Requirement 001 S6: the hub gets a Firewall view of the Claude Code permission and sandbox settings. The operator signs each change with the passkey; a host settings writer (systemd path unit) applies only exact, signed changes to allowlisted settings files through O_NOFOLLOW directory and file descriptors, and a timer refreshes the view. Every signed text and every page sink refuses or marks hidden characters: Cc, Cf, Zl, Zp, every space but U+0020 and the Default_Ignorable set, with U+FE0E/U+FE0F allowed only after one of the 359 non-ASCII emoji bases of Unicode 16 (shared table, validated at import, the same pair rule on the page). Removal of a deny, ask or denyRead entry is exempt only as an exact single remove. The permission hook prints the hub's refusal reason, cleaned of hidden characters. Accepted MEDUSA false positives (independent review, operator pick): 38 this round, mainly the Unicode defence tables read as attack patterns, generic MM-SCAN-058 heuristics, WEB-FLASK-004 at view.py:213 (ints from the validated table via tojson), EXF26-TOOL-004 on the non-secret WebAuthn challenge, PRIV-SCAN-060 on the office-action shape check and PQC007 on a picker key. 🎯 Fix: 95 % 💥 Break: 3 % 💸 Cost: – ⏱️ Time: – 🛡️ Security: 100 % 🏆 Score: 92 🚦 Gate: ✅ 90/5, cost and time <= 100, security 100 % Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
111 lines
5.8 KiB
JavaScript
111 lines
5.8 KiB
JavaScript
const RP_ID = "localhost";
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const ALGORITHMS = [-7, -8, -257];
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const onLocalhost = () => window.location.hostname === RP_ID;
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const localUrl = () => `http://${RP_ID}:${window.location.port}${window.location.pathname}${window.location.hash}`;
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const b64url = (buffer) => btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(buffer))).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
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const unb64url = (text) => Uint8Array.from(atob(text.replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/").padEnd(Math.ceil(text.length / 4) * 4, "=")), (char) => char.charCodeAt(0));
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const localLink = () => h("a", {href: localUrl()}, localUrl());
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const KEEPASSXC_LOCALHOST = "KeePassXC refuses passkeys on http://localhost until “Allow using localhost with passkeys” is checked in KeePassXC under Tools → Settings → Browser Integration → Advanced; the database must be unlocked. Otherwise KeePassXC-Browser reports “Passkeys request canceled.” and Chrome opens its own passkey dialog.";
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async function assertion(prepared, label) {
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if (!onLocalhost()) {
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toast(`${label}: not signed`, [`The passkey signs only under ${localUrl()}`], false);
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return null;
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}
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if (!prepared.credentials.length) {
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toast(`${label}: not signed`, ["No passkey pinned: Settings → Register passkey"], false);
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return null;
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}
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const prompt = h("div", {class: "toast wait passkey-prompt", id: "passkey-prompt", role: "status", "aria-live": "polite"}, h("strong", {}, "Passkey signs"), h("pre", {}, promptText(label, prepared)));
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document.body.append(prompt);
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try {
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const credential = await navigator.credentials.get({publicKey: {
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challenge: unb64url(prepared.challenge),
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rpId: RP_ID,
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allowCredentials: prepared.credentials.map((id) => ({type: "public-key", id: unb64url(id)})),
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userVerification: "preferred",
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timeout: 120000,
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}});
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const answer = credential.response;
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return {id: b64url(credential.rawId), clientDataJSON: b64url(answer.clientDataJSON), authenticatorData: b64url(answer.authenticatorData), signature: b64url(answer.signature)};
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} catch (error) {
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toast(`${label}: not signed`, [`${(error && error.name) || error}: KeePassXC locked or canceled; nothing was sent.`], false);
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return null;
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} finally {
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prompt.remove();
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}
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}
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let signing = false;
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async function prove(path, fields, label) {
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const result = await sendJson(path, fields);
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if (!result.ok || !result.data) {
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toast(`${label}: not possible`, fail(result), false);
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return null;
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}
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if (result.data.payload === null) {
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return {proof: null};
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}
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const signed = await assertion(result.data, label);
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return signed ? {proof: {payload: result.data.payload, assertion: signed}} : null;
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}
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async function signedProof(path, fields, label) {
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if (signing) {
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toast(`${label}: not signed`, ["Another passkey signature is still open: finish or cancel it first; nothing was sent."], false);
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return null;
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}
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signing = true;
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try {
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return await prove(path, fields, label);
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} finally {
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signing = false;
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}
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}
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function proofFor(entries, label) {
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return signedProof("/api/sign", {items: entries}, label);
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}
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async function registerPasskey(output) {
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if (!onLocalhost()) {
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output.replaceChildren(h("p", {class: "muted"}, "not registered: WebAuthn needs the domain ", localLink()));
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return;
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}
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try {
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const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({publicKey: {
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rp: {id: RP_ID, name: "Agent Orchestrator"},
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user: {id: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)), name: "operator", displayName: "Agent Orchestrator Operator"},
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challenge: crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),
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pubKeyCredParams: ALGORITHMS.map((alg) => ({type: "public-key", alg})),
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attestation: "none",
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authenticatorSelection: {residentKey: "preferred", userVerification: "preferred"},
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timeout: 120000,
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}});
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const answer = credential.response;
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const blob = b64url(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify({id: b64url(credential.rawId), attestationObject: b64url(answer.attestationObject), clientDataJSON: b64url(answer.clientDataJSON)})));
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const command = `python3 ~/.local/share/kvb-orchestrator/client/approval.py pin --port ${window.location.port} --approvers ~/.config/kvb-orchestrator/approvers.json --credential '${blob}'`;
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output.replaceChildren(
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h("p", {class: "muted"}, "Run this command in the host's terminal, outside any sandbox; only then does the passkey apply. The hub never pins by itself."),
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h("div", {class: "command"}, h("code", {}, command), copyButton(command)),
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h("label", {}, "Credential", h("textarea", {class: "field", readonly: true, rows: 3}, blob)));
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} catch (error) {
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output.replaceChildren(h("p", {class: "muted"}, `not registered: ${(error && error.name) || error}`), h("p", {class: "muted"}, KEEPASSXC_LOCALHOST));
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}
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}
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function passkeySection() {
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const output = h("div", {class: "mini", "aria-live": "polite"});
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const keys = state.approvers.length
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? h("ul", {class: "mini"}, state.approvers.map((key) => h("li", {}, pill(key.alg, "ok"), " ", h("code", {title: key.id}, `${key.id.slice(0, 16)}…`))))
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: h("p", {class: "muted"}, "No passkey pinned: runner, hook and commit skills refuse every grant.");
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return h("section", {}, h("h3", {}, "Passkey"),
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h("p", {class: "muted"}, "A passkey in KeePassXC signs grants of asks, reviews and operator commands; runner, hook and commit skills check the signature themselves against the pinned keys."),
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keys,
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h("p", {class: "muted"}, KEEPASSXC_LOCALHOST),
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onLocalhost() ? null : h("p", {class: "muted"}, "WebAuthn needs the domain: ", localLink()),
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h("div", {}, btn("Register passkey", "btn small soft", () => registerPasskey(output))),
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output);
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}
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