Requirement 001 S6: the hub gets a Firewall view of the Claude Code permission and sandbox settings. The operator signs each change with the passkey; a host settings writer (systemd path unit) applies only exact, signed changes to allowlisted settings files through O_NOFOLLOW directory and file descriptors, and a timer refreshes the view. Every signed text and every page sink refuses or marks hidden characters: Cc, Cf, Zl, Zp, every space but U+0020 and the Default_Ignorable set, with U+FE0E/U+FE0F allowed only after one of the 359 non-ASCII emoji bases of Unicode 16 (shared table, validated at import, the same pair rule on the page). Removal of a deny, ask or denyRead entry is exempt only as an exact single remove. The permission hook prints the hub's refusal reason, cleaned of hidden characters. Accepted MEDUSA false positives (independent review, operator pick): 38 this round, mainly the Unicode defence tables read as attack patterns, generic MM-SCAN-058 heuristics, WEB-FLASK-004 at view.py:213 (ints from the validated table via tojson), EXF26-TOOL-004 on the non-secret WebAuthn challenge, PRIV-SCAN-060 on the office-action shape check and PQC007 on a picker key. 🎯 Fix: 95 % 💥 Break: 3 % 💸 Cost: – ⏱️ Time: – 🛡️ Security: 100 % 🏆 Score: 92 🚦 Gate: ✅ 90/5, cost and time <= 100, security 100 % Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
295 lines
15 KiB
Python
295 lines
15 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import secrets
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import time
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from .asking import ask_state
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from .choosing import answer_signed
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from .cleanup import cleanup_request
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from .denying import DENIABLE, DENY_KEYS, denial_note, request_status, request_words
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from .errors import Conflict, Missing, ToolError
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from .fields import decode, expect, field, visible
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from .firewall import settings_request
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from .gating import gate_request
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from .offices import office_request
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from .records import digest, shown
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from .register import REGISTER, adder, operator_rows, read_register, runnable
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from .rules import enable_request, rule_matches, subject_of
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from .signed import (
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ask_signed,
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operator_signed,
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passkey,
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request_signed,
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review_signed,
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signing,
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verifier,
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)
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from .tasking import task_request
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BATCH_LIMIT = 100
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INBOX_KINDS = ("review", "ask", "decision", "operator", "rule")
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VERBS = ("approve", "reject")
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ITEM_KEYS = ("kind", "id", "verb", "label", "sha256")
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def inbox_item(raw: dict, label: str, title: str, gate: str, subject: dict | None, requester: str) -> dict:
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"""Args:
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raw: the page's entry, already checked for its keys and types.
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label: the chosen option of a decision, else empty.
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title: what the stream logs for the item.
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gate: the review gate, else empty.
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subject: what an approval signs; for a decision the answer post to
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the asking agent.
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requester: the requesting agent's name for a denial, else empty.
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Returns:
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The batch item. A denial of a deniable kind signs its own item and
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carries the note that tells the requesting agent.
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"""
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note = denial_note(raw, requester) if raw["verb"] == "reject" and raw["kind"] in DENIABLE else None
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signed = subject if raw["verb"] == "approve" else None if note is None else signing.denial_item(subject, note["channel"], note["reason"], note["to"])
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sha256 = raw["sha256"] if raw["kind"] == "operator" else ""
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return {"kind": raw["kind"], "id": raw["id"], "verb": raw["verb"], "label": label, "sha256": sha256, "title": shown(title)[:200], "gate": gate, "signed": signed, "note": note}
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class Approving:
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def keys(self) -> list[dict]:
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try:
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entries = signing.load_pinned(self.approvers)
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except signing.Refused:
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return []
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return [{"id": entry["id"], "alg": signing.ALGORITHMS[entry["alg"]]} for entry in entries]
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def challenge_for(self, items: list[dict]) -> dict:
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"""Returns:
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The approval payload over the items, its WebAuthn challenge and the
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pinned credential ids; payload and challenge are None for no item.
