The kvb-hub is a local review hub in a container bound to 127.0.0.1: one page, JSON APIs and an MCP endpoint for the operator's inbox, asks, decisions, staged-commit reviews, the radio stream, the agent graph, the worktree tree, push-to-talk and read-aloud radio (Piper, whisper.cpp) and an optional LLM command line. The hub is only a relay. The host executors in hub/client (the runner user service, the PermissionRequest hook and the approval CLI the commit skills call) verify a WebAuthn passkey signature against keys pinned outside every sandbox, refuse replays and fail closed. scripts/hub.sh with make hub-install, hub-check, hub-pin, hub-runner and hub-hook installs and checks the hub; hub-hook writes ~/.claude/settings.json after a backup. make watch-check shows a stuck watch hook. The new kvb-git-diff skill and the commit skills route reviews through the hub; the test_hub_* suites replace test_hub.py. Security review (kvb-think-criticize, three skeptics) fixed four holes: signed rules auto-approved chained shell commands; the client and LLM openers followed redirects, the LLM one with its bearer key; the worktree scan ran git fsmonitor and filter commands from agent-writable repos; compose set no memory, pids or health limits. Documented until core requirement 093, on the operator's word: the hub page is trusted while signing and pinning, local processes can forge the unsigned operator actions, and the container reads the host /tmp. Committed on the operator's word despite the gate: the passkey path is not yet verified live. Accepted MEDUSA false positives (137 findings on 115 lines, rows in security-accepted.jsonl): EXA002 x17, MEDUSA-MM-SCAN-058 x12, B603 x8, MEDUSA-FTSC-SCAN-089 x7, MEDUSA-PRIV-SCAN-762 x6, AIC-EXFIL-005 x5, EXA006 x5, MEDUSA-FTSCAN-231 x5, WEB-SSRF x5, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2057 x3, RH005 x3, TC001 x3, LO002 x2, MEDUSA-AEXP-SCAN-096 x2, MEDUSA-CGS-SCAN-028 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-1350 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2369 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2440 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2638 x2, MLSC-SERIAL-002 x2, PL002 x2, PQC005 x2, SAST-PATH-001 x2, TC004 x2, TC005 x2, TC006 x2, TC007 x2, AA-146, EXA007, FINE-050, GB-ENCODE-001, GB-ENCODE-003, MEDUSA-CGS-SCAN-029, MEDUSA-CGS-SCAN-103, MEDUSA-DP-SCAN-1034, MEDUSA-DP-SCAN-1916, MEDUSA-DP-SCAN-954, MEDUSA-EXF26-TOOL-004, MEDUSA-FT-TRIGGER-005, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2206, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2457, MEDUSA-INF-WEB-003, MEDUSA-INFRA-SCAN-030, MEDUSA-MP-SCAN-1135, MEDUSA-RLHF-POISON-002, MEDUSA-RT-SCAN-006, MM-ENCODE-001, MP-124, PQC001, PQC002, PQC006, RP001, TC009, TC010, WEB-FLASK-004. 🎯 Fix: 80 % 💥 Break: 4 % 💸 Cost: 129 % ⏱️ Time: – 🛡️ Security: 100 % 💰 Value: ? 🏆 Score: 60 🚦 Gate: ⛔ fix 80 % < 90; cost 129 % > 100: ask the operator before the commit ``` /home/kevinveenbirkenbach/Repositories/github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/skills/.worktrees/feature/kvb-hub ``` Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
143 lines
5.9 KiB
Python
143 lines
5.9 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import base64
|
|
import fnmatch
|
|
import hashlib
|
|
import json
|
|
import re
|
|
from pathlib import Path
|
|
|
|
RP_ID = "localhost"
|
|
VERSION = 1
|
|
LIFETIME = 900
|
|
RULE_LIFETIME = 366 * 86400
|
|
ALGORITHMS = {-7: "ES256", -8: "EdDSA", -257: "RS256"}
|
|
HASH = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{64}")
|
|
NONCE = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{32}")
|
|
ID = re.compile(r"[0-9a-f]{16}")
|
|
CHAINED = re.compile(r"[;&|`$<>()\n\r]")
|
|
APPROVAL_KEYS = {"v", "kind", "items", "nonce", "expires"}
|
|
RULE_KEYS = {"v", "kind", "id", "kinds", "tool", "pattern", "scope", "expires"}
|
|
WARNINGS = (
|
|
("löscht rekursiv", re.compile(r"\brm\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*-\S*[rR]")),
|
|
("erzwingt", re.compile(r"--force\b|\bpush\b.*\s-f\b")),
|
|
("pusht", re.compile(r"\bgit\b.*\bpush\b")),
|
|
("root", re.compile(r"\bsudo\b|\bdoas\b")),
|
|
("Pipe in eine Shell", re.compile(r"\|\s*(?:sudo\s+)?(?:ba|z|k|da)?sh\b")),
|
|
("verwirft Änderungen", re.compile(r"\bgit\b.*\b(?:reset\s+--hard|clean\s+-\S*f)")),
|
|
("Docker löscht", re.compile(r"\bdocker\s+(?:system\s+prune|volume\s+(?:rm|prune)|rmi?\b)")),
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
class Refused(Exception):
|
|
pass
|
|
|
|
|
|
def origin_of(port: int) -> str:
|
|
return f"http://{RP_ID}:{port}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def b64encode(data: bytes) -> str:
|
|
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def canonical(value: object) -> bytes:
|
|
return json.dumps(value, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), ensure_ascii=True, allow_nan=False).encode("ascii")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def challenge(payload: dict) -> str:
|
|
return b64encode(hashlib.sha256(canonical(payload)).digest())
|
|
|
|
|
|
def item_hash(item: dict) -> str:
|
|
return hashlib.sha256(canonical(item)).hexdigest()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ask_item(ask_id: str, tool: str, command: str, cwd: str, session: str) -> dict:
|
|
return {"kind": "ask", "id": ask_id, "tool": tool, "command": command, "cwd": cwd, "session": session}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def review_item(review_id: str, repo: str, worktree: str, branch: str, tree: str) -> dict:
|
|
return {"kind": "review", "id": review_id, "repo": repo, "worktree": worktree, "branch": branch, "tree": tree}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def operator_item(task: str, command: str, directory: str) -> dict:
|
|
return {"kind": "operator", "id": task, "command": command, "directory": directory}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def approval_payload(hashes: list[str], nonce: str, expires: int) -> dict:
|
|
return {"v": VERSION, "kind": "approve", "items": sorted(set(hashes)), "nonce": nonce, "expires": expires}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def rule_payload(rule_id: str, kinds: list[str], tool: str, pattern: str, scope: str, expires: int) -> dict:
|
|
return {"v": VERSION, "kind": "rule", "id": rule_id, "kinds": kinds, "tool": tool, "pattern": pattern, "scope": scope, "expires": expires}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def warnings(command: str) -> list[str]:
|
|
return [label for label, pattern in WARNINGS if pattern.search(command)]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def expiry(value: object, now: float, cap: int) -> int:
|
|
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
|
|
raise Refused("the expiry is no whole number of epoch seconds")
|
|
if value <= now:
|
|
raise Refused("the signature has expired")
|
|
if value > now + cap:
|
|
raise Refused("the expiry lies too far ahead")
|
|
return value
|
|
|
|
|
|
def checked_approval(payload: object, now: float) -> dict:
|
|
if not isinstance(payload, dict) or set(payload) != APPROVAL_KEYS or payload["v"] != VERSION or payload["kind"] != "approve":
|
|
raise Refused("the payload is no approval")
|
|
items = payload["items"]
|
|
if not isinstance(items, list) or not items or not all(isinstance(entry, str) and HASH.fullmatch(entry) for entry in items):
|
|
raise Refused("the approval lists no item hashes")
|
|
if not isinstance(payload["nonce"], str) or not NONCE.fullmatch(payload["nonce"]):
|
|
raise Refused("the approval holds no nonce")
|
|
expiry(payload["expires"], now, LIFETIME)
|
|
return payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
def checked_rule(payload: object, now: float) -> dict:
|
|
if not isinstance(payload, dict) or set(payload) != RULE_KEYS or payload["v"] != VERSION or payload["kind"] != "rule":
|
|
raise Refused("the payload is no rule")
|
|
if not isinstance(payload["id"], str) or not ID.fullmatch(payload["id"]):
|
|
raise Refused("the rule holds no id")
|
|
kinds = payload["kinds"]
|
|
if not isinstance(kinds, list) or not kinds or not all(isinstance(kind, str) for kind in kinds):
|
|
raise Refused("the rule names no kinds")
|
|
if not isinstance(payload["tool"], str) or not all(isinstance(payload[name], str) and payload[name] for name in ("pattern", "scope")):
|
|
raise Refused("the rule needs a tool text, a pattern and a scope")
|
|
expiry(payload["expires"], now, RULE_LIFETIME)
|
|
return payload
|
|
|
|
|
|
def rule_allows(rule: dict, item: dict, gate: str, now: float) -> bool:
|
|
if rule["expires"] <= now or item["kind"] not in rule["kinds"]:
|
|
return False
|
|
if item["kind"] == "ask":
|
|
named = fnmatch.fnmatchcase(item["tool"], rule["tool"]) and fnmatch.fnmatchcase(item["cwd"], rule["scope"])
|
|
plain = not CHAINED.search(item["command"]) and not warnings(item["command"])
|
|
return named and plain and fnmatch.fnmatchcase(item["command"], rule["pattern"])
|
|
if item["kind"] == "review":
|
|
return gate == "pass" and fnmatch.fnmatchcase(item["branch"], rule["pattern"]) and fnmatch.fnmatchcase(item["worktree"], rule["scope"])
|
|
return False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def load_pinned(path: Path) -> list[dict]:
|
|
try:
|
|
mode = path.stat().st_mode
|
|
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
return []
|
|
except (OSError, ValueError, RecursionError) as error:
|
|
raise Refused(f"the pinned keys in {path} are unreadable") from error
|
|
if mode & 0o022:
|
|
raise Refused(f"{path} is writable by others")
|
|
entries = data.get("credentials") if isinstance(data, dict) else None
|
|
shaped = isinstance(entries, list) and all(isinstance(entry, dict) and isinstance(entry.get("id"), str) and entry.get("alg") in ALGORITHMS and isinstance(entry.get("spki"), str) for entry in entries)
|
|
if not shaped:
|
|
raise Refused(f"the pinned keys in {path} are malformed")
|
|
return entries
|