The kvb-hub is a local review hub in a container bound to 127.0.0.1: one page, JSON APIs and an MCP endpoint for the operator's inbox, asks, decisions, staged-commit reviews, the radio stream, the agent graph, the worktree tree, push-to-talk and read-aloud radio (Piper, whisper.cpp) and an optional LLM command line. The hub is only a relay. The host executors in hub/client (the runner user service, the PermissionRequest hook and the approval CLI the commit skills call) verify a WebAuthn passkey signature against keys pinned outside every sandbox, refuse replays and fail closed. scripts/hub.sh with make hub-install, hub-check, hub-pin, hub-runner and hub-hook installs and checks the hub; hub-hook writes ~/.claude/settings.json after a backup. make watch-check shows a stuck watch hook. The new kvb-git-diff skill and the commit skills route reviews through the hub; the test_hub_* suites replace test_hub.py. Security review (kvb-think-criticize, three skeptics) fixed four holes: signed rules auto-approved chained shell commands; the client and LLM openers followed redirects, the LLM one with its bearer key; the worktree scan ran git fsmonitor and filter commands from agent-writable repos; compose set no memory, pids or health limits. Documented until core requirement 093, on the operator's word: the hub page is trusted while signing and pinning, local processes can forge the unsigned operator actions, and the container reads the host /tmp. Committed on the operator's word despite the gate: the passkey path is not yet verified live. Accepted MEDUSA false positives (137 findings on 115 lines, rows in security-accepted.jsonl): EXA002 x17, MEDUSA-MM-SCAN-058 x12, B603 x8, MEDUSA-FTSC-SCAN-089 x7, MEDUSA-PRIV-SCAN-762 x6, AIC-EXFIL-005 x5, EXA006 x5, MEDUSA-FTSCAN-231 x5, WEB-SSRF x5, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2057 x3, RH005 x3, TC001 x3, LO002 x2, MEDUSA-AEXP-SCAN-096 x2, MEDUSA-CGS-SCAN-028 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-1350 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2369 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2440 x2, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2638 x2, MLSC-SERIAL-002 x2, PL002 x2, PQC005 x2, SAST-PATH-001 x2, TC004 x2, TC005 x2, TC006 x2, TC007 x2, AA-146, EXA007, FINE-050, GB-ENCODE-001, GB-ENCODE-003, MEDUSA-CGS-SCAN-029, MEDUSA-CGS-SCAN-103, MEDUSA-DP-SCAN-1034, MEDUSA-DP-SCAN-1916, MEDUSA-DP-SCAN-954, MEDUSA-EXF26-TOOL-004, MEDUSA-FT-TRIGGER-005, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2206, MEDUSA-INF-SCAN-2457, MEDUSA-INF-WEB-003, MEDUSA-INFRA-SCAN-030, MEDUSA-MP-SCAN-1135, MEDUSA-RLHF-POISON-002, MEDUSA-RT-SCAN-006, MM-ENCODE-001, MP-124, PQC001, PQC002, PQC006, RP001, TC009, TC010, WEB-FLASK-004. 🎯 Fix: 80 % 💥 Break: 4 % 💸 Cost: 129 % ⏱️ Time: – 🛡️ Security: 100 % 💰 Value: ? 🏆 Score: 60 🚦 Gate: ⛔ fix 80 % < 90; cost 129 % > 100: ask the operator before the commit ``` /home/kevinveenbirkenbach/Repositories/github.com/kevinveenbirkenbach/skills/.worktrees/feature/kvb-hub ``` Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
125 lines
5.1 KiB
Python
125 lines
5.1 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import datetime
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import fcntl
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import json
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import os
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import tempfile
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import NamedTuple
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from passkey import verify_assertion
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from signing import (
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Refused,
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checked_approval,
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checked_rule,
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item_hash,
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load_pinned,
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rule_allows,
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)
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class Trust(NamedTuple):
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approvers: Path
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replay: Path
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origin: str
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def pinned(path: Path) -> list[dict]:
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entries = load_pinned(path)
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if not entries:
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raise Refused("no key is pinned")
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return entries
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def write_private(path: Path, data: dict) -> None:
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path.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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descriptor, name = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=path.parent, prefix=f".{path.name}-")
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try:
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with os.fdopen(descriptor, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
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json.dump(data, handle, indent=1, sort_keys=True)
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handle.flush()
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os.fsync(handle.fileno())
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os.replace(name, path)
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except OSError:
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Path(name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
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raise
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def pin(path: Path, entry: dict, now: float) -> list[dict]:
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stamp = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(now, datetime.UTC).isoformat(timespec="seconds")
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entries = [old for old in load_pinned(path) if old["id"] != entry["id"]] + [{**entry, "pinned": stamp}]
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write_private(path, {"credentials": entries})
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return entries
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def read_store(store: Path) -> dict:
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try:
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data = json.loads(store.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
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except FileNotFoundError:
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return {"used": {}, "counts": {}}
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except (OSError, ValueError, RecursionError) as error:
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raise Refused(f"the replay store {store} is unreadable") from error
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counts = data.get("counts") if isinstance(data, dict) else None
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shaped = isinstance(counts, dict) and all(isinstance(last, dict) and isinstance(last.get("count"), int) and isinstance(last.get("nonce"), str) for last in counts.values())
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if not shaped or not isinstance(data.get("used"), dict):
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raise Refused(f"the replay store {store} is malformed")
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return data
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def consume(store: Path, key: str, expires: int, credential: str, count: int, nonce: str, now: float) -> None:
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"""Args:
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store: the executor's own replay store, outside the hub's reach.
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key: the one-time id, nonce and item hash.
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expires: until when the id must stay known.
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credential: the id of the key that signed.
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count: its signature counter; 0 when the authenticator keeps none.
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nonce: the payload nonce; one bulk signature carries one counter.
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now: the current time in epoch seconds.
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"""
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store.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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descriptor = os.open(store.with_name(f"{store.name}.lock"), os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT, 0o600)
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try:
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fcntl.flock(descriptor, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
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state = read_store(store)
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used = {name: until for name, until in state["used"].items() if isinstance(until, int | float) and until > now}
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if key in used:
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raise Refused("this signature was already used for this item")
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last = state["counts"].get(credential)
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if last is not None and not (count > last["count"] or (count == last["count"] and (count == 0 or nonce == last["nonce"]))):
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raise Refused("the signature counter did not grow: a cloned authenticator or a replay")
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write_private(store, {"used": {**used, key: expires}, "counts": {**state["counts"], credential: {"count": count, "nonce": nonce}}})
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finally:
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os.close(descriptor)
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def check(proof: object, item: dict, gate: str, trust: Trust, now: float) -> None:
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"""Args:
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proof: {"payload", "assertion"} the kvb-hub relayed for the item.
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item: the executor's own item, built from what it is about to do.
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gate: pass or fail as the executor itself saw it; a rule approves a
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review on pass only.
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trust: the pinned keys, the executor's replay store and the origin.
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now: the current time in epoch seconds.
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Raises:
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Refused with the reason, unless a pinned key signed an unexpired
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approval that lists the item and is used here for the first time, or
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an unexpired rule whose pattern the item matches.
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"""
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if not isinstance(proof, dict) or set(proof) != {"payload", "assertion"}:
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raise Refused("no signature")
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payload = proof["payload"]
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if isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("kind") == "rule":
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checked_rule(payload, now)
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verify_assertion(proof["assertion"], payload, pinned(trust.approvers), trust.origin)
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if not rule_allows(payload, item, gate, now):
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raise Refused("the signed rule does not match this item")
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return
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checked_approval(payload, now)
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count = verify_assertion(proof["assertion"], payload, pinned(trust.approvers), trust.origin)
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digest = item_hash(item)
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if digest not in payload["items"]:
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raise Refused("the signature does not list this item")
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consume(trust.replay, f"{payload['nonce']}:{digest}", payload["expires"], proof["assertion"]["id"], count, payload["nonce"], now)
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