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Raises:
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ToolError from visible() for an item holding a text no prompt
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shows as signed, whatever source missed it.
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"""
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visible(items)
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credentials = [key["id"] for key in self.keys()]
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if not items:
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return {"payload": None, "challenge": None, "credentials": credentials}
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request = signing.approval_payload([signing.item_hash(item) for item in items], secrets.token_hex(16), int(time.time()) + signing.LIFETIME)
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return {"payload": request, "challenge": signing.challenge(request), "credentials": credentials}
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def operator_proven(self, proof: object, item: dict) -> dict:
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"""Args:
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proof: {"payload", "assertion"} the page sends for an act the hub
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runs itself as the operator.
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item: the hub's own item for that act.
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Returns:
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The proof, once a pinned key signed an unexpired approval listing
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the item, used here for the first time.
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"""
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trust = verifier.Trust(approvers=self.approvers, replay=self.replay, origin=signing.origin_of(self.public_port))
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try:
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verifier.check(proof, item, "", trust, time.time())
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except signing.Refused as error:
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raise ToolError(f"not signed: {error}") from None
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return proof
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def still_signed(self, proof: dict, item: dict) -> None:
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"""Raises:
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ToolError unless a pinned key signed the stored proof and it lists
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the item; expiry and replay held when the hub stored it.
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"""
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try:
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if signing.item_hash(item) not in proof["payload"]["items"]:
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raise signing.Refused("the signature does not list this item")
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passkey.verify_assertion(proof["assertion"], proof["payload"], verifier.pinned(self.approvers), signing.origin_of(self.public_port))
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except signing.Refused as error:
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raise ToolError(f"not signed: {error}") from None
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def covered(self, proof: object, signed: list[dict], now: float) -> dict | None:
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"""Args:
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proof: {"payload", "assertion"} from the page, or None.
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signed: the executor items the approval must list.
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now: the current time in epoch seconds.
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Returns:
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The proof to relay, None when nothing needs a signature. The hub
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verifies the signature of a denial itself, since it acts on it;
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of an approval it checks the shape, and the executors verify,
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the hub itself for a choice answer when it sends it.
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"""
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if not signed:
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if proof is not None:
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raise ToolError("proof must be null when no item needs a signature")
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return None
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if not isinstance(proof, dict):
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raise ToolError("not signed: an approval of an ask, review, choice or operator command needs the passkey signature")
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expect(proof, ("payload", "assertion"))
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try:
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payload = signing.checked_approval(proof["payload"], now)
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except signing.Refused as error:
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raise ToolError(f"proof: {error}") from None
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if not isinstance(proof["assertion"], dict) or any(signing.item_hash(item) not in payload["items"] for item in signed):
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raise ToolError("proof must carry the assertion and list every approved item")
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for item in signed:
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if item["kind"] == "deny":
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self.operator_proven(proof, item)
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return {"payload": payload, "assertion": proof["assertion"]}
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def automate(self, kind_name: str, record: dict) -> None:
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now = time.time()
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subject = subject_of(kind_name, record, self.deciders(kind_name, record))
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rule = next((rule for rule in self.rules.listed() if rule_matches(rule, kind_name, subject, now)), None)
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if rule is None:
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return
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title = {"review": record.get("title"), "ask": f"{record.get('tool')} {record.get('command')}", "decision": record.get("question")}[kind_name]
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signed = None if kind_name == "decision" else subject["item"]
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item = {"kind": kind_name, "id": record["id"], "verb": "approve", "label": record.get("recommended", ""), "sha256": "", "title": shown(title)[:200], "gate": record.get("gate", ""), "signed": signed, "note": None}
