Opt-in via LIM_E2E_QEMU=1. Models the whole process on a virtio VM (the
Pi's USB-gadget net can't be emulated, so it models the software stack,
not the board): builds a LUKS image carrying the real lim initcpio Tor
artifacts, boots it in QEMU rootless, lets the real netconf/tor/dropbear/
encryptssh chain publish the onion, delivers the passphrase over Tor, and
asserts the boot-ok marker on the serial console. Supports a private
offline Tor network via chutney.
The pure command builders (config.qemu_argv/kernel_cmdline/ssh_argv,
qemu_binary), the env parser, and drift guards that keep build_image.sh
aligned with the harness run in the normal suite — no QEMU/root/network.
The build stage needs root; harness.py primes sudo up front, keeps the
credential warm, and reclaims work-dir ownership on every exit path so
the pytest tmp cleanup never trips on root-owned files. QEMU stderr is
captured so an early exit is debuggable, and each teardown step is
fault-isolated so none masks the real error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opt-in via LIM_E2E_TOR=1. Generates the v3 onion keys offline exactly as
the image build does, stands up a real Tor onion service from a torrc
mirroring the baked-in one, and delivers a passphrase through Tor to a
dropbear stand-in — asserting it arrives and the endpoint "unlocks".
Needs the real tor binary and network, so it is skipped otherwise; the
offline keygen and production-flag guard run without network.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Encrypted image setups can now bake a Tor onion service into the initramfs
so the dropbear unlock shell stays reachable behind NAT or a dynamic IP.
When the user opts in, configure_encryption installs tor + busybox, drops
the mkinitcpio hooks (ordered `netconf tor dropbear encryptssh`), generates
the v3 onion keys offline in the image chroot, and prints the stable
.onion address. Unlock with `torsocks ssh root@<onion-address>`.
The runtime hook syncs the clock via NTP first (RTC-less boards boot at
1970, which Tor's consensus checks reject) and starts the onion service
pointing at dropbear on 127.0.0.1:22.
Hardening baked in from an adversarial review of the shipped path:
- cmdline.txt boot path (RPi4-class firmware boot) now sets the same
ip=::::<host>:eth0:dhcp net.ifnames=0 params as the boot.txt path, so
the initramfs actually gets a network and the onion can publish.
- the initramfs bakes in libnss_dns.so.2 so the NTP hostname resolves.
- the hook extracts DHCP DNS with sed instead of sourcing the lease files,
which would run attacker-controlled DHCP option strings as root pre-boot.
- NTP is attempted unconditionally (bounded), not gated on DHCP-provided DNS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"lim" is taken on PyPI (a GLMM genomics package); linux-image-manager
is free and matches the repo name. Import package and CLI alias stay
"lim". MIRRORS follows the hetzner-arch-luks schema.
Bash scripts were untestable and duplicated device/LUKS/mount logic;
the lim/ package centralizes it behind one subprocess wrapper and a
YAML image catalog (single point of truth).
BREAKING CHANGE: scripts/*.sh removed. Use `lim --type <cmd>`; new
types mount/umount/single-boot/raid1-boot/lock/unlock/import/export
replace direct script calls. --extra is deprecated and ignored.
- distributions.yml + lim/catalog.py hold the image catalog (PyYAML)
- pytest suite: 102 tests with mocked subprocess (tests/unit) and a
250-line max file-length guard (tests/lint)
- ruff strict (select ALL), GitHub Actions CI, Dependabot; Travis gone
- Makefile: install (symlink ~/.local/bin/lim) and test targets
- fixes over bash: SUDO_USER-aware chown, mmcblk/nvme partition paths,
sha512 checksum support, whole-pipeline failure detection, blkid
UUID fallback for pre-mounted images, conditional fstab seeding for
PARTUUID/LABEL images, clean errors for missing binaries
