.
expires: until when the id must stay known.
credential: the id of the key that signed.
count: its signature counter; 0 when the authenticator keeps none.
nonce: the payload nonce; one bulk signature carries one counter.
now: the current time in epoch seconds.
"""
store.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
descriptor = os.open(store.with_name(f"{store.name}.lock"), os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT, 0o600)
try:
fcntl.flock(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
state = read_store(store)
used = {name: until for name, until in state["used"].items() if isinstance(until, int | float) and until > now}
if key in used:
raise Refused("this signature was already used for this item")
last = state["counts"].get(credential)
if last is not None and not (count > last["count"] or (count == last["count"] and (count == 0 or nonce == last["nonce"]))):
raise Refused("the signature counter did not grow: a cloned authenticator or a replay")
write_private(store, {"used": {**used, key: expires}, "counts": {**state["counts"], credential: {"count": count, "nonce": nonce}}})
finally:
os.close(descriptor)
def check(proof: object, item: dict, gate: str, trust: Trust, now: float) -> None:
"""Args:
proof: {"payload", "assertion"} the Agent Orchestrator relayed for the item.
item: the executor's own item, built from what it is about to do.
gate: pass or fail as the executor itself saw it; a rule approves a
review on pass only.
trust: the pinned keys, the executor's replay store and the origin.
now: the current time in epoch seconds.
Raises:
Refused with the reason, unless a pinned key signed an unexpired
approval that lists the item and is used here for the first time, or
an unexpired rule whose pattern the item matches.
"""
if not isinstance(proof, dict) or set(proof) != {"payload", "assertion"}:
raise Refused("no signature")
payload = proof["payload"]
if isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("kind") == "rule":
checked_rule(payload, now)
verify_assertion(proof["assertion"], payload, pinned(trust.approvers), trust.origin)
if not rule_allows(payload, item, gate, now):
raise Refused("the signed rule does not match this item")
return
checked_approval(payload, now)
count = verify_assertion(proof["assertion"], payload, pinned(trust.approvers), trust.origin)
digest = item_hash(item)
if digest not in payload["items"]:
raise Refused("the signature does not list this item")
consume(trust.replay, f"{payload['nonce']}:{digest}", payload["expires"], proof["assertion"]["id"], count, payload["nonce"], now)