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batch = self.batches.add([item], f"rule:{rule['id']}", rule.get("proof"), self.apply)
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words = f"{rule['kind']} {rule['tool']} {rule['pattern']}".replace(" ", " ")
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self.log.add({"kind": "rule", "title": f"Rule grants: {item['title']}", "text": words, "ref": {"rule": rule["id"], "batch": batch["id"], "item": item["id"]}})
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def apply(self, batch: dict) -> None:
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for item in batch["items"]:
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try:
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outcome = self.settle_item(item, batch["proof"] if item["signed"] is not None else None)
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except (OSError, ToolError) as error:
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outcome = f"failed: {error}"
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verb = "Grant" if item["verb"] == "approve" else "Denial"
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label = f" → {item['label']}" if item["label"] else ""
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ref = {"kind": item["kind"], "id": item["id"], "verb": item["verb"], "source": batch["source"], "outcome": outcome}
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self.log.add({"kind": "approval", "title": f"{verb} {item['kind']}: {item['title']}{label}", "text": f"{outcome} ({batch['source']})", "ref": ref})
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def settle_item(self, item: dict, proof: dict | None) -> str:
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approve = item["verb"] == "approve"
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if item["note"] is not None:
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return self.deny(item, proof)
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if item["kind"] == "operator":
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return self.queue_job(item, proof)
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if item["kind"] == "ask":
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record = self.asks.get(item["id"])
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if record is None or ask_state(record, time.time())["status"] == "expired":
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return "expired"
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record, changed = self.asks.decide(item["id"], {"status": "allowed" if approve else "denied", "proof": proof})
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elif item["kind"] == "review":
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record, changed = self.reviews.decide(item["id"], {"status": "approved" if approve else "rejected", "proof": proof})
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elif item["signed"] is not None:
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return self.answer_choice(item, proof)
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else:
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record, changed = self.decisions.decide(item["id"], {"status": "decided", "choice": item["label"]})
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if record is None:
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return "unknown"
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return record["status"] if changed else f"already {record['status']}"
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def requester(self, raw: dict, who: str) -> str:
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"""Returns:
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The requester a denial addresses, empty for every other item.
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Raises:
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Conflict when it is no longer the one the inbox showed the
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operator, sent back as raw["to"].
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"""
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if raw["verb"] != "reject" or raw["kind"] not in DENIABLE:
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return ""
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name = self.addressee(who)[0]
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if raw["to"] != name:
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raise Conflict({"id": raw["id"], "status": "recipient changed", "to": name})
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return name
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def operator_entry(self, raw: dict, tasks: dict[str, dict]) -> dict:
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"""Args:
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raw: a checked inbox entry of kind operator.
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tasks: the register.
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Returns:
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The signed item of the operator row raw names, once its task,
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command and directory pass visible().
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"""
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row = next((row for row in operator_rows(tasks) if row["task"] == raw["id"]), None)
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if row is None:
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raise Missing(str(raw["id"]))
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visible({name: row[name] for name in ("task", "command", "directory")})
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if raw["verb"] == "approve" and not runnable(row):
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raise ToolError("an operator row is approved only when it holds a directory and a command")
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if digest(row["command"]) != raw["sha256"]:
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raise Conflict({"id": row["task"], "status": "changed"})
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if row["task"] in self.open_jobs():
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raise Conflict({"id": row["task"], "status": "queued"})
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return inbox_item(raw, "", row["command"], "", operator_signed(row), self.requester(raw, adder(tasks[row["task"]])))
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def item_of(self, raw: object, tasks: dict[str, dict]) -> dict:
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if not isinstance(raw, dict):
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raise ToolError("every item must be an object with kind, id, verb, label and sha256, and a denial also channel, reason and to")
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kind_name, verb = raw.get("kind"), raw.get("verb")
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expect(raw, (*ITEM_KEYS, *DENY_KEYS) if verb == "reject" and kind_name in DENIABLE else ITEM_KEYS)
