Requirement 001 S6: the hub gets a Firewall view of the Claude Code permission and sandbox settings. The operator signs each change with the passkey; a host settings writer (systemd path unit) applies only exact, signed changes to allowlisted settings files through O_NOFOLLOW directory and file descriptors, and a timer refreshes the view. Every signed text and every page sink refuses or marks hidden characters: Cc, Cf, Zl, Zp, every space but U+0020 and the Default_Ignorable set, with U+FE0E/U+FE0F allowed only after one of the 359 non-ASCII emoji bases of Unicode 16 (shared table, validated at import, the same pair rule on the page). Removal of a deny, ask or denyRead entry is exempt only as an exact single remove. The permission hook prints the hub's refusal reason, cleaned of hidden characters. Accepted MEDUSA false positives (independent review, operator pick): 38 this round, mainly the Unicode defence tables read as attack patterns, generic MM-SCAN-058 heuristics, WEB-FLASK-004 at view.py:213 (ints from the validated table via tojson), EXF26-TOOL-004 on the non-secret WebAuthn challenge, PRIV-SCAN-060 on the office-action shape check and PQC007 on a picker key. 🎯 Fix: 95 % 💥 Break: 3 % 💸 Cost: – ⏱️ Time: – 🛡️ Security: 100 % 🏆 Score: 92 🚦 Gate: ✅ 90/5, cost and time <= 100, security 100 % Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
125 lines
4.2 KiB
Python
125 lines
4.2 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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import math
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import re
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from .errors import ToolError
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from .signed import limits, signing
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WAIT_CAP = 300
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TEXT_LIMIT = 20_000
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COMMAND_LIMIT = 4000
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PATH_LIMIT = limits.PATH_LIMIT
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NAME_LIMIT = 120
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COUNT = re.compile(r"[0-9]{1,12}")
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PATH = re.compile(rf"/[^\x00-\x1f\x7f]{{0,{PATH_LIMIT - 1}}}")
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LINE = r"(?=[^\x00-\x1f\x7f]*\S)[^\x00-\x1f\x7f]{{1,{0}}}"
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ORDER_NAME = re.compile(r"(?![\s-])[^,\x00-\x1f\x7f]{1,200}")
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FIELDS = {
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"repo": (PATH, "an absolute path"),
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"worktree": (PATH, "an absolute path"),
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"page": (PATH, "an absolute path"),
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"branch": (re.compile(r"[\w./@+-]{1,255}"), "a branch name"),
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"tree": (re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{40}|[0-9a-f]{64}"), "the hash git write-tree prints"),
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"title": (re.compile(LINE.format(200)), "one line of 1 to 200 characters"),
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"agent": (re.compile(LINE.format(200)), "one line of 1 to 200 characters"),
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"to": (re.compile(LINE.format(200)), "an agent name, one line of 1 to 200 characters"),
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"label": (re.compile(LINE.format(NAME_LIMIT)), f"one line of 1 to {NAME_LIMIT} characters"),
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"tool": (re.compile(LINE.format(200)), "one line of 1 to 200 characters"),
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"id": (re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{16}"), "an id the Agent Orchestrator returned"),
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}
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def expect(arguments: dict, names: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
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problems = [f"missing argument {name}" for name in names if name not in arguments]
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problems += [f"unknown argument {key}" for key in sorted(map(str, arguments)) if key not in names]
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if problems:
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raise ToolError("; ".join(problems))
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def field(arguments: dict, name: str) -> str:
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pattern, hint = FIELDS[name]
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value = arguments[name]
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if not isinstance(value, str) or not pattern.fullmatch(value):
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must be {hint}")
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visible({name: value})
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return value
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def visible(value: object) -> None:
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"""Args:
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value: an object of named texts, or a list of them, that reaches a
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signed payload or the approval prompt.
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Raises:
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ToolError with the reason signing.hidden_problem() gives for the
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first text holding an invisible, format, control or look-alike
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character.
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"""
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hidden = signing.hidden_problem(value, "value")
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if hidden:
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raise ToolError(hidden)
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def bounded(arguments: dict, name: str, limit: int) -> str:
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value = arguments[name]
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if not isinstance(value, str) or len(value) > limit:
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must be text of at most {limit} characters")
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return value
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def message_text(arguments: dict, name: str) -> str:
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value = bounded(arguments, name, TEXT_LIMIT)
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if not value.strip():
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must not be empty")
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return value.strip()
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def seconds(arguments: dict, name: str, cap: float) -> float:
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value = arguments[name]
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if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int | float) or not 0 <= value < math.inf:
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must be a finite number of seconds, 0 or more")
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return float(min(value, cap))
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def decode(body: bytes) -> dict:
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try:
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data = json.loads(body)
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except (ValueError, RecursionError):
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raise ToolError("body must be a JSON object") from None
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if not isinstance(data, dict):
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raise ToolError("body must be a JSON object")
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return data
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def single(query: dict[str, list[str]], name: str) -> str | None:
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values = query.get(name)
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if values is None:
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return None
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if len(values) != 1:
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must be given once")
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return values[0]
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def instant(query: dict[str, list[str]], name: str) -> float | None:
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text = single(query, name)
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if text is None or text == "":
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return None
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try:
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value = float(text)
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except ValueError:
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must be seconds since the epoch") from None
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if not 0 <= value < 1e11:
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must be seconds since the epoch")
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return value
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def whole(query: dict[str, list[str]], name: str) -> int | None:
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text = single(query, name)
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if text is None or text == "":
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return None
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if not COUNT.fullmatch(text):
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raise ToolError(f"{name} must be a whole number")
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return int(text)
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