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if kind_name not in INBOX_KINDS or verb not in VERBS or not isinstance(raw["label"], str) or not isinstance(raw["sha256"], str):
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raise ToolError(f"kind must be one of {', '.join(INBOX_KINDS)}, verb approve or reject, label and sha256 text")
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if kind_name == "operator":
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return self.operator_entry(raw, tasks)
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if kind_name == "rule" and verb == "approve":
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raise ToolError("a rule request is accepted in its row, with the passkey signature over the rule itself")
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item_id = field(raw, "id")
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record = {"review": self.reviews, "ask": self.asks, "decision": self.decisions, "rule": self.rule_requests}[kind_name].get(item_id)
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if record is None:
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raise Missing(item_id)
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status = ask_state(record, time.time())["status"] if kind_name == "ask" else request_status(record, time.time()) if kind_name == "rule" else record["status"]
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if status != "pending":
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raise Conflict({"id": item_id, "status": status})
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label = ""
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if kind_name == "decision":
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if verb != "approve" or raw["label"] not in [option["label"] for option in record["options"]]:
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raise ToolError("a decision is approved with one of its option labels")
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label = raw["label"]
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if kind_name == "rule":
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return inbox_item(raw, "", f"Rule {request_words(record)}", "", request_signed(record), self.requester(raw, record["agent"]))
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title = {"review": record.get("title"), "ask": f"{record.get('tool')} {record.get('command')}", "decision": record.get("question")}[kind_name]
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subject = {"review": review_signed, "ask": ask_signed}[kind_name](record) if kind_name != "decision" else answer_signed(record, label)
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return inbox_item(raw, label, title, record.get("gate", ""), subject, self.requester(raw, record["session"] if kind_name == "ask" else ""))
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def checked(self, raw: object) -> list[dict]:
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if not isinstance(raw, list) or not 1 <= len(raw) <= BATCH_LIMIT:
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raise ToolError(f"items must be a list of 1 to {BATCH_LIMIT} objects")
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tasks = read_register(self.council / REGISTER)
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items = [self.item_of(entry, tasks) for entry in raw]
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keys = [(item["kind"], item["id"]) for item in items]
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if len(set(keys)) != len(keys):
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raise ToolError("items must be distinct")
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if len(items) > 1 and any(item["kind"] == "review" and item["verb"] == "approve" and item["gate"] != "pass" for item in items):
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raise ToolError("a review whose gate is not green is approved only on its own")
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if any(self.batches.holds(kind_name, item_id) for kind_name, item_id in keys):
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raise Conflict({"status": "held"})
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return items
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def sign(self, body: bytes) -> dict:
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payload = decode(body)
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expect(payload, ("items",))
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raw = payload["items"]
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if cleanup_request(raw):
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signed = self.deletable(raw)
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elif office_request(raw):
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signed = self.appointable(raw)
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elif task_request(raw):
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signed = self.task_changes(raw)
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elif gate_request(raw):
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signed = self.gate_changes(raw)
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elif settings_request(raw):
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signed = self.settings_changes(raw)
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elif enable_request(raw):
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signed = self.enable_items(raw)
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return {**self.challenge_for(signed), "enables": signed[0]["rule"]}
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else:
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signed = [item["signed"] for item in self.checked(raw) if item["signed"] is not None]
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return self.challenge_for(signed)
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def approve(self, body: bytes) -> dict:
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payload = decode(body)
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expect(payload, ("items", "proof"))
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items = self.checked(payload["items"])
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proof = self.covered(payload["proof"], [item["signed"] for item in items if item["signed"] is not None], time.time())
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return self.batches.add(items, "operator", proof, self.apply)
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def undo(self, batch_id: str) -> dict:
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batch = self.batches.undo(batch_id)
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titles = ", ".join(item["title"][:80] for item in batch["items"])
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self.log.add({"kind": "approval", "title": f"Undone: {titles}", "text": batch["source"], "ref": {"batch": batch_id}})
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return {"id": batch_id, "status": "undone"}
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